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In this dissertation I seek to explain how and why multinational corporations (MNCs) can 
organize for corporate social responsibility (CSR) and fight corruption in a complex global 
business environment. In particular, I explore the collective and dynamic patterns of imple-
menting and creating meaning of CSR and anti-corruption processes in a heterogeneous 
global context involving multiple actors, expectations and interpretive schemes. In doing so, 
this work not only follows the recent call of organization scholars for more ‘problem-driven’ 
research (Davis & Marquis, 2005) but also acknowledges that “nothing is so practical as a 
good theory” (Van de Ven, 1989, p. 486) by advancing conceptual ideas on solutions for real-
life problems. Throughout this dissertation, I will identify the need to regard the exact path 
and goals envisioned by central actors in this global socio-environmental context as not al-
ways fully determined from the beginning, but as being continuously developed and reconfig-
ured over time through interactions and collaborations among the actors involved. Put differ-
ently, the journey itself of multiple actors with multiple interests collectively addressing so-
cio-environmental issues becomes the destination. In the following I will briefly outline the 
general problem this dissertation addresses, before introducing the key theoretical concepts I 
aim to advance. 
Problem. In the process of globalization, business firms have extended their opera-
tions across national borders, sourcing and selling goods and services with a global perspec-
tive (Beck & Camiller, 2000; Scherer & Palazzo, 2008). With the broadening of global ex-
change, the causes and effects of socio-environmental problems, such as corruption, human 
rights violations and global warming have also expanded transnationally. In today’s global-
ized economy, the regulatory power of single states to address transnational social and envi-
ronmental challenges is declining and has shifted to multiple actors including business firms 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Kobrin, 2001; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; 
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Scherer, Palazzo, & Baumann, 2006). Particularly, various societal actors increasingly expect 
businesses to take on responsibilities for global socio-environmental problems (Campbell, 
2007; Crane & Matten, 2004). Definitions of corporate social responsibility are manifold and 
controversially discussed among scholars (see e.g. Campbell, 2007; Carroll, 1979). I refer to 
CSR in this global context underlying my dissertation as a corporation’s role to address trans-
national socio-environmental problems in spheres like protecting human rights, labor stan-
dards and the natural environment or fighting corruption (Matten & Crane, 2005; Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2007). While the first essay of this dissertation looks at CSR as a whole, the other 
two essays focus on corruption, which is defined as the “misuse of an organizational position 
or authority for personal gain or organizational (or sub-unit) gain” (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 
2004, p. 40). 
Extant literature on CSR and anti-corruption (see e.g. Ashforth, Gioia, Robinson, & Treviño, 
2008) seems to neglect that with the transnational expansion of business in the process of 
globalization, many corporations now operate in heterogeneous environments and are thus 
exposed to multiple and sometimes conflicting demands (Pache & Santos, 2010). On the one 
hand, MNCs face pressures toward a standardization of rules and processes as demanded by 
transnational regulations (e.g. US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)) and a variety of 
international institutions (e.g. International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI)) (Gilbert, Rasche, & Waddock, 2011; Waddock, 2008). On the 
other hand, MNCs operate in a diversity of local contexts whose distinct regulative and cul-
tural influences interfere with global standardization trends (Pache & Santos, 2010; Scherer, 
Palazzo, & Seidl, 2013). As I will outline in essays two and three, MNCs from Western de-
veloped countries face pressures especially from Western regulators and standard setters to 
globally apply strict anti-corruption measures, yet operate in host countries where there is a 
strong demand for engagement in corrupt practices and only weak or no enforcement of anti-
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corruption sanctions (Quah, 2007; TI, 2012). The world’s most comprehensive and popular 
index on perceived corruption across the world, annually released by the international NGO 
Transparency International (TI), best illustrates the heterogeneous corruption demands MNCs 
face. In this map, the darker a country is colored, the higher is the perceived level of corrup-
tion in the public sector in this country.  
 
Source: Corruption Perception Index 2013
1
, Transparency International 
Theory. To develop explanations for how and why MNCs can organize for CSR and 
fight corruption in such a heterogeneous environment, this dissertation mainly builds on and 
contributes to institutional theoretic perspectives applied in the CSR or corruption literatures. 
Institutional theory proves helpful for this dissertation as it has a strong and recent focus on 
complexity in an organization’s environment (e.g. Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, 
& Lounsbury, 2011; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Scherer et al., 2013), providing a wide range of 
                                                
1
The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is a composite indicator of perceived corruption in the public sector in 
different countries around the world. It aggregates corruption-related data from 13 different independent and 
well known institutions such as the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Economist Intelligence 
Unit and others. According to a recent independent assessment, the CPI may be more reliable than each of its 
sources taken separately (Saisana & Saltelli, 2012). 
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perspectives on how organizations can respond to contradictory demands and manage trade-
offs imposed by various actors. In the context of complex environments involving multiple 
actors and contradictory interests, maintaining organizational legitimacy becomes a key chal-
lenge and concern for MNCs. Legitimacy can be defined as the social acceptance of organiza-
tions and their activities, which is based on a “generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Legiti-
macy constitutes a precondition for the existence and survival of organizations, considering 
that the access to resources and the support by important constituents may be severely threat-
ened or even withheld in case of a lack of legitimacy (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). Institutional 
theorists therefore regard the quest for legitimacy as a key driver for organizations to respond 
to demands in their environment (Greenwood et al., 2011; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), and con-
sequently discussed various strategies of managing legitimacy to deal with conflicting de-
mands (Oliver, 1991; Scherer et al., 2013), which I will outline further down. 
While research on maintaining legitimacy in complex environments is comprehensive, it re-
mains so far largely unaddressed how organizations can regain legitimacy, e.g. after a severe 
transgression, in such complex environments. Insights on this matter are provided in the sec-
ond paper and appear crucial considering that (1) increasing enforcement of Western transna-
tional anti-corruption law has triggered a recent wave of corruption scandals across a wide 
range of Western MNCs (Gebhardt & Müller-Seitz, 2011; GibsonDunn, 2013), and (2) previ-
ous studies acknowledge that corporate transgressions, crises and routine failures lead to con-
cerns about the organization’s legitimacy (see Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Scherer et al., 2013). 
Moreover, to maintain legitimacy when faced with contradictory demands, institutional theory 
literature has for a long time suggested an organizational response referred to as ‘decoupling’, 
i.e. the creation of a gap between formal policies and actual organizational practices (Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977). However, scholars recently observed a global trend toward accountability 
 9 
and transparency as well as increasing regulatory pressure (Bromley & Powell, 2012), as evi-
dent for example in increasing enforcement of anti-corruption regulation (GibsonDunn, 
2013). As a result, organizations are pushed to align their policies and practices more closely, 
making ‘decoupling’ (of policies and practices) increasingly difficult and less common 
(Bromley & Powell, 2012; Coburn, 2004). At the same time, global business firms are more 
and more expected to help solving complex transnational societal problems (Brunsson, 1989), 
as they are increasingly regarded as corporate citizens endowed with interests and ‘actorhood’ 
(Bromley & Powell, 2012). In this context, scholars recently discussed whether remedying 
decoupling of policies and practices is an appropriate means to achieve envisaged societal 
ends (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Wijen, 2014). Referring to the causal complexity and opaque 
relationship between organizational practices and global socio-environmental ends, Wijen 
(2014) has even suggested a trade-off between strict compliance with formal policies as a 
means to achieve intended ends. In paper three, I outline why previous perspectives on de-
coupling may obscure a more comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon by not al-
ways fully acknowledging the role of dynamics, multiple geographic spaces, and challenges 
in clearly observing and defining notions such as ‘compliance’ with practices and the 
‘achievement’ of societal goals. 
This dissertation addresses these limitations and adds to the decoupling literature by focusing 
on a multi-spatial geographic context and treating decoupling as a purely dynamic phenome-
non. In addition, paper three presents a social-constructionist perspective on decoupling by 
examining the role of communication and meaning creation (see e.g. Berger & Luckmann, 
1967; Weick, 1995) among central actors in the anti-corruption field. Such an approach ac-
knowledges that policies, practices and outcomes are not always objectively observable and 
clearly definable as suggested in objectivist views on decoupling. 
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Even more, this dissertation not only examines developments at single organizations, as done 
in the second paper, but in papers one and three also scrutinizes efforts of multiple actors to 
collectively solve global societal problems. Over the last decade, transnational governance 
schemes have emerged as a widespread phenomenon offering businesses means of addressing 
global societal issues together with governmental and non-governmental actors (Christmann 
& Taylor, 2006; Rasche, Waddock, & McIntosh, 2013; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). The volun-
tary global CSR initiative United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) is the largest and argua-
bly most prominent transnational governance schemes. While it has received intense aca-
demic attention, scholars often appear to be divided into two camps with regard to the legiti-
macy and accomplishments of such initiatives (see e.g. Berliner & Prakash, 2014; Rasche, 
2009; Voegtlin & Pless, 2014). Proponents argue that knowledge exchange and stakeholder 
interactions can support good policy-making and business practice in weakly or non-regulated 
issue areas (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Scherer et al., 2006) and thereby contribute to 
the emergence of new global institutions (Maguire & Hardy, 2006). Critics, however, high-
light the lack of stringent enforcement mechanisms and state that “the UNGC has failed to 
induce its signatory companies to enhance their CSR efforts and integrate the 10 principles in 
their policies and operations” (Sethi & Schepers, 2014, p. 193) (see also Berliner & Prakash, 
2014; Deva, 2006; Hemphill, 2005). Considering that a lack of impact would threaten the 
legitimacy of such initiatives and their participants alike, the first essay of this dissertation 
provides crucial empirical evidence based on a novel and theoretically informed assessment 
measure that helps shed light into this controversial debate. In the third essay I will then focus 
on the role of corporate actors in promoting collective efforts in the fight against corruption. 
In this dissertation, I scrutinize and theorize ways of socio-environmental governance in a 
complex global context. All three papers address research questions that share one central 
matter: How and why can multinational corporations organize for CSR and fight corruption 
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despite the heterogeneous and sometimes contradictory institutional expectations they face in 
multiple institutional environments? 
The conclusion, which I will discuss in length further down, is that the exact path and goals 
envisioned by central actors in this process of global socio-environmental governance are not 
fully determined from the beginning, but are shaped and reconfigured over time through in-
teractions and collaborations of corporate actors, state institutions and NGOs among others. 
Not only is the UNGC continuously adjusting its accountability structure and guidance for 
implementing its ten principles, also corporate actors change and reconfigure their CSR and 
anti-corruption processes and strategies as a result of close interaction and coordination with 
relevant actors in the field of socio-environmental governance. In other words, alluring to the 
title of this dissertation, the collective journey of different actors seems to be the destination in 
the context of global socio-environmental governance. I will discuss the two central aspects of 
this conclusion – (1) the role of progress and dynamics over time and (2) the role of collec-
tively working toward the achievement of societal goals which are often re(de)fined along the 
way – in detail further down. 
Confidence in the overall conclusions of this dissertation is bolstered by the fact that findings 
are derived from multiple approaches and levels of analysis, ranging from qualitative analyses 
on the micro and meso level to a comprehensive set of quantitative analyses on the meso and 
macro level. Qualitative and quantitative approaches have complementary strengths as the 
former allow for more exploratory, in-depth and dynamic insights while the latter allow for 
greater generalizability of the focal research and the testing of existing theory (see e.g. 
Corley, 2012; Eisenhardt, 1989). I consequently develop and test in my quantitative analysis 
hypotheses built around theoretical arguments stemming from a long established yet contro-
versial debate on CSR implementation progresses and collaborations of participants in volun-
tary transnational initiatives. The qualitative analyses in this dissertation then focus on very 
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recent phenomena that have not yet received sufficient theoretical explanations and thus de-
mand for exploratory analyses aimed at developing theory. Further, this dissertation was not 
created in isolation; through more than 40 in-depth interviews across Europe and the Asia-
Pacific and several presentations at leading international conferences propositions and conclu-
sions have been discussed among academics and practitioners alike. In the remainder of this 
introduction, I first summarize each of the three essays. I then outline the central contributions 
of this dissertation as a whole before delineating avenues for future research. 
SUMMARY OF THE THREE PAPERS 
In the first paper, which is single-authored, I am interested in the implementation of CSR on a 
quantitative basis looking at the case of the UNGC. This research is mainly driven by the ur-
gent need for empirical insights on the impact of transnational socio-environmental govern-
ance schemes (see e.g. calls by Berliner & Prakash, 2014). The UNGC encourages partici-
pants to commit to ten universal principles in the areas of human rights, labor standards, the 
environment and anti-corruption and, above all, aims to serve as a long-term CSR learning 
platform (Kell & Levin, 2003; Palazzo & Scherer, 2010; Rasche, 2009). Scholars have long 
criticized this initiative’s lack of accountability mechanisms, suggesting that it fails to have 
any impact on organizational practices and instead invites participants to ‘bluewash’ their 
image by associating themselves with the (blue) UN flag (Knudsen, 2011, p. 334). Contrary to 
the ‘bluewashing’ arguments of UNGC critics, my results show that the initiative’s learning 
and network structure has an impact on organizational practices even in the absence of strict 
and upfront accountability mechanisms: the duration of participation in the UNGC has a posi-
tive effect on the level of CSR implementation. This positive effect holds when looking at 
different time-period subsamples, for example by excluding companies that have joined the 
initiative in the first year as these might have been predominantly industry leaders (see 
Mwangi, Rieth, & Schmitz, 2013). Restricting the analysis on the period since the 2003 and 
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2005 refinements of the UNGC accountability structure, the first introducing an annual 
‘communication on progress’ reporting policy and the latter introducing ‘company delistings’ 
(Mwangi et al., 2013), even displays considerably bigger participation duration effects. 
Moreover, the presence of strong local UNGC networks positively affects implementation, 
although its hypothesized mediating role between UNGC participation length and UNGC 
implementation level is very small. However, I found a significant positive relation between 
UNGC participation and the two largest strong local UNGC networks, Spain and France, con-
tributing to recent arguments on the necessity for global CSR initiatives of achieving a ‘criti-
cal mass’ of participants to generate outcomes (Barkemeyer & Napolitano, 2009; Haack, 
Schoeneborn, & Wickert, 2012). 
My findings on the UNGC participation duration and local network effect are supported by all 
types of analytical models applied in this paper ranging from ordered probit and ordered logit 
models that closely account for the ordinal character of the dependent variable (UNGC im-
plementation level: learner, active, advanced) to linear regression analyses that treat the de-
pendent variable as it was scaled continuously. Last but not least, I controlled for the possibil-
ity that these models may not fully take into account selection effects. Such effects are present 
if firms that participate longer in the UNGC have independent tendencies toward different 
characteristics in their social performance than firms that participate shorter or not at all (see 
Berliner & Prakash, 2014). To control for this potential selection effect, i.e. endogeneity of 
‘UNGC participation duration’, I included an instrumental variable
2
 in a set of further analyti-
cal models. I thereby isolated the exogenous component of UNGC participation duration, 
which yielded even bigger positive effects of UNGC participation duration on the level of 
UNGC implementation. 
                                                
2
Building on theoretical arguments from institutional theory that firms tend to mirror the behavior of salient peer 
groups such as firms in the same industrial sector (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), I chose the average duration of 
participation per sector of firms that have already left the UNGC. Looking only at former UNGC participants 
ensures that the instrumental variable pertains only to the actions of firms other than the reference firm. 
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I further outline how the UNGC has continuously refined its accountability structure and re-
cently introduced a ‘Differentiation Programme’ to distinguish between UNGC implementa-
tion at three levels. At the lowest level of implementation (‘Learner’) participants do not ad-
dress all of the four UNCG issue areas human rights, labor, environment and corruption. At 
the second level (‘Active’) all four issue areas need to be addressed in any way, whereas at 
the highest level (‘Advanced’) participants need to fulfill particular criteria in each of the four 
issue areas (UNGC, 2012b). My thorough scrutiny of this measure revealed that it closely 
corresponds with theoretically informed assessment models (Baumann-Pauly & Scherer, 
2013). To gain greater confidence in the empirical validity of the UNGC implementation 
measure, I compared firm classifications according to the UNGC implementation measure 
with other long established and popular sustainability implementation measures such as the 
Dow Jones Sustainability World Index. The findings suggest that a higher classification ac-
cording to the UNGC measure tends to correspond with a higher rating as assessed under the 
latter measure and hence increase our confidence in the empirical validity of the newly avail-
able UNGC measure. Finally, the study provides quantitative evidence on further factors that 
drive the level of UNGC implementation, most notably organizational-level factors such as 
firm size or public ownership and, to a minor extent, also macro-level factors such as country 
or industry. 
On the basis of this first paper, I identify the need for the academic debate on transnational 
socio-environmental governance initiatives to incorporate and acknowledge for the role of 
time and dynamics, as well as the potential nested in collaboration among stakeholders. I 
thereby add to the so far mostly theoretical literature on socio-environmental governance and 
by providing first empirical evidence on the drivers of UNGC implementation based on a 
newly available measure – the UNGC implementation measures thoroughly scrutinized in my 
first dissertation paper – that may be of great use for future empirical CSR research. Focusing 
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on CSR in general and providing first quantitative evidence on implementation and account-
ability progress over time, this first essay prepares the ground for the following two essays 
that look at one specific CSR issue, corruption, to explore in detail how and why implementa-
tion dynamics occur over time. 
The second paper, a multiple longitudinal case study coauthored by Andreas Georg Scherer, 
focuses on the organizational dynamics once the legitimacy of MNCs is already lost or at 
least seriously threatened. It explores organizational strategies for regaining legitimacy after 
the disclosure of a corruption scandal at the case firms Siemens AG, Daimler AG and ABB 
Ltd. by conducting interviews and analyzing documents over a period of time. We refer to 
regaining legitimacy as a process of reintegration, i.e. repairing a transgressor’s damaged rela-
tionships with key internal and external stakeholders (Goodstein, Butterfield, Pfarrer, & 
Wicks, 2014). 
Indeed, the examined organizational behavior can be associated to a certain extent with le-
gitimacy strategies identified in previous research: organizations may try to adapt to the ex-
pectations they are confronted with in their organizational environment (‘isomorphic adap-
tion’) or they may engage in a variety of practices aimed at manipulating the perceptions of 
their most important social constituencies (‘strategic manipulation’) (Oliver, 1991). ‘Decou-
pling’ of policies and practices, as briefly introduced above, has been identified as one such 
form of manipulation (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scherer et al., 
2013). Furthermore, particularly in situations where accepted standards of behavior are frag-
mented or unavailable (Teubner & Fischer-Lescano, 2004), organizations may engage in 
‘moral reasoning’. This strategy refers to the practice of openly communicating and arguing 
with focal stakeholders or societal groups about the acceptability of the organization’s status 
quo and behavior where no party dominates from the beginning the process and the resolution 
to be found (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Scherer et al., 2013; Suchman, 1995). 
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However, we found distinct constellations of scandal and reintegration process characteristics 
forcing the organization to interact both instantly and substantially with key actors in its envi-
ronment. This calls for a refinement of existing conceptualizations of legitimacy strategies. In 
particular, if all different types of organizational legitimacy (pragmatic, moral and cognitive, 
see: Suchman, 1995) are severely threatened at the same time, a situation which we refer to as 
a strong ‘legitimacy shock’, such radical responses appear likely. Siemens suffered a legiti-
macy shock when faced with unprecedented regulatory and social sanctions putting the orga-
nization right in the spotlight of societal evaluation. Decoupling was clearly no longer an op-
tion. In contrast, Siemens chose to over-fulfill the demands raised by various actors, i.e. the 
company was doing more than formal agreements for example with the US SEC or the Bavar-
ian prosecutor’s office required. Rather than merely reintegrating with its institutional envi-
ronment, Siemens has created and now promotes a new benchmark in the anti-corruption 
field, which we summarize as a ‘substantial influence’ strategy and perceive as a form of stra-
tegic manipulation. We thereby add to the literature by distinguishing two extremes of strate-
gic manipulation: decoupling on the one hand and substantial influence on the other. 
In cases where such legitimacy shocks are lacking, companies have more time to react and 
hence rather choose an ‘isomorphic adaptation’ strategy to gradually adapt their organiza-
tional processes to regulatory expectations. These companies rely almost exclusively on par-
ticipating in ‘moral reasoning’ activities to safeguard their new anti-corruption strategy. How-
ever, if change processes occur reluctantly after the disclosure of a big scandal, we found that 
externally imposed monitors may exercise severe pressure forcing the transgressor to eventu-
ally install a leading set of corruption controls. Our findings thereby further add to the litera-
tures on reintegration and managing organizational corruption by highlighting the need to 
incorporate the role of a dynamic institutional environment (see section on contributions). 
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The third paper of this dissertation, coauthored by Patrick Haack and Andreas Georg Scherer, 
directly builds on the insights obtained in the second paper. The focus is now on how Western 
MNCs like Siemens as well as other actors in the anti-corruption field develop an understand-
ing about compliance and achievement in the global fight against corruption. The analysis is 
driven by the quest to contribute to the organizational research on decoupling, which has re-
cently suggested a trade-off between compliance and goal achievement. Underlying this rea-
soning is the assumption that in the complex and opaque context of socio-environmental gov-
ernance practices, causality and outcomes are hard to understand and trace, so that enforcing 
compliance with rules and policies is unlikely to yield the results for which these rules and 
policies have been designed (Wijen, 2014).  
This recently emerged stream of decoupling research advances our understanding of the chal-
lenges in socio-environmental governance. However, it does not sufficiently address that in 
the heterogeneous settings of global business multiple actors, interests and interpretive 
schemes are involved. Also incorporating the insights especially from the second dissertation 
paper, it appears possible that decoupling may rather be a transitory phenomenon. We there-
fore expect that in the complex context of socio-environmental governance notions of ‘com-
pliance’ and ‘achievement’ are highly contested and further argue that the meaning and rela-
tionship of these notions is not fixed but negotiated within a dynamic and non-linear process 
of sensemaking (Haack & Schoeneborn, 2015; Weick, 1995). Sensemaking refers to a com-
municative process through which attitudes or interpretations can adjust during interaction 
and may thereby develop a shared subjectivity (Weick, 1995). Considering that sensemaking 
happens in and through communication, and storytelling in particular, we focus in this paper 
on the analysis of ‘narratives’, which can be defined as recurrent practices of storytelling 
(Boje, 1991, p. 106). 
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Through a set of 42 interviews with different actors from Western Europe and Asia we find a 
parallel existence of a ‘compliance despite non-achievement’ narrative with respect to low 
corruption-risk regions and ‘noncompliance as means for achievement’ narrative with respect 
to high-risk regions. That is, we explore that even compliant MNCs and various types of non-
corporate actors from the Western hemisphere implicitly accept noncompliance of actors from 
certain high corruption-risk geographic spaces for a certain period of time. Actors of different 
type and origin make sense of a ‘collective action’ narrative to link the two parallel narratives. 
Actors perceive this interaction of compliant and (transitory) noncompliant actors to be a nec-
essary means towards achieving anti-corruption goals in the longer term. They picture the 
future by using a ‘progress as achievement’ narrative. It becomes evident in this narrative that 
instead of referring to global anti-corruption goal achievement in absolute terms actors con-
strue any type of small change in this global context as achievement per se. Our results show 
that through narration actors develop a shared understanding of what it means to be compliant 
and through narration also means and ends are reciprocally typified. We also find selective 
evidence that ideational dynamics are reflected in material anti-corruption developments, e.g. 
in rising popularity and implementation of regional anti-corruption initiatives or discourse-
induced law enhancements. We add to organization theory scholarship by showing how a 
global dynamic and genuinely social-constructionist approach puts the tradeoff between com-
pliance and goal achievement (Wijen, 2014) into perspective. 
SYNERGIES AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
This dissertation sheds light on dynamics and collective efforts in global socio-environmental 
governance as identified in quantitative and qualitative, objectivist and social-constructionist 
analytical approaches. More specifically, the three papers reveal important synergies and con-
tribute to existing research. First, all papers highlight how the incorporation of time in CSR 
and organizational corruption research puts challenges or even trade-offs identified in previ-
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ous studies into perspective. Second, they outline the need for joining forces across multiple 
geographic spaces to tackle collective societal ends. Finally, further specifying the role of 
dynamics and collective efforts, the two qualitative studies reveal how the incorporation of 
sensemaking processes allows for a more dynamic and flexible understanding of compliance 
and achievement in socio-environmental governance. 
Time. The first essay empirically contributes to the controversial debate on the impact 
of voluntary CSR initiatives that lack stringent enforcement mechanisms (Behnam & 
MacLean, 2011; Haack & Scherer, 2014; Rasche, 2009). Being the first to draw on a new and 
theoretically informed UNGC implementation measure, the UNGC ‘Differentiation Pro-
gramme’, this study provides evidence that the duration of participation in the UNGC does 
actually impact organizational behavior and that voluntary CSR initiatives can gradually re-
fine their accountability structure over time. I thereby contribute to the extant literature on 
CSR standardization by highlighting that a predominantly static and compliance focused per-
spective (Behnam & MacLean, 2011; Delmas & Cuerel Burbano, 2011; Ostrom, 1990; 
Weaver & Treviño, 1999) tends to underestimate the impact of learning and stakeholder-
oriented initiatives as well as the possibility to progressively tighten accountability mecha-
nisms in such socio-environmental governance regimes.  
The second essay contributes to the literature on organizational corruption that has previously 
incorporated a dynamic perspective for reintegration on the organizational level of analysis, 
but has neglected dynamics and heterogeneity in the institutional environment of the organi-
zation (Bertels, Cody, & Pek, 2014; Pfarrer, Decelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008). We contribute 
to this literature by highlighting that reintegration in the complex context of global socio-
environmental governance is not necessarily a fixed and predetermined state but rather a con-
tinuous process in which organizations have to manage legitimacy vis-à-vis a heterogeneous 
set of institutional expectations (Pache & Santos, 2010). To satisfy the expectations of West-
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ern regulatory institutions, Siemens had to over-fulfill existing organizational anti-corruption 
standards. Adding to the legitimacy literature on ‘strategic manipulation’ (Oliver, 1991; 
Scherer et al., 2013; Suchman, 1995), we identify a ‘substantial influence’ strategy at Siemens 
to promote a new benchmark of anti-corruption processes in a so far heterogeneous environ-
ment to secure legitimacy across different stakeholder groups. Organizational corruption and 
reintegration literature should therefore acknowledge the dynamic and contested nature of 
what is considered a legitimate group of organizations. We further add to these literatures by 
outlining that reintegration is not always a linear or stepwise process over time (Bertels et al., 
2014; Pfarrer et al., 2008), but can also happen radically and abruptly in case of unprece-
dented regulatory and social sanctions resulting in a ‘legitimacy shock’. 
Looking at the micro processes within institutions in the anti-corruption field, the third paper 
then further specifies this dissertation’s contribution with regard to time by highlighting the 
need to incorporate the dynamics of sensemaking processes in the literatures on decoupling 
and socio-environmental governance. Several studies in the decoupling and CSR standardiza-
tion debate (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Campbell, 2007; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Wijen, 2014) 
not fully incorporate the role of dynamics and communication, instead taking a predominantly 
static perspective of social reality. In the global context of a heterogeneous anti-corruption 
environment, we identify that actors make sense of a shared space-contingent understanding 
about compliance and achievement as long as actors perceive progressive developments over 
time. Moreover, actors perceive notions of compliance and achievement not always as prede-
termined and fixed. Rather, a mutual understanding of compliance is developed through dis-
cursive interaction leading to a continuous adjustment and refinement of means and ends. As 
mirrored in the title of this dissertation, the identified ‘progress as achievement’ narrative cap-
tures the ongoing and continuously recalibrated efforts in the fight against corruption. Our 
focus on sensemaking across time and space taken here has helped to further develop this 
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debate: We suggest that it is ultimately by ‘means’ of an interaction between compliant and 
noncompliant actors that the ‘end’ of ‘effective’ socio-environmental governance can be ap-
proached. 
Collective efforts. All three papers of this dissertation further have in common that 
they contribute to literature on collective efforts in the areas of CSR and anti-corruption. My 
first paper makes a two-fold contribution in this regard. First, acknowledging that the very 
nature of the UNGC is one of collective action – bringing different types of actors together 
under one roof to jointly solve global societal problems – the finding that longer participation 
duration in the UNGC leads to higher implementation of its principles is already a contribu-
tion to the so far controversial literature in this field. Further incorporating local opportunities 
for collective activities, my study lends at least partial support to theoretical arguments on the 
effect of local stakeholder engagement and networking opportunities. The presence of strong 
local UNGC networks has a significant positive effect on business participants’ implementa-
tion of the UNGC principles in these countries (see Mwangi et al., 2013; Rasche, 2012; 
Vormedal, 2005). Furthermore, while the general effect of these strong networks on progres-
sive UNGC implementation over the duration of UNGC participation seems rather limited, 
this effect is much stronger when looking at the two largest local UNGC networks, Spain and 
France. In both countries participants display significantly more implementation progress 
compared to countries without active and long established local networks. Our analysis thus 
lends support to recent studies suggesting the necessity of achieving a ‘critical mass’ to trig-
ger dynamics in CSR standardization (see Barkemeyer & Napolitano, 2009; Haack et al., 
2012; Kell, 2005). 
While the initial focus in the second essay is on how individual actors can regain legitimacy 
after a transgression, this essay also shows that interaction with other actors is crucial along 
this process. We not only find support for the role of ‘moral reasoning’ among central actors 
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to openly exchange views on how to cope with complex institutional environments (Driscoll, 
2006; Oliver, 1991; Scherer et al., 2013; Scott, 2007; Suchman, 1995). Moreover, we bring 
forward this literature by highlighting the need to distinguish between two extremes of ‘stra-
tegic manipulation’ – decoupling and ‘strategic influence’ – as outlined above. 
The third study then explores in detail how such ‘collective actions’ can help to level the 
(anti-)corruption playing field by developing a shared understanding on the means and ends in 
the global fight against corruption. The social-constructionist perspective taken in this analy-
sis reveals that actors of different type and geographical origin make sense of a joint naviga-
tion as the crucial element in approaching collective societal ends such as fighting corruption. 
Put differently, they care less about how, i.e. in what state of compliance or noncompliance, 
actors ‘get on board’, but much more on the fact that they get on board at all. Collective ini-
tiatives to organize for CSR and fight corruption such as the UNGC or joint agreements to 
commit to anti-corruption principles (so-called Integrity Pledges) therefore include actors at 
very different levels of CSR implementation or compliance. This interaction of compliant and 
less compliant actors is perceived as a necessary precondition to approach global goals over 
time. Consequently, this collectively typified understanding of solving societal problems puts 
the tradeoff or even paradox suggested by previous objectivist studies on compliance and goal 
achievement (Baron & Lyon, 2012; Wijen, 2014) into perspective. Finally, the third paper 
supports a contribution of the first paper highlighting the need to achieve a critical mass and 
connects with previous research stressing the benefits of joint problem solving among more 
and less compliant actors in other contexts of socio-environmental governance, such as labor 
conditions in global supply chains (Locke, Amengual, & Mangla, 2009). 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
Each of the three papers reveals several empirical and conceptual avenues for future research. 
In particular, my findings provide a basis for future research aimed at further exploring the 
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development of collective efforts in the context of socio-environmental governance. For ex-
ample, I outline in paper one that future research is needed to further assess the continuous 
refinement, adjustment and geographic expansion of transnational sustainability standards. 
Similarly, paper two and three identify the need for further narration-oriented analyses on 
anti-corruption or other ethically contested issues, and for in-depth studies on the relation be-
tween ideational and material developments in this context. Considering that this dissertation 
produced comprehensive knowledge on the role of large MNCs on these issues, and at the 
same time revealed conflicting arguments with regard to smaller sized firms, I will take this 
observation as a basis for specifying my suggestions for future research avenues: (1) conduct 
exploratory studies on the role of legitimacy and (de)coupling at small and medium sized 
firms (SMEs) in the global fight against corruption; (2) study the interaction of SMEs and 
large MNCs in this context; and (3) conduct quantitative studies tracing the diffusion of anti-
corruption practices from large MNCs to SMEs over time. 
First, future research could shift or even extend its focus from large MNCs to small and me-
dium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the global fight against corruption. SMEs are commonly 
referred to as “enterprises which employ fewer than 250 persons and which have an annual 
turnover not exceeding 50 million euro, and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding 43 
million euro” (EC, 2003). Papers two and three of this dissertation outline that large MNCs of 
high visibility and prominence were forced to respond to increasing expectations to fight cor-
ruption after a series of scandals threatening their legitimacy. In contrast, SMEs are so far 
mainly untroubled by such scandals and might feel less pressure to respond to external expec-
tations (Hauser & Kronthaler, 2013) in order to preserve their legitimacy. The interviews 
conducted in the context of this dissertation further reveal the perceived need of practitioners 
to gain more insights into how SMEs fight corruption in a changing institutional environment, 
as illustrated in the following table: 
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Calls from practitioners for more insights into the role of 
SMEs in the global fight against corruption 
Interviewee 
“(At) a lot of these big companies that are in the press, it is a 
reactive behavior. They are reacting because they’ve gotten 
into trouble in the past. How many companies – if you look at 
the small or medium size enterprises in Switzerland – are tak-
ing a proactive approach?” 
Integrity manager, large 
power and automation 
MNC, Switzerland 
“I think at some circumstances – because we are a big player – 
the problem with the smaller players is that if they say no, 
things will be delayed or a permit will not be issued right away, 
because the official might take his time. So that is still possible. 
(…) But as far as we are concerned, I think it’s the size plus the 
consistency in the messaging.” 
Finance director,  
large oil and gas MNC, 
Philippine subsidiary  
“SMEs face considerably more challenges fighting corruption 
compared to larger firms as they cannot exert influence.” 
Lawyer and FCPA expert, 
large law firm, Germany 
“It is always difficult to define, (what counts as) a medium-
sized enterprise, but I think to observe that initiatives are in-
creasing here. Look at the consultancy business, which strongly 
caught-up already and offers solutions for medium-sized busi-
nesses. This is always a good indicator.” 
Compliance manager, large 
automotive MNC, Germany 
“I can tell you there are a lot of companies, small and medium 
kind of enterprises, in Switzerland that have no idea. That is 
where you have a huge market, if you want to promote compli-
ance and integrity. (…) I would be very curious about, what I 
said, that aspect of small and medium sized enterprises.” 
Integrity manager, large 
power and automation 
MNC, Switzerland 
 
Particular insights from the corruption literature suggest that SMEs face greater challenges in 
fighting corruption and are more likely to be involved in corrupt practices than large MNCs 
(Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier, & Pagés, 2011; Bennedsen, Feldmann, & Dreyer Lassen, 
2009). On the other hand, the CSR literature suggests that internationally operating SMEs 
despite their limited resources may pursue an approach of solving societal problems that is not 
necessarily inferior to the one of large MNCs (Jenkins, 2004; Murillo & Lozano, 2006; Wick-
ert, 2014). Future research is needed to address central questions that arise from this puzzle: 
What are the actual organizational differences between SMEs and MNCs in fighting corrup-
tion? Why are there differences and how can we explain their development over time? How 
do actors make sense of such differences over time? Based on these findings, can we identify 
whether one approach of fighting corruption is ‘inferior’ to the other? Put differently: how can 
SMEs, as opposed to MNCs, fight corruption? 
 25 
A thorough review of the literatures on CSR, anti-corruption, legitimacy and decoupling 
seems necessary to shed light on the common grounds among them and on the specific condi-
tions under which certain contradictory expectations persist. To help clarify persisting ambi-
guities, exploratory qualitative studies appear necessary for potentially revealing so far ne-
glected contingencies in this context. Such studies could build on and further expand qualita-
tive data of this dissertation or of related studies on CSR standardization (Haack et al., 2012) 
and include further documentary data over time. 
Second, building on this dissertation’s insights into the role of collective actions, future re-
search should include SMEs when analyzing how actors make sense of compliance and 
achievement in the fight against corruption over time (Christensen, Morsing, & Thyssen, 
2013; Weick, 1995; Wijen, 2014). Studying this interaction appears important considering 
that SMEs are constrained by limited resources and visibility and that collective efforts to 
level the anti-corruption playing field require substantial financial and human resources that 
often only MNCs possess. The current popularity in organization theory to study discourse 
and sensemaking is crucially dependent on the ability to link ideational dynamics with mate-
rial developments. This dissertation provides comprehensive evidence on material organiza-
tional changes at Western MNCs in paper two and offers first selective evidence that idea-
tional dynamics may in fact be associated with material developments in the global anti-
corruption field. However, future research is needed to explore the causal relations between 
ideational and material dynamics over time and highlight the specific conditions under which 
such relationships hold. It will be exciting to see whether and to what extent, for example, 
diffusion theories postulating a dynamic process from noncompliance to compliance enacted 
trough narration and the development of a shared understanding among actors (Boxenbaum & 
Jonsson, 2008; Haack et al., 2012) help explain the dynamic and material interactions be-
tween SMEs and MNCs in the fight against corruption. 
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Following-up on the development of global collective action initiatives like the UNGC and on 
regional collective action initiatives like the ones in the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and 
Indonesia identified in papers two and three of this dissertation (see also 
ASEAN_CSR_Network, 2014) appears promising here as it would allow to trace develop-
ments over time. Furthermore, even a follow-up on a specific SME-MNC interaction which I 
identified during the data acquisition for this dissertation appears promising: At an anti-
corruption workshop in Myanmar, a young representative of the local 170 employee ‘SMART 
group of companies’ highlighted the value of the close anti-corruption screening and support 
it received by the Western MNC General Electric. Approaching the interaction from the other 
side, in-depth investigations of MNC collective action initiatives reaching out to SMEs and 
supply chain partners provide a rich context for empirical research. 
Third, quantitative research on collective action and CSR standardization is needed for tracing 
developments across MNCs and SMEs over time. These studies can further shed light on the 
generalizability of central findings obtained through this dissertation and the qualitative re-
search suggested above. In the second and third essay of this dissertation, I could already ex-
amine that practices of large MNCs tend to converge to a common set of ‘best practices’. One 
interesting direction for quantitative analyses is thus to test arguments from institutional the-
ory on the diffusion of institutionalized practices (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Misangyi, 
Weaver, & Elms, 2008; Strang & Meyer, 1993), most notably here from large MNCs to 
SMEs. Literature on the emergence and diffusion of anti-corruption norms focused so far on 
the position of actors in a field (Misangyi et al., 2008) but tended to neglect the influence of 
firm size and other organizational characteristics. Potential hypotheses may state as follows: If 
internationally operating SMEs increasingly implement anti-corruption processes over time, 
they follow the implementation patterns at large Western MNCs. Or more specifically: The 
closer the supply chain relationship and/or collective actions between internationally operat-
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ing SMEs and Western MNCs, the higher the levels of anti-corruption implementation at 
SMEs become over time. 
Alternatively to explaining CSR diffusion as a result of interactions between MNCs and 
SMEs, insights from integrative social contracts theory on the role of national identity and 
local norms (Bailey & Spicer, 2007; Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994) can be applied to the issue 
of corruption. Following the recent wave of scandals, I outline in the second paper that many 
MNCs have centralized their anti-corruption processes including the hiring of crucial compli-
ance personnel, the coordination of training programs or the financial payment structure. 
Global or so-called ‘hypernorms’ (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994, p. 264) therefore seem to 
dominate local norms. Potentially though, employees in a small subsidiary of an internation-
ally operating SME may be more influenced by the corruption norms of the host country (see 
e.g. Bailey & Spicer, 2007). Future research may thus hypothesize and test under what condi-
tions different degrees of SME foreign embeddedness explain differences in anti-corruption 
structures and processes. 
Methodically, the goal of future quantitative studies should be to create panel data on CSR 
and anti-corruption standardization to run fixed or random effects regression analyses 
(Wooldridge, 2010) which are conducive for tracing causal developments over time. As my 
first dissertation paper has outlined, a theoretically informed UNGC implementation measure 
is available since 2011 allowing by now to analyze changes over time. This CSR measure will 
be of great use for future empirical studies on socio-environmental governance and even al-




Anand, V., Ashforth, B.E., & Joshi, M. (2004). Business as usual: The acceptance and 
perpetuation of corruption in organizations. Academy of Management Executive, 
18(2), 39-53.  
ASEAN_CSR_Network. (2014). Collective action against corruption. Business and anti-
corruption initiatives in ASEAN. 
Ashforth, Blake E., & Gibbs, Barrie W. (1990). The double-edge of organizational 
legitimation. Organization Science, 1(2), 177-194.  
Ashforth, Blake E., Gioia, Dennis A., Robinson, Sandra L., & Treviño, Linda K. (2008). Re-
viewing organizational corruption. Introduction to a special topic forum. Academy of 
Management Review, 33(3), 670-684.  
Aterido, Reyes, Hallward-Driemeier, Mary, & Pagés, Carmen. (2011). Big constraints to 
small firms’ growth? Business environment and employment growth across firms. 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 59(3), 609-647.  
Bailey, Wendy, & Spicer, Andrew. (2007). When does national identity matter? Convergence 
and divergence in international business ethics. Academy of Management Journal, 
50(6), 1462-1480.  
Barkemeyer, Ralf, & Napolitano, Giulio. (2009). The UN Global Compact: Moving towards a 
critical mass or a critical state? Academy of Management Annual Meeting 
Proceedings, 1-6.  
Baron, David P., & Lyon, Thomas P. (2012). Environmental governance. In P. Bansal & A. J. 
Hoffman (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of business and the natural environment (pp. 
122-139). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Baumann-Pauly, Dorothée, & Scherer, Andreas G. (2013). The organizational implementation 
of corporate citizenship: An assessment tool and its application at UN Global Compact 
participants. Journal of Business Ethics, 117(1), 1-17.  
Beck, Ulrich, & Camiller, Patrick. (2000). What is globalization? Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Behnam, Michael, & MacLean, Tammy L. (2011). Where is the accountability in 
international accountability standards?: A decoupling perspective. Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 21(1), 45-72.  
Bennedsen, Morten, Feldmann, Sven E., & Dreyer Lassen, David. (2009). Strong firms lobby, 
weak firms bribe: A survey-based analysis of the demand for influence and corruption. 
EPRU Working Paper Series, No. 2009-08.  
Berger, Peter L., & Luckmann, Thomas. (1967). The social construction of reality: A treatise 
on the sociology of knowledge. New York: Anchor Books. 
Berliner, Daniel, & Prakash, Aseem. (2014). "Bluewashing" the firm?: Voluntary regulations, 
program design and member compliance with the United Nations Global Compact. 
Policy Studies Journal, 43(1), 115-138.  
Bertels, Stephanie, Cody, Michael, & Pek, Simon. (2014). A Responsive approach to 
organizational misconduct: Rehabilitation, reintegration, and the reduction of 
reoffense. Business Ethics Quarterly, 24(3), 343-370.  
Boje, David M. (1991). The storytelling organization: A study of story performance in an 
office-supply firm. Administrative science quarterly, 36(1), 106-126.  
Boxenbaum, Eva, & Jonsson, Stefan. (2008). Isomorphism, diffusion and decoupling. In R. 
Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin, & R. Suddaby (Eds.), The Sage handbook of 
organizational institutionalism (pp. 78-98). London: SAGE. 
Bromley, Patricia, & Powell, Walter W. (2012). From smoke and mirrors to walking the talk: 
Decoupling in the contemporary world. The Academy of Management Annals, 6(1), 
483-530.  
 29 
Brunsson, Nils. (1989). The organization of hypocrisy: talk, decisions and actions in 
organizations.  
Campbell, John L. (2007). Why would corporations behave in socially responsible ways? An 
institutional theory of corporate social responsibility. Academy of Management 
Review, 32(3), 946-967.  
Carroll, Archie B. (1979). A three-dimensional conceptual model of corporate performance. 
Academy of Management Review, 4(4), 497-505.  
Christensen, Lars Thøger, Morsing, Mette, & Thyssen, Ole. (2013). CSR as aspirational talk. 
Organization, 20(3), 372-393.  
Christmann, Petra, & Taylor, Glen. (2006). Firm self-regulation through international 
certifiable standards: Determinants of symbolic versus substantive implementation. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 37(6), 863-878.  
Coburn, Cynthia E. (2004). Beyond decoupling: Rethinking the relationship between the 
institutional environment and the classroom. Sociology of Education, 77(3), 211-244.  
Corley, Kevin. (2012). Publishing in AMJ—Part 7: What's Different about Qualitative 
Research? Academy of Management Journal, 55(3), 509-513.  
Crane, Andrew, & Matten, Dirk. (2004). Business ethics: A European perspective. Managing 
corporate citizenship and sustainability in the age of globalisation. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Davis, Gerald F., & Marquis, Christopher. (2005). Prospects for organization theory in the 
early twenty-first century: Institutional fields and mechanisms. Organization Science, 
16(4), 332-343.  
Delmas, Magali A, & Cuerel Burbano, Vanessa. (2011). The drivers of greenwashing. 
California Management Review.  
Deva, Surya. (2006). Global Compact: A critique of the U.N.'s "public-private" partnership 
for promoting corporate citizenship. Syracuse Journal of International Law & 
Commerce, 34(1), 107-151.  
DiMaggio, Paul J., & Powell, Walter W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional 
isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological 
Review, 48(2), 147-160.  
Djelic, Marie-Laure, & Sahlin-Andersson, Kerstin. (2006). Transnational governance: 
Institutional dynamics of regulation: Cambridge University Press. 
Donaldson, Thomas, & Dunfee, Thomas W. (1994). Toward a unified conception of business 
ethics: Integrative social contracts theory. Academy of Management Review, 19(2), 
252-284.  
Driscoll, C. (2006). The not so clear-cut nature of organizational legitimating mechanisms in 
the Canadian forest sector. Business & Society, 45(3), 322.  
EC. (2003). Recommendation 2003/361/EC regarding the SME definition. Brussels: 
European Commission, Directorate-General Enterprise and Industry. 
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. Academy of 
Management Review, 14(4), 532-550.  
Gebhardt, Christian, & Müller-Seitz, Gordon. (2011). Phoenix arising from the ashes: An 
event-oriented analysis of the Siemens' corruption scandal as nexus between 
organization and society. Managementforschung, 21, 41-90.  
GibsonDunn. (2013). 2012 year-end FCPA update: Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. 
Gilbert, Dirk U., Rasche, Andreas, & Waddock, Sandra. (2011). Accountability in a global 
economy: The emergence of international accountability standards. Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 21(1), 23-44.  
Goodstein, Jerry, Butterfield, Kenneth D, Pfarrer, Michael D, & Wicks, Andrew C. (2014). 
Individual and organizational reintegration after ethical or legal transgressions: 
Challenges and opportunities. Business Ethics Quarterly, 24(3), 315-342.  
 30 
Greenwood, Royston, & Hinings, C. R. (1996). Understanding radical organizational change: 
Bringing together the old and the new institutionalism. Academy of Management 
Review, 21(4), 1022-1054.  
Greenwood, Royston, Raynard, Mia, Kodeih, Farah, Micelotta, Evelyn R., & Lounsbury, 
Michael. (2011). Institutional complexity and organizational responses. The Academy 
of Management Annals, 5(1), 317-371.  
Haack, Patrick, & Scherer, Andreas Georg. (2014). Why sparing the rod does not spoil the 
child: A critique of the “Strict Father” model in transnational governance. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 1-16.  
Haack, Patrick, & Schoeneborn, Dennis. (2015). Is Decoupling Becoming Decoupled from 
Institutional Theory? A Commentary on Wijen. Academy of Management Review, 
40(2), 307-310.  
Haack, Patrick, Schoeneborn, Dennis, & Wickert, Christopher. (2012). Talking the talk, moral 
entrapment, creeping commitment? Exploring narrative dynamics in corporate 
responsibility standardization. Organization Studies, 33(5-6), 815-845.  
Hauser, Christian, & Kronthaler, Franz. (2013). Neue Märkte, neue Risiken. Empirische 
Evidenz zum Korruptionsrisiko für den international aktiven Mittelstand. Zeitschrift 
für Betriebswirtschaft(ZfB special issue 4/2013), 37-60.  
Hemphill, Thomas A. (2005). The United Nations Global Compact: The business 
implementation and accountability challenge. International Journal of Business 
Governance and Ethics, 1(4), 303-316.  
Jenkins, Heledd. (2004). A critique of conventional CSR theory: an SME perspective. Journal 
of General Management, 29, 37-57.  
Kell, Georg. (2005). The Global Compact. Selected experiences and reflections. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 59(1-2), 69-79.  
Kell, Georg, & Levin, David. (2003). The Global Compact network: An historic experiment 
in learning and action. Business & Society Review, 108(2), 151-181.  
Knudsen, Jette. (2011). Company delistings from the UN Global Compact: Limited business 
demand or domestic governance failure? Journal of Business Ethics, 103(3), 331-349.  
Kobrin, Stephen J. (2001). Sovereignty@bay: Globalization, multinational enterprise, and the 
international political system. In A. M. Rugman & T. L. Brewer (Eds.), The Oxford 
handbook of international business (2 ed., pp. 181-205). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Kostova, Tatiana, & Zaheer, Srilata. (1999). Organizational legitimacy under conditions of 
complexity: The case of the multinational enterprise. Academy of Management 
Review, 24(1), 64-81.  
Locke, Richard, Amengual, Matthew, & Mangla, Akshay. (2009). Virtue out of necessity? 
Compliance, commitment, and the improvement of labor conditions in global supply 
chains. Politics & Society, 37(3), 319-351.  
Maguire, Steve, & Hardy, Cynthia. (2006). The emergence of new global institutions: A 
discursive perspective. Organization Studies, 27(1), 7-29.  
Matten, Dirk, & Crane, Andrew. (2005). Corporate citizenship: Toward an extended 
theoretical conceptualization. Academy of Management Review, 30, 166-179.  
Meyer, John W., & Rowan, Brian. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as 
myth and ceremony. American journal of Sociology, 83(2), 340-363.  
Misangyi, Vilmos F., Weaver, Gary R., & Elms, Heather. (2008). Ending corruption: The 
interplay among institutional logics, resources, and institutional entrepreneurs. 
Academy of Management Review, 33(3), 750-770.  
Murillo, David, & Lozano, Josep M. (2006). SMEs and CSR: An approach to CSR in their 
own words. Journal of Business Ethics, 67(3), 227-240.  
 31 
Mwangi, Wagaki, Rieth, Lothar, & Schmitz, Hans P. (2013). Encouraging greater 
compliance: Local networks and the United Nations Global Compact. In T. Risse, S. 
C. Ropp, & K. Sikkink (Eds.), The persistent power of human rights: From 
commitment to compliance (pp. 203-222). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Oliver, Christine. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional processes. Academy of 
Management Review, 16(1), 145-179.  
Ostrom, Elinor. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective 
action: Cambridge University Press. 
Pache, Anne-Claire, & Santos, Filipe. (2010). When worlds collide: The internal dynamics of 
organizational responses to conflicting institutional demands. Academy of 
Management Review, 35(3), 455-476. doi: 10.5465/amr.2010.51142368 
Palazzo, Guido, & Scherer, A. G. . (2006). Corporate legitimacy as deliberation: A 
communicative framework. Journal of Business Ethics, 66(1), 71-88.  
Palazzo, Guido, & Scherer, Andreas G. (2010). The United Nations Global Compact as a 
learning approach. In A. Rasche & G. Kell (Eds.), The United Nations Global 
Compact. Achievements, Trends and Challenges (pp. 234-247). New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Pfarrer, M.D., Decelles, K.A., Smith, K.G., & Taylor, M.S. (2008). After the fall: 
Reintegrating the corrupt organization. Academy of Management Review, 33(3), 730-
749.  
Quah, Jon ST. (2007). Combating corruption Singapore-style: Lessons for other Asian 
countries. Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, 2007(2), 1-56.  
Rasche, Andreas. (2009). "A necessary supplement": What the United Nations Global 
Compact is and is not. Business & Society, 48(4), 511-537.  
Rasche, Andreas. (2012). Global policies and local practice: Loose and tight couplings in 
multi-stakeholder initiatives. Business Ethics Quarterly, 22(4), 679.  
Rasche, Andreas, Waddock, Sandra, & McIntosh, Malcolm. (2013). The United Nations 
Global Compact: Retrospect and prospect. Business & Society, 52(1), 6-30.  
Saisana, Michaela, & Saltelli, Andrea. (2012). Corruption Perceptions Index 2012 statistical 
assessment (pp. 1-22). Luxembourg: European Commission. 
Scherer, Andreas G., & Palazzo, Guido. (2007). Toward a political conception of corporate 
responsibility: Business and society seen from a Habermasian perspective. Academy of 
Management Review, 32(4), 1096-1120.  
Scherer, Andreas G., & Palazzo, Guido. (2011). The new political role of business in a 
globalized world: A review of a new perspective on CSR and its implications for the 
firm, governance, and democracy. Journal of Management Studies, 48(4), 899-931.  
Scherer, Andreas G., & Palazzo, Guido (2008). Globalization and corporate social 
responsibility. In A. Crane, A. McWilliams, D. Matten, J. Moon, & D. S. Siegel 
(Eds.), The Oxford handbook of corporate social responsibility (pp. 413-431). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Scherer, Andreas G., Palazzo, Guido, & Baumann, Dorothée. (2006). Global rules and private 
actors: Toward a new role af the transnational corporation in global governance. 
Business Ethics Quarterly, 16(4), 505-532.  
Scherer, Andreas G., Palazzo, Guido, & Seidl, David. (2013). Managing legitimacy in 
complex and heterogeneous environments: Sustainable development in a globalized 
world. Journal of Management Studies, 50(2), 259-284.  
Scott, W. Richard. (2007). Institutions and organizations: Ideas and interests (3rd ed.). 
Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc. 
Sethi, S. Prakash, & Schepers, Donald H. (2014). United Nations Global Compact: The 
promise–performance gap. Journal of Business Ethics, 122(2), 193-208.  
 32 
Strang, David, & Meyer, John W. (1993). Institutional conditions for diffusion. Theory and 
society, 22(4), 487-511.  
Suchman, Mark C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. 
Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 571-610.  
Teubner, Gunther, & Fischer-Lescano, Andreas. (2004). Regime-collisions: The vain search 
for legal unity in the fragmentation of global law. Michigan Journal of International 
Law, 25(4), 999-1046.  
TI. (2012). Corruption Perceptions Index 2012. Berlin: Transparency International. 
UNGC. (2012b). Differentiation Programme.   Retrieved May 4, 2012, from 
http://unglobalcompact.org/COP/differentiation_programme.html 
Van de Ven, Andrew H. (1989). Nothing is quite so practical as a good theory. Academy of 
Management Review, 14(4), 486-489.  
Voegtlin, Christian, & Pless, Nicola M. (2014). Global governance: CSR and the role of the 
UN Global Compact. Journal of Business Ethics, 122(2), 179-191.  
Vormedal, Irja. (2005). Governance through learning: The UN Global Compact and corporate 
responsibility. University of Oslo: Center for Development and the Environment. 
Waddock, Sandra. (2008). Building a new institutional infrastructure for corporate 
responsibility. Academy of Management Perspectives, 22(3), 87-108.  
Weaver, Gary R., & Treviño, Linda Klebe. (1999). Compliance and Values Oriented Ethics 
Programs. Business Ethics Quarterly, 9(2), 315-335.  
Weick, Karl E. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations (Vol. 3). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Wickert, Christopher. (2014). “Political” corporate social responsibility in small-and medium-
sized enterprises: A conceptual framework. Business & Society, Advance online 
publication. DOI: 10.1177/0007650314537021.  
Wijen, Frank. (2014). Means versus ends in opaque institutional fields: Trading off 
compliance and achievement in sustainability standard adoption. Academy of 
Management Review, 39(3), 302-323.  









FIRST DISSERTATION PAPER  
 
 
IMPLEMENTING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: 
EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS ON THE IMPACT OF THE UN GLOBAL COMPACT  







A version of this paper will be resubmitted (the 2
nd
 time) to Business & Society  




IMPLEMENTING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: 
EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS ON THE IMPACT OF THE UN GLOBAL COMPACT ON 
ITS BUSINESS PARTICIPANTS 
 
Abstract 
The implementation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is crucial for the legitimacy of 
an organization in today’s globalized economy. This study aims to enrich our knowledge of 
the implementation of the largest voluntary CSR initiative – the UN Global Compact 
(UNGC). Drawing on insights from stakeholder and institutional theory, I derive a positive 
impact of UNGC participation length on the implementation of the UNGC principles, despite 
potential weaknesses in the initiative’s accountability structure. Moreover, I scrutinize the 
validity of the newly introduced UNGC ‘Differentiation Programme’ before applying this 
measure in the empirical analysis. Results from ordinal and linear regression models and from 
approaches addressing endogeneity suggest that, contrary to arguments by UNGC critics, the 
length of UNCG participation does affect the level of UNGC implementation. However, this 
effect appears to be much smaller than previous practitioner studies have suggested. More-
over, the presence of strong local UNGC networks positively affects the implementation level 
of the UNGC, although its hypothesized mediating role between UNGC participation length 
and UNGC implementation level is very small. 
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Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has gained such prominence in organizational theory 
and practice (De Bakker, Groenewegen, & Den Hond, 2005; The Economist, 2005; Lockett, 
Moon, & Visser, 2006; Margolis & Walsh, 2003) that its organizational implementation has 
grown into one of the key challenges that organizations face (Gilbert & Rasche, 2008; 
Knudsen, 2011; Lindgreen, Swaen, & Maon, 2009; Maon, Lindgreen, & Swaen, 2009). In the 
process of globalization, many companies extended their operations across national borders 
and, in certain cases, even gained greater economic and social power than some governments 
(Garriga & Melé, 2004). At the same time, the capacity of national governmental agencies to 
regulate multinational corporations (MNCs) and to produce public goods has been eroding 
(Habermas, 2001; Kobrin, 2001; Scherer & Palazzo, 2008).  
Socio-environmental problems, such as human rights violations, global warming and corrup-
tion, have reached a level of complexity at which they can no longer be managed by unilateral 
national policy alone because their causes and effects are often transnational. While legisla-
tion on transnational business activities has been proliferating over the last decades, so far 
governments have failed to address these social and environmental challenges adequately on 
an international level (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Scherer, Palazzo, & Baumann, 2006). Con-
sequently, various societal actors increasingly expect businesses to take on public responsi-
bilities (Campbell, 2007; Crane & Matten, 2004; Fransen & Burgoon, 2014). The pressures 
are real, as industry leaders like Nike, Exxon, Nestlé, and Pfizer can attest (Maon et al., 2009; 
Vogel, 2010). More and more companies can thus no longer afford to act merely as isolated 
players but may have to take on a political role (Matten & Crane, 2005; Scherer, Palazzo and 
Baumann 2006).  
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Social accountability initiatives like the UN Global Compact (UNGC), the SA 8000 social 
accountability standard and the ISO 26000 CSR standard offer businesses means of comple-
menting legislation in order to adequately address social, environmental and anti-corruption 
issues (Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Hess, 2001; Rasche, Waddock, & McIntosh, 2013; 
Vogel, 2010). The UNGC is the most prominent voluntary CSR initiative worldwide; partici-
pants commit to ten universal principles in the areas of human rights, labor standards, the en-
vironment and anti-corruption (see Appendix 1). The overarching goal of the initiative is to 
serve as a long-term CSR learning platform (Kell & Levin, 2003; Palazzo & Scherer, 2010; 
Rasche, 2009). ‘Learning’ is understood in this paper as a business participant’s progress re-
garding “the development, implementation, and disclosure of sustainability policies and prac-
tices“ (see UNGC, 2012c) in the context of the ten principles. This understanding closely cor-
responds with more general definitions suggesting that organizational learning occurs when 
organizations institutionalize new structures, routines or strategies that lead to changes in ac-
tion (Huysman, 1999; Kell & Levin, 2003).  
To date, however, scholars have conducted little empirical research on the impact of the 
UNGC, despite the potential significance of such an initiative for the corporate world 
(Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Maon et al., 2009; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Runhaar & 
Lafferty, 2009). The few exceptions that empirically analyze the implementation of the 
UNGC are based on only a few companies (Baumann-Pauly & Scherer, 2013; Rieth, 2009; 
Runhaar & Lafferty, 2009) or a single country (Berliner & Prakash, 2014; Hamann, Sinha, 
Kapfudzaruwa, & Schild, 2009), or examine particular CSR policies whose implementation is 
not directly tied to the UNGC principles (Bernhagen & Mitchell, 2010). Findings with regard 
to the impact of UNGC participation on business practices are mixed (Rasche et al., 2013). 
What remains unaddressed in most of these studies is the impact of UNGC participation dura-
tion on the implementation of its principles on a large global basis. While practitioner studies 
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offer first quantitative insights on this issue, the self-assessments of the respondents are not 
based on any sort of explicit implementation criteria (see e.g. McKinsey, 2007; UNGC, 
2012e). Their results suggest that UNGC participation duration has a high positive impact on 
the implementation of the ten principles; critics, however, continue to reject this conclusion 
(Berliner & Prakash, 2014; Sethi & Schepers, 2014). 
The aim of the present work is thus to enrich our knowledge on the question of whether the 
Global Compact has an impact on its business participants as regards the implementation of 
its principles over the duration of participation. The newly introduced UNGC ‘Differentiation 
Programme’ thereby offers, for the first time, a comprehensive measure capturing different 
levels of UNGC implementation. Launched in February 2011, it prescribes its participants to 
assess their level of UNGC implementation based on a set of predefined criteria. I analyze the 
validity of this program’s ‘content’ in the data and method section by comparing its imple-
mentation criteria with a theoretically informed UNGC assessment model (Baumann-Pauly & 
Scherer, 2013). Acknowledging the difficulties to measure actual – day-to-day – implementa-
tion, especially across a large population of companies, Appendix 2 lists a set of analyses 
providing initial insights about the validity of this newly available self-assessed UNGC im-
plementation ‘construct’. 
As UNGC participants, companies have the obligation to communicate with their 
stakeholders on a regular basis. Further, they have the possibility to collaborate with them in 
the course of various UNGC network events. Stakeholder theory (see e.g. Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Jones, 1995) suggests that managing stakeholder relationships 
in such a manner has an impact on organizational practices. Beyond global coordination with 
stakeholders, scholars have argued about the importance of strong local stakeholder networks 
to generate aspired outcomes (Rasche, 2012; Vormedal, 2005). Critics, however, point to the 
initiative’s lack of accountability mechanisms and of guidance on how the principles should 
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be implemented, which allows for the risk of the UNGC being used solely as marketing tool 
(Hemphill, 2005; Williams, 2004). More precisely, companies with a poor reputation may 
simply choose to join the UNGC without intending to actually implement its principles in 
their organizational structures, assuming that the mere association with the UN allows them to 
create a positive image. This practice is derogatorily referred to as ‘bluewashing,’ (Knudsen, 
2011, p. 334) in allusion to the blue UN flag. 
To contribute to the controversial debate on whether the UNGC has an impact on its business 
participants, despite the lack of stringent accountability mechanisms, this study addresses the 
following research questions: Does longer UNGC membership duration lead to higher levels 
of UNGC implementation? How does the presence of strong local UNGC networks mediate 
this relationship? 
To answer these questions, I apply multiple analytical approaches including ordinal and linear 
regression analyses and instrumental variable models to address endogeneity and selection 
issues. Contrary to arguments by UNGC critics, my findings suggest that the duration of 
UNCG participation does affect the level of UNGC implementation. However, this effect 
seems to be much smaller than previous practitioner studies suggested. The presence of 
strong, i.e. active and long-established, local UNGC networks positively affects the imple-
mentation level of the UNGC, although its hypothesized mediating role between UNGC par-
ticipation duration and UNGC implementation level is very small. Finally, firm size and pub-
lic ownership seem to be the strongest drivers of UNGC implementation. 
IMPLEMENTING CSR IN THE UN GLOBAL COMPACT: THEORETICAL 
BACKGROUND AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Over the last decades, the literature on CSR mainly concentrated on whether CSR is good for 
profits (Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003; Peloza, 2009). Margolis 
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and Walsh (2003) reviewed the available literature on CSR published between 1972 and 2002 
and found that most studies treated CSR as a ‘black box’ – that is, as an independent variable 
– and only 15 percent treated it as the dependent variable. In addition, more recent studies 
have found that there is little research on how companies implement CSR (Christmann & 
Taylor, 2006; Rasche, 2009).  
Over the last years, however, social accountability initiatives like the UNGC, the SA 8000 
social accountability and the ISO 26000 CSR standard were instituted to offer businesses a 
means to address social, environmental and anti-corruption issues in the absence of a legally 
binding global governance system (Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Frost, 2005; Hess, 2001; 
Rasche et al., 2013). The effectiveness of such initiatives has been of interest in the recent 
literature (Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Maon et al., 2009; O'Rourke, 2003; Runhaar & 
Lafferty, 2009; Schuler & Christmann, 2011). While there is some evidence that under certain 
conditions international certifiable standards, like the ISO 9000 general management standard 
or the ISO 14001 environmental management standard, influence organizational practices 
(Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Potoski & Prakash, 2005), studies on the effectiveness of global 
standards covering a comprehensive spectrum of CSR issues, like the UNGC, so far rely on a 
few cases only (see Baumann-Pauly & Scherer, 2013; Runhaar & Lafferty, 2009). Other ex-
isting studies tend to focus on a particular country (e.g. Berliner & Prakash, 2014; Mwangi, 
Rieth, & Schmitz, 2013; Rieth, 2009) or use UNGC implementation measures that are either 
binary or not directly related to the ten UNGC principles (see Bernhagen & Mitchell, 2010; 
Perez-Batres, Miller, & Pisani, 2011). 
In contrast, insights on the effectiveness of voluntary initiatives based on a global quantitative 
analysis relying on measures with predefined criteria directly tied to the initiatives principles 
are scarce, yet crucially needed. In particular, more such analyses of the UNGC appear neces-
sary, not only because it is the largest but arguably also most ambitious voluntary CSR initia-
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tive (Rasche, 2009; Vormedal, 2005). As we can see in Appendix 1, the UNGC principles 
span the whole spectrum of CSR issues, ranging from human rights and labor standards to 
environmental and anti-corruption issues (for an overview of CSR standards and institutions 
see Gilbert, Rasche, & Waddock, 2011; Waddock, 2008). Hence, several scholars refer to the 
UNGC as a comprehensive initiative capturing an extended concept of corporate responsibili-
ties applicable in today’s globalized economy, where state actors increasingly lose control 
over transnational corporate activities (Matten & Crane, 2005; Scherer et al., 2006). 
Toward clearer guidance on the implementation of the UNGC principles 
 
The UNGC, initiated by the former UN secretary general Kofi Annan at the Davos World 
Economic Summit in 1999, was formally launched on July 26, 2000. The initiative invites the 
private sector to collaborate with the UN in order to identify and spread good business prac-
tices that incorporate the UNGC’s ten universal principles (Ruggie, 2001) in the areas of hu-
man rights, labor rights, protection of the environment and anti-corruption (see Appendix 1). 
The ten principles are derived from key international declarations (UNGC, 2012a) and as such 
enjoy a broad consensus. As more companies joined the scheme, the UNGC soon evolved 
into the largest voluntary corporate CSR initiative in the world (Hemphill, 2005), with cur-
rently 8,322 business participants (data as of April 29, 2015). The primary goal of the initia-
tive is to provide its participants with the resources and expertise that will help them imple-
ment the ten UNGC principles. Since its foundation, the scheme has received both a great 
deal of support and a great deal of criticism. One major criticism leveled at the UNGC by a 
number of scholars (see Hemphill, 2005; Rasche, 2009; Williams, 2004) is that the Compact’s 
principles are vague and thus hard to implement. 
Deva (2006) points out that the UNGC principles provide little concrete guidance to compa-
nies on the conduct that is expected from them. Since the introduction of the compulsory 
‘Communication on Progress’ (COP) policy in 2003, corporations have to report annually on 
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the progress they have made in implementing the ten principles, but for a long time this policy 
lacked standardized criteria for evaluating the progress of participants, as well as incentives 
for stricter implementation. Therefore, it was previously possible for a participant to highlight 
just one CSR area where its record of progress was excellent and conceal other issue areas 
where its record was poorer (Williams, 2004).  
To react to this issue, in February 2011 the UNGC and its stakeholders introduced the ‘Dif-
ferentiation Programme’, for the first time prescribing that its participants must choose among 
different levels of UNGC implementation criteria. The three basic levels of the program are 
‘Learner Platform’ (Learner), ‘GC Active’ (Active) and ‘GC Advanced’ (Advanced). In both 
the Advanced and the Active level (see UNGC, 2012b) it is no longer possible for participants 
to highlight just one issue where implementation is good, while concealing others where im-
plementation is poor. Companies have to report on each issue (human rights, labor, environ-
ment, anti-corruption) separately. On the Advanced level there are 24 detailed criteria that 
companies have to meet in their annual COP reports. A criterion is considered met when a 
company communicates that it has implemented or plans to implement one or more of the 
commonly accepted best practices associated with that criterion. Companies are only allowed 
to exclude single issues if they can outline why a particular issue is not relevant to the organi-
zation’s specific operating context. 
In sum, there is a need for further comprehensive investigations of voluntary initiatives like 
the UNGC. Furthermore, the recent UNGC developments toward clearer implementation 
guidance call for an updated analysis of the initiative’s accomplishments. The aim of this 
study is, hence, to enrich our knowledge on the implementation of the UNGC and the impact 
of its stakeholder engagement approach by drawing on a large set of companies and countries 
worldwide and applying a three-level implementation measure that is directly tailored to as-
sess UNGC implementation. 
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HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
One of the most crucial questions regarding the impact of the UNGC can be stated as follows: 
compared to the newer participants, have the older participants learned to better implement 
the UNGC principles? This question is especially relevant given the common criticism that 
companies simply join to benefit from the UN’s reputation without intending to improve their 
implementation of the UNGC principles (Deva, 2006; Rasche et al., 2013; Williams, 2004). 
Critics argue that the design of the initiative, lacking stringent enforcement mechanisms such 
as independent monitoring is inappropriate to generate substantive organizational outcomes 
(e.g. Berliner & Prakash, 2014; Sethi & Schepers, 2014). 
To analyze the impact of the UNGC on the organizational practices of its business partici-
pants, we have to consider only those features that are exclusively available to UNGC partici-
pants. In the following, I will refer to the exclusive impact of the UNGC on business partici-
pants as the ‘net impact’. What is hence excluded in the analysis of the UNGC’s net impact is 
the myriad of documents that provide guidance on implementing the ten UNGC principles, as 
these are publicly available to all interested parties. In fact, the only feature exclusively avail-
able to UNGC participants is its learning and network structure. Business participants are 
linked with governments, civil society organizations and labor through three engagement 
mechanisms: learning events, dialogue events and partnership projects (see Palazzo & 
Scherer, 2010; Rasche, 2009; Williams, 2004). 
Several models on learning processes in the context of CSR integration have been developed, 
the most prominent of which is arguably Zadek’s (2004) model on Nike. However, many 
scholars argue that there is not a single ‘best way’ to manage organizational change (Burnes, 
1996). While research has so far failed to develop a single, universally accepted theory of 
organizational learning, it at least suggests that learning occurs over a period of time 
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(Crossan, Maurer, & White, 2011). Moreover, according to a recent CSR implementation 
framework incorporating previous literature on the CSR implementation processes, there 
seems to be one central means of achieving learning, or ‘change’, underpinning every step of 
CSR implementation: ‘continuous stakeholder dialogue’ (Maon et al., 2009). 
Considering the clear focus of the UNGC on achieving learning through networking and dia-
logue with stakeholders, I draw on insights from stakeholder theory to hypothesize on the 
impact of the UNGC on its business participants. Stakeholders are commonly defined as those 
“groups or individuals who can affect, or are affected by, the achievement of an organiza-
tion’s mission” (Freeman, 1984, p. 54). Stakeholders are the central actors that produce ac-
countability standards like the UNGC, as NGOs do, or benefit from their implementation, as 
employees do, and shape the discussion on how standards are put into practice (Gilbert & 
Rasche, 2008). Certain types of CSR can be perceived as manifestations of attempts to estab-
lish trusting, cooperative relationships between businesses and stakeholders (Jones, 1995). 
Scholars widely agree that, with regard to the UNGC, the interaction between firms and 
stakeholders is a driver for UNGC implementation (Mwangi et al., 2013; Simmons, 2009) or 
CSR in general (Campbell, 2007, p. 962). Burnes (2004) argues that learning about 
stakeholder expectations and the specific context in which they operate helps design the ap-
propriate mechanisms for positive organizational change. 
Applied to the UNGC, sharing best practices and following notable examples is crucial for 
learning (Kell & Levin, 2003; Rasche, 2009). At the global level, the online Learning Forum 
is one example of a UNGC learning mechanism. It is a database inviting participants to share 
good practice cases and learn from other organizations’ experience in implementing the 10 
principles through the GC web portal; the goal of the UNGC office is to form a knowledge 
platform that integrates the views of all relevant stakeholders, and at the same time increases 
the transparency of participants’ activities (Kell & Levin, 2003; Vormedal, 2005). Moreover, 
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participants can meet in person at the annual international learning forum conferences to share 
best practices and discuss experiences of working with the UNGC or attend global issue-
specific multi-stakeholder dialogues, so-called global ‘policy dialogues’, to discuss contem-
porary challenges of globalization and corporate responsibility (Rasche, 2009; Vormedal, 
2005). Taken together, we may expect that firms that have engaged more with stakeholders in 
the context of these UNGC engagement mechanisms have also learned to better implement 
the UNGC principles compared to firms that exhibit a lower level of engagement. 
The annual Global Compact Implementation Survey, the 2011 version comprising 1,325 
companies from over 100 countries, suggests a strong relationship between the length of 
UNGC participation and the degree of engagement with UNGC stakeholders. “Companies 
that have been in the Global Compact the longest are significantly more likely to partner with 
the UN – 60% of early joiners versus 25% of recent joiners“ (UNGC, 2012e, p. 22). The re-
sults of another study suggest “that companies that have participated many years in the GC, 
have submitted the most projects and have attended the most GC meetings“ (Cetindamar & 
Husoy, 2007, p. 163). With regard to learning or implementation progresses of UNGC par-
ticipants, reports by the UNGC (2011) itself as well as by the consultancy firm McKinsey 
(2007) suggest that learning indeed does occur among UNGC participants. However, the re-
sponses are not tied to any predefined set of implementation criteria and results may suffer 
from several biases, as I will outline in the methods section. 
Combining a) the presented arguments on the impact of stakeholder engagement on the im-
plementation of the UNGC and b) the strong relationship between the length of UNGC par-
ticipation and the likelihood to engage and partner with UNGC stakeholders, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1a: The longer a company has been a participant in the UNGC, the higher 
the degree of UNGC implementation. 
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Learning in the UNGC is not only supposed to occur at the global level, but also at the local 
level (Kell & Levin, 2003; Rasche, 2009). Most notably, the UNGC supports the proliferation 
of ‘local UNGC networks’ at the regional or country level (Rasche, 2012; Vormedal, 2005). 
The organizational learning literature widely acknowledges the importance of inter-
organizational networks on organizational outcomes (see e.g. Knight, 2002). Applied to the 
UNGC, “[t]heir role is to facilitate the progress of companies (...) engaged in the Compact 
with respect to implementation of the ten principles, while also creating opportunities for 
multi-stakeholder engagement and collective action“ (UNGC, 2014) (see also Gilbert & 
Behnam, 2013; Williams, 2004). Some scholars even argue that “membership in the GC alone 
is unlikely to move a company in significant ways toward progressive implementation of the 
core GC principles”, but that “the existence of active regional and local GC networks is a cru-
cial ingredient for setting in motion specific mechanisms, such as peer learning and capacity 
building, that can contribute effectively to improved performance of individual member com-
panies” (Mwangi et al., 2013, p. 204) (see also Gilbert, 2010).  
We have general indications that certain local networks have been attended regularly and that 
participants perceive the meetings as fruitful thanks to the more intense and small-scale inter-
actions that allowed them to learn from one another’s experiences (see survey by Vormedal, 
2005). Moreover, the 2011 UNGC implementation survey concludes that “[c]ompanies that 
have participated in the Global Compact the longest are more likely to engage locally“ 
(UNGC, 2012e, p. 25). Yet, we also know that local UNGC networks vary significantly, e.g. 
as regards annual activities, type of stakeholder inclusion and years of existence, if estab-
lished at all (Rasche, 2012; UNGC, 2010). In line with first qualitative empirical analyses 
(Mwangi et al., 2013) based on two local networks, the German and Australian UNGC net-
work, we may expect a higher impact of the UNGC on business routines in countries with 
strong, i.e. long established and active, UNGC networks. 
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Building on the arguments underlying the development of hypothesis 1a, and recalling that 
learning usually occurs over a period of time (Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999), I further hy-
pothesize: 
Hypothesis 1b: The presence of active and long existing local networks positively me-
diates the relationship between the duration of UNGC participation and the level of 
UNGC implementation. 
The model presented in Figure 1 illustrates the hypothesized impact of UNGC participation 
duration on the level of UNGC implementation (H1a) together with the suggested mediating 
effect of active long-established local networks of this relationship (H1b). Following the CSR 
literature, this model also includes more general determinants of UNGC implementation (con-
trol variables; described in the methods section). 
----------------------------- Insert Figure 1 about here ----------------------------- 
DATA AND METHOD 
The main data source for this study is the UNGC business participant database. My dataset 
comprises all UNGC business participants that submitted a COP between the introduction of 
the ‘Differentiation Programme’ on February 1, 2011 and November 29, 2011. After merging 
and eliminating incomplete, duplicate or otherwise unusable data, the final dataset consisted 
of 2,280 UNGC business participants. 
The date of data collection was deliberately chosen, because companies can assign themselves 
the lowest level of UNGC implementation – Learner – only once and only for the period of 12 
months, after which they must either proceed to a higher level of implementation or leave the 
UNGC. This means that data on implementation levels collected after February 1, 2012, (i.e. 
more than 12 months after the beginning of the ‘Differentiation Programme’) would suffer 
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from a strong self-selection bias, because companies which classified as Learner in the first 
year of the ‘Differentiation Programme’ and did not assess a progress in implementation dur-
ing that year would be excluded from the initiative. Recognizing that prior to February 1, 
2012 no such formal pressure to make implementation progress in the UNGC existed, the risk 
that my dataset suffers significantly from a self-selection bias may be regarded as compara-
tively low. 
Dependent variables 
UNGC implementation. The newly introduced UNGC ‘Differentiation Programme’ provides, 
for the first time, a comprehensive measure allowing for a differentiated analysis of UNGC 
implementation among participants worldwide. My analysis based on this measure comple-
ments our empirical knowledge in two ways. 
On the one hand, while relying on participant declarations – like most, if not all, measures of 
CSR implementation in large quantitative studies – it avoids asking participants about any 
type of perceived implementation progress as done in other studies. For example, response 
categories like “Advancement would not have happened otherwise” or “Significantly helped” 
(see UNGC, 2012e, p. 10) are not tied to any criteria. Therefore, they may be particularly 
prone to a social desirability bias, i.e. “systematic error in self-report measures resulting from 
the desire of respondents to avoid embarrassment and project a favorable image to others“ 
(Fisher, 1993, p. 303) (see also Crane, 1999). Instead, I derive my conclusions on UNGC ac-
complishments by confronting the self-assessed UNGC implementation levels with the objec-
tively observable measure ‘years’ of UNGC participation. On the other hand, this measure 
does not suffer from response selection biases, which are present in surveys that are re-
sponded by an unrepresentative fraction of contacted companies – possibly only those who 
made greater implementation progress. In contrast, the self-assessments of UNGC implemen-
tation according to the ‘Differentiation Programme’ are mandatory for every participant. 
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To further enrich our knowledge of the validity of the UNGC implementation measure, later 
used in my empirical analysis, I now analyze whether the ‘content’ of this measure validly 
represents a theoretically informed UNGC implementation concept. The CC assessment tool 
of Baumann-Pauly and Scherer (2013) – operationalizing the extended CSR concept of the 
Global Compact for organizational implementation (see Table 1) – is well suited for this pur-
pose. Baumann-Pauly and Scherer (2013) distinguish three dimensions that are crucial for 
CSR implementation: commitment, structures & procedures and interaction. Commitment is 
demonstrated by the corporation’s willingness to implement CSR systematically. Structures 
& procedures describe the internal implementation of CC principles in the corporation’s day-
to-day activities. Finally, interaction – primarily with external stakeholders – is necessary for 
gaining legitimacy (Scherer et al., 2006; Suchman, 1995). For each dimension they developed 
specific criteria, drawing on the relevant organizational and management literature.  
The left side of Table 1 displays the highest level of CSR implementation, which in the Bau-
mann-Pauly and Scherer (2013) CC assessment tool is referred to as the ‘Civil’ stage (see also 
Zadek, 2004). I will compare this stage with the Advanced stage in the UNGC ‘Differentia-
tion Programme’ (hereafter ‘UNGC Advanced criteria’) to examine whether these UNGC 
criteria indeed correspond to a high degree of CC implementation as derived from academia. 
A perfect match, i.e. exact equivalence, between the two models can be ascertained if the fol-
lowing two conditions are met: (1) each criterion used in the CC assessment tool has its coun-
terpart in the UNGC Advanced criteria, and vice versa. (2) There are no (or only minimal) 
possibilities to formally circumvent the CC assessment tool criteria through ‘loopholes’ or 
lack of clarity in the UNGC Advanced criteria. 




(1) The comparison between the UNGC Advanced criteria and those of the Baumann-Pauly 
and Scherer (2013) CC assessment (Table 1) shows that, indeed, all CC assessment tool crite-
ria are addressed in at least one UNGC Advanced criterion. Several CC assessment tool crite-
ria correspond to various UNGC Advanced criteria, as the latter are quite detailed. In fact, this 
specification is well in line with Baumann-Pauly and Scherer (2013), who identified the need 
to complement their original CC assessment tool by specifying further criteria for certain 
complex issue areas. The UNGC Advanced criteria 5 to 20 address four issue areas: human 
rights, labor, the environment and anti-corruption with respectively four criteria (commit-
ment, management systems, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and standardized per-
formance indicators). Vice versa, all UNGC Advanced criteria are addressed in the CC as-
sessment tool. The first condition is therefore fully met. 
(2) Three CC tool criteria ‘alignment of incentive structures,’ ‘provision of training’ and 
‘complaints procedure’ are not directly addressed in any of the UNGC Advanced criteria as 
such, but appear only in single best practices listed underneath several criteria. These appear 
italicized in Table 1. Because it is sufficient for UNGC participants to fulfill one best practice 
under each UNGC Advanced criterion for that criterion to be met, they have the possibility to 
circumvent these three CC tool criteria. Furthermore, some suggested best practices – such as 
“Allocation of responsibilities and accountability within the organization” (UNGC Advanced 
criterion 6, fourth best practice, UNGC, 2012d, p. p. 5) – are less clear-cut than other best 
practices e.g. regarding application levels of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) (see 
UNGC Advanced criterion 23, UNGC, 2012d, p. p. 13). Because of such ‘loopholes’ or miss-
ing specification, the third condition is only partially met. Given the necessity to maintain a 
certain degree of generalizability with regard to the 24 criteria, which have to apply to all 
sorts of businesses worldwide, certain ‘loopholes’ and ambiguities may be deemed unavoid-
able. In view of this, the match between the two models can be regarded as ‘reasonably’ good. 
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In addition to the analysis of the UNGC implementation measure’s ‘content’, I conducted 
several analyses allowing for initial insights on the validity of the self-assessed UNGC im-
plementation ‘construct’ (see Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). In other words, I try to generate 
knowledge on whether there is the risk of ‘decoupling’, i.e. a gap between a company’s CSR 
‘talk’ and its actual day-to-day CSR ‘walk’ (see Aravind & Christmann, 2011; Behnam & 
MacLean, 2011), in this study’s dataset. As Appendix 2 outlines in detail, the theoretical risk 
of decoupling has been reduced with the increased accountability structure of the UNGC. 
Empirically, I find that companies included in the Dow Jones Sustainability World Index, a 
third-party CSR performance assessment based on its own set of sustainability criteria, are 
37% more likely to classify as Advanced in the UNGC ‘Differentation Programme’ when 
compared with those classifying as Learner. Moreover, based on a small third-party UNGC 
assessment database, I find that a one-unit increase in the reliability of UNGC participant in-
formation increases the probability to classify as (UNGC) Advanced by 29% when compared 
to Learner. While these analyses suggest that there is considerable ‘noise’ in the relationship 
between the analyzed variables, they do not find any evidence for the presence of systematic 
decoupling, e.g. a negative relationship between UNGC implementation and DJSI inclusion, 
in my dataset. 
Independent variables 
Duration of UNGC participation. To analyze the effect of the duration of participa-
tion on UNGC implementation, I recoded the date of UNGC entry in the dataset into com-
pleted years of participation. 
‘Strong’ local UNGC networks (mediating variable). To analyze how the presence of 
‘strong’ local UNGC networks mediate the relationship between UNGC participation dura-
tion and level of (self-assessed) UNGC implementation, I created a dummy variable assigning 
countries the values 1 or 0 based on the following categorization (data from the local network 
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report: UNGC, 2010). I define ‘strong’ local networks as those fulfilling the following crite-
ria: 1) Businesses – both large companies and small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) – 
are involved in the network as participant, in its governance and at events. 2) The network has 
more activities than the global average (data referring to 2009). 3) The network exists at least 
since 2004. This threshold was chosen pragmatically to allow both for a ‘critical mass’ of 
established networks and a ‘sufficient’ period of engaging with its participants over time. 
Consequently countries with local networks in the following countries were coded as ‘strong’ 
(=1): Argentina, Bulgaria, France, Italy, Japan, Spain and the UK. 
Control variables 
According to CSR research, most of the drivers for CSR implementation, or UNGC imple-
mentation in particular, relate to the visibility and the resources of the firm, as well as the in-
stitutional background against which the CSR engagement takes place (Mitchell, Agle, & 
Wood, 1997). Institutional perspectives on CSR suggest that firms form relevant decisions by 
drawing on the prevailing norms and benchmarks that are available in a broader social context 
(Humphreys, 2008). Scholars have identified a variety of institutional factors that inform 
CSR-related decisions (Campbell, 2007; Ioannou & Serafim, 2010; McWilliams & Siegel, 
2001). Due to constraints in scope, I will only use these variables as controls, rather than pos-
tulating further hypotheses regarding their impact on UNGC implementation. 
Firm size. The increasing scope and economic interdependence of many corporations, 
generally resulting in higher firm visibility, appears to be an important driver for firms to 
adopt CSR initiatives (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Porter & Kramer, 2006; Vogel, 2010). Previ-
ous empirical results suggest that bigger firms are more likely to join the UNGC (Bennie, 
Bernhagen, & Mitchell, 2007); so far there are no results on whether they are also better 
implementers. I used the number of employees as a measure of firm size. The respective 
analysis in my sample revealed that the presence of several very large firms leads to a posi-
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tively skewed distribution. After a natural logarithm (ln) transformation was applied to the 
number of employees, the distribution resembled a normal distribution. Thus, in this study 
firm size is represented by the ln-transformed number of employees. 
Country/region. Campbell (2007) argues that certain national institutional conditions, 
such as strong and effectively enforced state regulation as well as the presence of strong trade 
associations or employee associations, promote corporate socially responsible behavior. 
These conditions are characteristic of the more ‘coordinated market economies’, as opposed 
to rather ‘liberal market economies’ (see Hall & Soskice, 2001; Jackson & Apostolakou, 
2010). Moreover, other explanations for cross-country variations in CSR implementation 
have been suggested, such as the degree of a country’s overall development (see Brammer, 
Pavelin, & Porter, 2006) or embeddedness in international (non-)governmental organization 
networks (Berliner & Prakash, 2012). 
To reduce the number of (dummy) variables, I grouped countries into regions in many mod-
els. If the company is located e.g. in Western Europe, its value is 1 for this region dummy and 
0 for all others. Countries represented by 50 or more business participants in the UNGC are 
listed separately and have not been included in the region dummy variable; for example, 
Germany is listed separately, as it is represented by 82 business participants in the UNGC, 
and has hence not been included in the Western Europe dummy. The dummy United States of 
America has been omitted in the analyses and serves as a reference point for a typical liberal 
market economy, to which more coordinated market countries can be compared. The regional 
categorization is based on the composition of macro geographical (continental) regions and 
geographical sub-regions provided by the UN Statistics Division. In addition, Caribbean and 
Central American companies have been grouped together into Central America, while the 
regional dummy MENA represents countries in the Middle East and North Africa. 
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Industrial sector. Considering that the main challenges companies within the same in-
dustrial sector face are similar, their approaches to CSR may also be similar. The boundaries 
of different industrial sectors can thus be taken to represent the boundaries of different institu-
tional fields (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). I grouped the various sectors as presented in the 
dataset obtained from the UNGC into 19 ‘supersectors’, following the Industry Categoriza-
tion Benchmark (ICB), 2011. 
Ownership type. Previous studies on the UNGC (2011) or CSR in general (Atkinson 
& Galaskiewicz, 1988; Graves & Waddock, 1994; Johnson & Greening, 1999) suggest that a 
company’s ownership structure may be another determinant in the adoption of CSR practices. 
Different types of ownership are also related to a firm’s level of visibility and scrutiny, espe-
cially as regards private versus public ownership (Baker, 2010), and may therefore influence 
the degree of UNGC implementation as well. I used four different categories of business 
ownership (public, private, state-owned, subsidiary) as dummy variables in all analyses. 
Analytical Approaches 
I test my hypotheses across a range of models, i.e. ordered logit and probit versus ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression, incorporating different assumptions regarding the underlying 
distribution and/or nature of the dependent variable. First, to closely adhere to the ordinal na-
ture of the dependent variable ‘UNGC implementation’, ordered logit and probit models ap-
pear most appropriate. These models take the ceiling and floor effects into account and avoid 
potential distortions resulting from subjectively assigned scores to the three UNGC differen-
tiation levels (Hanushek & Jackson, 1977). 
In the ordered logit and probit models, the ordinal dependent variable y is viewed as a discrete 
realization of an underlying latent variable y*, which is unobservable. The categories of vari-
able y are contiguous intervals on the continuous scale of variable y*. Whereas the unobserv-
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able y* would satisfy the linear regression model y*i = x’iß + ui (x being the covariate vector, 
ß the vector of regression coefficients and u the error term), the observable y is assumed to 
arise from y* as follows: yi = j if αj-1 < y*i ≤ αj (the α’s representing unknown cutpoints, cate-
gory boundaries, in the distribution of y*) (see e.g. Lu, 1999). The ordered logit and ordered 
probit models differ in the underlying distribution. For the (ordered) logit, the distribution F is 
the logistic cumulative distribution function (cdf) F(z) = exp(z)/[1 + exp (z)], whereas for the 
(ordered) probit, F is the standard normal cdf  (Wooldridge, 2012). In Table 3a, models 1 and 
2 are based on ordered logit, models 3 and 4 on ordered probit regressions. To interpret the 
size of effects in ordered logit and probit models, we need to look at marginal effects (Table 
3b). The following formula outlines the marginal effect of an increase in regressor xr on the 
probability of falling into category j: ∂pij/∂xri = [F’(αj-1 – x’iß) – F’(αj – x’iß)]ßr. The sum of 
the marginal effects of each variable on the different categories is always zero. 
In addition to the ordered logit and probit models, I perform linear (OLS) regression analyses 
(models 5 and 6 in Table 3a). The benefit of this type of analysis is the easier interpretability 
of the ß coefficients. However, as the OLS model violates the ordinal-rank assumption of our 
dependent variable y assuming an interval-scale instead, results need to be interpreted with 
caution. 
Finally, I controlled for the possibility that participation duration itself is nonrandom, i.e. that 
selection into participating longer in the UNGC as opposed to participating shorter or not at 
all may be driven by omitted variables. This potential selection problem has long been unad-
dressed in empirical work on the UNGC (Berliner & Prakash, 2014). Selection effects are 
present if firms that participate longer in the UNGC have independent tendencies toward dif-
ferent aspects in their social performance compared to firms that participate shorter or not at 
all. I use the method of instrumental variables (IV) (Wooldridge, 2012) in a set of further lin-
ear models to solve the potential selection – i.e. endogeneity – problem, thereby assessing 
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only the exogenous element of UNGC participation duration. A valid instrumental variable 
(instrument) is correlated with the potentially endogenous independent variable, but has no 
partial effect on the dependent variable (when the potentially endogenous variable and omit-
ted variables have been controlled for) (Wooldridge, 2012). In other words, the instrument 
must predict UNGC participation duration of the firms considered in my dataset, but must not 
influence their level of UNGC implementation. 
I identify one variable that fulfills these conditions both theoretically and empirically: the 
average participation duration per sector of firms that have exited or been delisted from the 
UNGC. The theoretical intuition behind this instrument draws on arguments from the institu-
tional isomorphism and policy diffusion literatures, stating that organizations tend to mimic 
the behavior of salient peer groups, for example as regards decisions to participate in volun-
tary initiatives (Berliner & Prakash, 2014; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Simmons, Dobbin, & 
Garrett, 2006). Recent empirical UNGC literature suggests that a higher number of UNGC 
participants per sector increases the mimetic pressure on other firms in that sector to partici-
pate (Berliner & Prakash, 2014). Building on this argument, I expect that mimetic pressures 
not only apply for firms’ decision to join but also to stay in the UNGC. That is, if firms in a 
given sector stay longer in voluntary initiatives, other firms in that sector may face mimetic 
pressures to stay longer as well. As the instrumental variable must only refer to actions of 
firms other than the reference firms, it only comprises former UNGC participants (as of No-
vember 29, 2011). Further considering that reasons of leaving or being excluded from the 
UNGC appear to be so varied (see also Knudsen, 2011), a relation between the participation 
duration of exited participations and the level of UNGC implementation appears highly un-
likely. Empirical tests support the strength of this instrumental variable. In the applied two-
stage least squares model including the instrumental variable, the Cragg-Donald F statistic as 
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a test for the presence of weak instruments (i.e. that the equation is only weakly identified) 
(Stock & Yogo, 2002) is far above a critical value. 
In addition to these IV estimation analyses, I apply yet another model addressing selection 
issues: the classic Heckman two-step selection model (Heckman, 1979). This model predicts 
selection to a potentially endogenous treatment (UNGC participation duration) and then con-
trols for unmodeled selection to treatment in predicting the dependent variable (UNGC im-
plementation) (Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010). For this model to work I 
need to consider both participants and nonparticipants in order to have non-random missing 
data with regard to the dependent variable. As nonparticipants, I included a dataset of 2926 
delisted UNGC business participants obtained at the same time as my main data set used in all 
other analyses so far (Nov. 29, 2011). The total number of observations thereby amounted to 
5187. I controlled for unmodeled selection to treatment in predicting the dependent variable 
by using again the same instrument as in the IV model: average participation duration per 
sector of past UNGC business participants. Again, caution is necessary when interpreting the 
results, as the IV and Heckman models relax the ordinal-scale assumption of the dependent 
variable, assuming an interval scale instead. 
In all analyses, I ensure that standard errors are robust against heteroscedasticity (see Breusch 
& Pagan, 1979), i.e. that the possible presence of correlated or of not normally distributed 
residuals does not invalidate my statistical significance tests. I applied a robust variance esti-
mator, typically referred to as Huber-White sandwich estimator (White, 1980), in all models. 






As displayed in Table 2 (a), almost a quarter (23%) of UNGC business participants imple-
ments the UNGC at the ‘Learner Platform’ stage, the vast majority (71%) reports to be at the 
‘GC Active’ stage, while only a very small percentage (6%) declares an implementation of 
the UNGC at the ‘GC Advanced’ level. 
----------------------------- Insert Table 2 about here ----------------------------- 
Table 2 (b) is a correlation matrix for key variables included in this study. 
Testing hypothesis 1a 
Models 1, 3 and 5 displayed in Table 3a report the effect of the years of participation on – 
self-assessed – UNGC implementation. In all three models, the variable years of participation 
has a significant positive effect on UNGC implementation. Recalling that the ß coefficients in 
the ordered logit (model 1) and ordered probit (model 3) regressions do not show the actual 
size of the effect, we need to analyze the marginal effects in such models, which are depicted 
in Table 3b. 
----------------------------- Insert Tables 3a and 3b about here ----------------------------- 
For example, we can see in the ordered probit model that with each additional year of UNGC 
participation (centered at mean 3.78), the probability for a business participant classifying as 
Learner decreases by 1.2%, whereas the probabilities of classifying as Active or Advanced 
increase by 0.8% and 0.4% respectively. In comparison, marginal effects of the presence of a 
strong local network on the different UNGC differentiation stages are bigger. A UNGC busi-
ness participant from a country with a strong local UNGC network is 15.5% less likely to 
classify as Learner, 10.7% more likely to classify as Active and 4.8% more likely to classify 
as Advanced when compared with UNGC participants from the remaining countries. Mar-
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ginal effects in the ordered logit model are very similar to the ones in the ordered probit 
model. However, we can see in the bottom half of Table 3b that the ordered probit model pre-
dicts the actual frequencies (of falling into each of the three UNGC implementation levels) 
slightly better than the ordered logit model. Therefore, these effects are not reported here. 
Finally, the OLS model provides further indication that the size of the UNGC participation 
duration effect is rather small (ß = 0.016*** in model 5 and ß = 0.015*** in model 6). We 
have to recall that this effect only reflects the net impact of the length of UNGC participation, 
i.e. it excludes learning effects from sources outside the Global Compact. We further have to 
keep in mind that the underlying data is cross-sectional and does not trace the implementation 
scores of participants over time.  
However, by restricting our analysis on time-period subsamples of our data set (not reported 
in a separate table due to constraints in scope), we can get a more detailed picture on the ro-
bustness or variability of the UNGC participation duration effect. To acknowledge for argu-
ments that it might have been mainly industry leaders that joined the UNGC in the first place 
(see e.g. Mwangi et al., 2013, p. 211), we first exclude companies having joined in 2000, the 
year of UNGC foundation. Rerunning the analysis performed in model 6 now with this re-
stricted participant base, the UNGC participation duration effect remains highly significant 
and positive, while its size reduces by a very tiny bit from ß = 0.0153*** (full sample) to ß = 
0.0151***, which is at least consistent with the expected direction of the above stated argu-
ment. Further, restricting our analysis on the time period since the introduction of the two 
UNGC governance reforms in 2003 and 2005, the first introducing the COP policy and the 
latter formally classifying companies as “non-communicating” or “inactive” in case of non-
compliance with the COP policy (Mwangi et al., 2013, p. 207), reveals additional interesting 
insights. Indeed, the size of the UNGC participation duration effect increases to ß = 
0.0175*** for the subsample including participants since 2003, and even further to ß = 
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0.0255*** for the subsample of participants since 2005. In both cases, the effect remains 
highly significant. Finally, restricting our analysis solely on the period around the introduc-
tion of the ‘Differentiation Programme’ (official introduction in 2011, but basic self-
assessment of the coverage of all four UNGC issue areas in place already in 2010) yields sur-
prising results. The participation duration effect becomes negative when looking only at par-
ticipants having joined the UNGC since 2009 (ß = 0.060*), or 2010 (ß = 0.090
+
) respectively, 
2011 being the latest year considered in this study. 
A locally weighted regression analysis, so-called ‘lowess smoothing’ (see Cleveland, 1979), 
of years of participation on UNGC implementation (Figure 2) illustrates that a ‘progressive 
implementation’ effect seems to be present especially for the sample of companies having 
joined prior to 2010, i.e. being participants for more than two years. On the other hand, Figure 
2 also illustrates the previously identified negative participation duration effect for the sample 
of companies having joined since 2010, the last two years considered in this study.  
----------------------------- Insert Figure 2 about here ----------------------------- 
Finally, the results of the instrumental variable models in Table 5, solving the potential selec-
tion effect of UNGC participation duration in the UNGC by assessing only its exogenous 
component, all yield significant positive effects for UNGC participation duration on UNGC 
implementation. In the two stage least squares (2sls) model 1 this effect is even larger (ß = 0.!
062
+
) compared to the OLS models 5 and 6 in Table 3a. However, significance levels for the 
participation duration effect are reduced in the 2sls model: While remaining within the 10% 
level when clustering the geography variable at the country level, significance drops slightly 
beyond the 10% level when clustering at a more regional level as done in models 1 to 6 of 
Table 3a. In both Heckman models, model 2 using maximum likelihood and model 3 two-step 
estimation, the size of the participation duration (ß = 0.016*** in models 2 and 3) effect re-
mains similar to the OLS models in Table 3a, while still being highly significant. Further-
 
 60 
more, the selection equations (not reported in Table 5) reveal a highly significant effect of the 
instrumental variable on the likelihood of the dependent variable being observed. 
Overall, the findings across the great majority of analytical approaches and model specifica-
tions ascertain a significant positive effect of UNGC participation duration on UNGC imple-
mentation and thus provide support for my hypothesis 1a. 
Testing hypothesis 1b 
The results illustrated in Table 4 provide us with detailed and partially surprising insights on 
the mediating role of ‘strong’ local UNGC networks in the relationship between the duration 
of UNGC participation and the level of self-assessed UNGC implementation. To test for me-
diation, I followed the three step approach by Baron & Kenny (1986, p. 1177). In step a, I 
regressed the mediator ‘strong local network’ on the dependent variable ‘UNGC implementa-
tion’; in step b, I regressed the dependent variable on the independent variable ‘years of par-
ticipation’; finally, in step c, I regressed the dependent variable on both the independent vari-
able and on the mediator. In all three steps, I included the controls firm size, region, supersec-
tor (industry) and ownership type. 
Mediation is established if the following conditions hold: the independent variable affects the 
mediator in step a; the independent variable affects the dependent variable in step b; and, in 
step c, the mediator must affect the dependent variable. As a consequence of these three con-
ditions being met, with coefficients pointing in the predicted directions, the effect of the inde-
pendent variable on the dependent variable must be less in the third equation than in the sec-
ond. In case of perfect mediation, this effect fully disappears (R. M. Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 
1177). Results in Table 4 show that, indeed, these three conditions are met. We have signifi-
cant effects in all relationships. However, the reduction of the effect of the independent vari-
able on the dependent variable in the third equation, compared to the second, is rather small: 
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in the ordered probit model, ß reduces from 0.044 to 0.043 (Table 4a), the marginal effects 
reducing, for example, from 0.0082 to 0.0080 for the Active level (Table 4b); in the OLS 
model, ß reduces from 0.016 to 0.015. This very small reduction occurring when including 
the mediator variable means that the effect of UNGC participation duration on the level of 
UNGC implementation is only mediated to a very small extent by the presence of strong local 
UNGC networks. Nevertheless, these results do suggest that there is at least a very small, i.e. 
partial, mediation of ‘strong local networks’ between ‘years of UNGC participation’ and 
‘UNGC implementation’. While this lends support for hypothesis 1b, the size of the effect 
may be regarded too small to be meaningful. 
I have so far hypothesized a mediating role of ‘strong local networks’. A related effect of a 
third variable on the relationship between an independent and a dependent variable is the one 
of a moderator (R. M. Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 1174). The argumentation for the presence of 
a moderation effect slightly differs from the one for a mediation effect. While mediators ex-
plain how or why a certain effect between two variables occurs, moderator variables specify 
when certain effects will hold. This difference is reflected in different approaches of testing 
moderation compared to mediation. To increase our knowledge on the role of strong local 
UNGC networks, I thus also considered its potential moderating effect in further analyses. 
The results in Figure 3 show that this moderating effect is insignificant for the total group of 
‘strong’ networks (Argentina, Bulgaria, France, Italy, Japan, Spain, UK). However, we obtain 
interesting insights when looking at each of these countries separately. For Spain, the ‘strong’ 
local network with the highest number of business participants, we obtain a highly significant 
positive effect on the ‘years of participation – level of implementation’ relationship (see lower 
left graph of Figure 3). Similarly, I find such an effect for France (see lower right graph of 
Figure 3), the local network with the second most business participants, and for Italy. A rea-
son for this effect to be present especially in the two countries with the largest local networks 
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may be the need to achieve a ‘critical mass’, which I will discuss later on. Recalling that 
French business participants overall self-assess significantly lower levels of UNGC imple-
mentation (see Table 3), it appears now particularly interesting to note that UNGC implemen-
tation “progress” over the duration of participation appears much stronger in France than in 
countries without ‘strong’ local networks. We can now understand that the overall negative 
‘French business UNGC implementation’ effect (Table 3) mainly stems from much lower 
self-assessments especially by recently joining French businesses. 
----------------------------- Insert Figure 3 about here ----------------------------- 
Finally, I obtain insignificant moderating effects for Japan (positive), a country with a 
‘strong’ local network that has been also identified as very efficient in previous studies 
(Rasche, 2012) and for Argentina, Bulgaria and the UK (negative). Overall, similar to my 
findings regarding the presence of a mediation effect, the findings regarding the potential 
presence of a moderation effect do not provide clear results. At least, we can recognize that 
none of the countries with ‘strong’ local networks (as categorized here) displays a significant 
negative moderating effect, yet three of these networks (among them the two biggest ones) 
display a significant positive one. 
General determinants of UNGC implementation (control variables) 
Table 3a also provides the results for other determinants of UNGC implementation. All four 
types of determinants (national institutional context, size, sector, ownership type) influence 
UNGC implementation.  
Firm size. In all three models, firm size appears to significantly and strongly increase 
UNGC implementation. This result tends to add to previous studies stating that higher visibil-
ity and capacity of large companies lead to a higher likelihood of joining voluntary CSR ini-
tiatives (Bennie et al., 2007), yet seems to contradict with recent arguments about CSR im-
plementation at SMEs (Baumann-Pauly, Wickert, Spence, & Scherer, 2013). I will outline the 
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need for further investigations addressing potential ambiguities in previous research on firm 
size in the ‘limitations and future research’ section. 
National institutional context. My results show that UNGC implementation can vary 
significantly across countries. However, this variation seems not to depend on the type of na-
tional business systems as postulated by previous scholars (Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010; 
Khanna, Kogan, & Palepu, 2006). Indeed, implementation scores of companies in the liberal 
market economy system of the UK do not significantly vary from scores in the US. On the 
other hand, most companies from countries with a coordinated market economy do not im-
plement significantly lower than the US benchmark. In fact, of such countries, only French 
companies are implementing the UNGC significantly lower than the US, whereas companies 
from Japan, Italy and Spain are implementing significantly higher.  
Industrial sector. Surprisingly, only very little variation of UNGC implementation can 
be explained by the context of a firm’s industry sector. Taking the automobiles & parts sector 
as the benchmark category of a high impact sector, company levels of UNGC implementation 
in most other sectors do not significantly differ. The only significant result is that companies 
in the utilities sector implement the Global Compact significantly higher than companies in 
the automobiles & parts sector.  
Ownership type. Finally, my results suggest that the type of ownership explains varia-
tion in UNGC implementation. Public companies implement the Compact significantly higher 
than private ones. These results are hence in line with prior literature arguing that stronger 




DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study focuses on the largest voluntary CSR initiative worldwide, the UN Global Com-
pact. Its purpose is to enrich our knowledge of the impact of the initiative on the business par-
ticipants’ implementation of the ten UNGC principles. Consequently, this study addressed the 
following research questions: Does longer UNGC membership duration lead to higher levels 
of UNGC implementation? How does the presence of strong local UNGC networks mediate 
this relationship? My findings, discussed in detail below, contribute to the UNGC literature 
by examining the role of participation duration, local stakeholder engagement opportunities 
and institutional context in explaining UNGC implementation. In addition, I provide theoreti-
cal and empirical insights on the validity of the new ‘Differentiation Programme’ measure. 
UNGC participation duration. While scholars have predominantly referred to problems with 
‘weak’ standard designs (Behnam & MacLean, 2011; Berliner & Prakash, 2012), my findings 
suggest that voluntary CSR initiatives may indeed impact organizational practices, even in the 
absence of strict compliance and enforcement measures. Overall, I found UNGC implementa-
tion to be higher for longer UNGC participants than for newer ones. Consequently, my results 
suggest that UNGC participation duration has a positive, albeit moderate, effect on the level 
of UNGC implementation. This study hence complements our knowledge of UNGC imple-
mentation derived from the few existing quantitative studies about the impact of the UNGC 
over the time of participation (McKinsey, 2007; UNGC, 2011), which had to rely on non-
criteria based perceptions. In the 2010 UNGC implementation survey, only 16% of the busi-
ness participant respondents stated that the Compact has a minimal impact on CSR policies 
and practices (5% replied that the Compact has no impact). The vast majority (79%), how-
ever, stated that the Compact has at least a moderate impact on such behavior (UNGC, 2011, 
p. 16). The UNGC study by McKinsey (2007, p. 18) reported similar findings: here, 59% of 
respondents, which were CEOs of companies participating in the Global Compact, replied 
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that they had incorporated environmental, social and governance issues into core strategy 
“much more“ than five years ago. 
Here, I assess the net impact of UNGC participation by drawing upon the objectively observ-
able measure years of participation. My findings across all different types and specifications 
of analytical models, including instrumental variable approaches, suggest that the duration of 
UNGC participation has a much lower impact on the level of UNGC implementation (mar-
ginal effects in the ordered logit and probit models around 1%; OLS coefficient ß = 0.02) than 
the McKinsey (2007) study and the UNGC (2011) implementation survey suggest. In this 
respect, we may need to scale down the very optimistic expectations regarding the UNGC’s 
impact on its business participants’ CSR-related behavior that appear in previous studies. To 
obtain a better picture on the UNGC ‘net’ impact in future surveys, the UNGC could add 
questions controlling for the impact of other CSR initiatives (see also Rasche et al., 2013). 
Moreover, my findings provide additional insights on the effect of ‘first joiners’ as well as the 
various governance reforms by looking at time-period subsamples. On the one hand, the 
UNGC participation duration effect becomes slightly smaller, remaining positive and signifi-
cant, if we exclude companies having joined the initiative in the first year. While this result is 
in line with previous arguments regarding the likelihood of industry leaders joining the 
UNGC in the first place (Mwangi et al., 2013), the UNGC participation duration effect holds. 
On the other hand, this effect becomes considerably bigger again when restricting the analysis 
on the time period since the refinement of the UNGC accountability structure through the 
2003 introduction of the COP policy and 2005 introduction of ‘company delistings’ (Mwangi 
et al., 2013). This finding may provide initial evidence that these governance reforms in-
creased the impact of the UNGC on its business participants, thereby highlighting the value of 
accountability structures in voluntary CSR programs (Behnam & MacLean, 2011; Berliner & 
Prakash, 2014).  
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More generally, this finding contributes to the discussion about the essence and design of 
global voluntary CSR initiatives. Several studies of such initiatives tended to restrict their 
analysis on a static perspective, i.e. they focused on the accountability and performance re-
lated aspects of a standard at a given point in time. For example, such a perspective led Deva 
(2006) to criticize the UNGC principles as being too vague and thus hard to implement, or 
Behnam and MacLean (2011) to conclude that the UNGC invites participants to decouple 
actual practices from formal principles. This understanding may focus too much on the per-
formance of standards, e.g. by comparing nonadopters with adopters (often irrespective of the 
duration of adoption) (A. A. King & Toffel, 2007; Wijen, 2014). According to this view, due 
to the risk of symbolic adoption in case of weak guidance and accountability of a global vol-
untary standard, standards “need to be designed and implemented in such a way that adopters 
will substantively comply with standard requirements“ (Wijen, 2014, p. 306) (D. P. Baron & 
Lyon, 2012; Campbell, 2007; B. G. King & McDonnel, 2012). In contrast, this study suggests 
that voluntary global standards may have a much more developmental character than critics 
applying a static performance based view on standards suggest. I showed that the duration of 
participation (rather than simply joining) positively affects the level of UNGC implementa-
tion. I further outlined how the UNGC refined its guidance and accountability structure of the 
years of existence, and provided first indication that this gradual refinement may have further 
increased the progress of participants over time. In sum, these findings suggest that imple-
mentation criteria and exact goals are not fully predefined at the time of standard foundation 
yet may be continuously adjusted and refined along the way (see also Haack, Schoeneborn, & 
Wickert, 2012; Schembera, Haack, & Scherer, 2015).    
Strong local UNGC networks and general determinants of UNGC implementation. My study 
lends at least partial support to theoretical arguments on the effect of local stakeholder en-
gagement and networking opportunities. In line with previous theoretical arguments, the pres-
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ence of strong local UNGC networks has a significant positive effect on the UNGC imple-
mentation as regards business participants in these countries (see Mwangi et al., 2013; 
Rasche, 2012; Vormedal, 2005). However, the effect of these strong networks on progressive 
UNGC implementation over the duration of UNGC participation seems rather limited. The 
mediating (and potential moderating) effect of strong local UNGC networks between UNGC 
participation length and UNGC implementation is small, if significant at all. However, the 
moderating analysis revealed at least greater ‘learning’ effects of business participants within 
the two largest local UNGC networks, Spain and France. While French business participants 
assess significantly lower levels of UNGC implementation than their Spanish neighbors, in 
both countries participants assess significantly more progress as regards the implementation 
of the UNGC compared to countries without active and long established local networks. 
These observed patterns may lend support for recently emerging arguments regarding the ne-
cessity of achieving a ‘critical mass’ of participants to promote global CSR practices (see 
Barkemeyer & Napolitano, 2009; Haack et al., 2012; Kell, 2005). In line with these studies, 
one may argue that voluntary CSR initiatives first need to be concerned with building up a 
large group of participants by keeping the implementation criteria low; only thereafter a tight-
ening of criteria and progress among participants may be expected (Christensen, Morsing, & 
Thyssen, 2013; Haack et al., 2012). 
The new ‘Differentiation Programme’. I discussed the validity of the UNGC ‘Differentiation 
Programme’ by consulting academic assessment models (Baumann-Pauly & Scherer, 2013; 
Behnam & MacLean, 2011) as well as empirical data on sustainability compiled by independ-
ent third parties (RobeccoSAM and BHP Brugger und Partners). As regards content, the 
UNGC ‘Differentiation Programme’ displays – in most regards – a good fit with the academic 
corporate citizenship assessment tool of Baumann-Pauly and Scherer (2013). However, my 
analysis revealed certain ‘loopholes’ in the former, namely a so far insufficient integration of 
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three central elements of UNGC implementation: ‘alignment of incentive structures’, ‘provi-
sion of training’ and ‘installation of a complaints procedure’. Therefore, to further increase 
the potential impact of the initiative, I recommend to close these ‘loopholes’ by obliging par-
ticipants aiming for the GC Advanced level to incorporate these three CSR elements in all 
four UNGC issue areas. 
Regarding the risk of bluewashing or decoupling in the UNGC, recent developments like the 
introduction of the ‘Differentiation Programme’ or public ‘delistings’ as part of the COP pol-
icy constitute improvements of the UNGC’s accountability structure and suggest an updated 
analysis of the former application of decoupling characteristics to the UNGC by Behnam and 
MacLean (2011). Furthermore, comparisons of the self-assessed UNGC data with third-party 
assessments did not indicate that the findings in this study might be crucially distorted by the 
presence of ‘decoupling’ or social desirability bias. 
With regard to further determinants of UNGC implementation, my findings suggest that the 
generally more visible public companies report higher levels of implementation than their 
private counterparts, which is in line with institutional theory and resource dependency argu-
ments (Campbell, 2007; Hart, 1995). More controversially with regard to previous research 
though, the results in this study suggest that the level of UNGC implementation rises with 
increasing firm size (measured by the number of employees). On the one hand, this finding 
seems to be in line with previous studies analyzing the determinants of joining voluntary CSR 
initiatives (Bennie et al., 2007; Porter & Kramer, 2006; Vogel, 2010). Furthermore, literature 
on the particular (CSR) issue corruption suggests that SMEs face greater challenges in im-
plementing corruption controls and are more likely to be involved in corrupt practices 
(Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier, & Pagés, 2011; Bennedsen, Feldmann, & Dreyer Lassen, 
2009). On the other hand, there is also a prominent stream of recent CSR literature suggesting 
that, despite their limited resources, SMEs may pursue an approach of solving societal prob-
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lems that is not necessarily inferior to the one of large MNCs (Baumann-Pauly et al., 2013; 
Jenkins, 2004; Murillo & Lozano, 2006; Wickert, 2014). As I will highlight below, more re-
search on the role of firm size with regard to the implementation of CSR (issues) appears nec-
essary to address this controversial debate. 
Limitations and future research 
Inevitably, this study has its limitations, some of which might serve as a basis for future re-
search. A first limitation results from the fact that I had to rely on the information provided by 
the participants themselves in order to assess CSR implementation on a large quantitative 
basis. As outlined above, the current accountability structure may not necessarily promote 
decoupling self-assessed from actual implementation. If, however, the central aim of the re-
searcher is to explore the gap between self-assessed and actual CSR implementation in the 
best possible manner, the inclusion of qualitative studies becomes inevitable, but at the cost of 
limited generalizability. Despite this shortcoming, conducting qualitative studies on one or 
more of the companies examined by Baumann-Pauly and Scherer (2013) could help research-
ers trace the development of decoupling over time. 
Another constraint is the largely cross-sectional nature of the data. This means that the possi-
bility of reverse causality cannot be ruled out. While I, at least partly, controlled for argu-
ments regarding the higher likelihood of industry leaders joining the UNGC in the first 
year(s) of existence, as well as potential effects stemming from the continuously increased 
UNGC accountability structure, my findings do not take into account time-dependent CSR 
implementation progress that stems from sources other than the UNGC. To analyze the full 
spectrum of a company’s CSR implementation progress over time, longitudinal future re-
search is needed drawing on a representative panel of UNGC participants to identify changes 
over time incorporating a mix of quantitative and qualitative analyses (see Rasche et al., 2013, 
p. 22). This research could then also analyze in depth the conditions under which local UNGC 
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networks, beyond globally organized learning events, enhance the implementation of the 
UNGC principles, and how this local network effect unfolds over the duration a company 
participates in the UNGC. 
With regard to the general design and development of voluntary CSR programs, future re-
search is needed to further investigate the relationship and possible tradeoff between refining 
a standard’s accountability structure and maintaining a ‘critical mass’ of participants over 
time (Haack et al., 2012). Finally, the current analysis should be complemented with studies 
analyzing the impact of the UNGC since the introduction of the ‘Differentiation Programme’. 
This study’s initial, yet surprising, findings regarding the level of UNGC implementation of 
participants having joined the UNGC very recently may suggest that this program has led to 
shifting motivations for UNGC participation. Arguably, the opportunity to select an Ad-
vanced level of UNGC implementation had positive effects on the perceived legitimacy of the 
initiative and now attracts (again?) increasingly companies that have already achieved high 
CSR performance and are now able to differentiate themselves from lower CSR performers in 
the UNGC. 
Last but not least, combining insights from studies on CSR and organizational corruption on 
the role of firm size presented above, we face a puzzle of partially contradicting expectations. 
Future research is therefore needed to address the questions arising from this puzzle: What are 
the actual organizational differences between SMEs and MNCs in organizing CSR and/or 
particular CSR issues like corruption? Why are there differences and how did they develop 
over time? Based on these findings, can we identify whether one approach of fighting corrup-
tion is ‘inferior’ to the other? By answering these questions, future research should then be 
able to define the appropriate role of global voluntary initiatives in addressing and/or accom-
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Figure 2: Level of UNGC Differentiation by years of participation 
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*(not classified as ‘strong’ local network country) 
 
 












1) ‘Strong’ local network 
countries 
-0.017 0.036 
2) Years of participation 0.021 0.005 




Constant 1.742*** 0.021 
2807 0.013 0.011 
1) Spain 0.149** 0.046 
2) Years of participation 0.021*** 0.004 
Interaction (of 1 and 2) 0.023* 0.010 
Spain 
Constant 1.742*** 0.020 
2166 0.051 0.050 
1) France -0.486*** 0.057 
2) Years of participation 0.021*** 0.005 
Interaction (of 1 and 2) 0.024* 0.011 
France 
Constant 1.742*** 0.021 
2129 0.077 0.075 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 81 






CC assessment tool “Civil” stage 
(see Haack et al., 2012) 
UNGC Advanced implementa-





• CC significant value in company’s mission 
statement and all other documents  
• Respecting stakeholders’ demands is cen-
tral to the company’s mission.  
• CC used by top management to justify 
company decisions.  
• Legal compliance and compliance with the 
Code is equally important. 
• Criterion1: The COP describes key 
aspects of the company’s high-level 
sustainability strategy in line with 
Global Compact principles 
• Criterion 5 (9/13/17): The COP 
describes robust commitments, 
strategies or policies in the area of 
human rights (labour/ environ-
mental stewardship/ anti-corruption) 
• Best practice: Statement of policy 
expressing commitment…treat […] 
as a legal compliance issue … 
CC-Coordination • CC-Committee is drafting the CC strategy 
in line with the overall company strategy.  
• Recommendations are forwarded to the 
Executive Committee, which decides over 
the implementation on a periodic basis.  
• A CC- department is in charge of coordi-
nating the implementation process. 
• Top management is directly and regularly 
involved. 
• Criterion 2: The COP describes 
effective decision-making processes 
and systems of governance for cor-
porate sustainability 
• Criterion 6 (10/14/(18)): The COP 
describes effective management sys-
tems to integrate the human rights 
(labour/ environmental/ anti-
corruption) principles  
• Best practice: Allocation of re-
sponsibilities and accountability 
within the organization 
Structures & Procedures 
Alignment of policies 
and procedures 
• All elements of the CC- commitment 
translated into policies and procedures.  
• These are the basis for all business proc-
esses, including the management of the 
global supply chain.  
• Policies and procedures regularly re-
viewed and revised; feedback from inter-
nal and external stakeholders is integrated. 
• Criterion 5 (9/13/17): (see above) 
• Criterion 6 (10/14/18): (see above) 
• Criterion 21: The COP describes 
implementation of the Global 




• Incentive structure is fully aligned with 
the commitment to CC  
• Important factor for assessing individual 
performance.  
• Decisions over promotion and bonus de-
pend on respect for CC principles. 
• Criterion 2: (see above) 
• Best practice: Goals and incentive 
schemes for management (C-suite) 
to promote sustainability strategy 
in line with Global Compact prin-
ciples 
Provision of training 
on CC requirements 
• Training is provided to all employees to 
prepare for decision-making situations and 
encourage discussion. 
• Training courses are adapted to the com-
pany’s context  
• Specific groups within the organization 
are targeted for follow-up courses. 
• Company shares training material  
• Initiates the development of training mate-
rial for innovative topics. 
• Criterion 6 (10/14/18): (see above)  
• Best practice: Internal awareness-
raising and training on human 
rights (labour/ environmental 
stewardship/ anti-corruption) for 
management and employees 
Creation of a com-
plaints procedure 
• Confidential complaints channel is pro-
vided 
• Easy access guaranteed 
• Criterion 6 (10/14/18): (see above)  
• Best practice: Operational-level 
grievance mechanisms for those 
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• Procedure is communicated  
• Cases are analyzed to further improve the 
systems. 
• Reporting is a duty. 
potentially impacted by the com-
pany’s activities 
Evaluation of CC 
implementation 
• Impact assessment methods of CC initia-
tives are developed in multi-stakeholder 
forums. 
• Methods are revised regularly 
• Results are discussed publicly (both, posi-
tive and negative). 
• Criterion 7 (11/15/19): The COP 
describes effective monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms of human 
rights (labour/ environmental stew-
ardship/ anti-corruption) integra-
tion 
• Criterion 24: The COP is inde-
pendently verified by a credible 
third-party 
Reporting on CC • CC-data is fully integrated in the annual 
report.  
• CC-data is produced based on KPIs that 
are gathered regularly 
• GRI guidelines are followed.  
• Regular reporting on good practices and 
lessons learnt in the context of CC. 
• Transparency of targets, means and meas-
urements. 
• Criterion 8 (12/16/20)
b
: The COP 
describes key outcomes of human 
rights (labour/ environmental stew-
ardship/ anti-corruption) integra-
tion. 
• Criterion 22: The COP provides 
information on the company's pro-
file and context of operation 
• Criterion 23: The COP incorporates 
high standards of transparency and 
disclosure  
• Criterion 24: The COP is inde-






• Engagement with stakeholders on a regu-
lar/need basis.  
• Dialogue with stakeholders is seen as a 
necessary seismograph for society’s 
changing awareness of particular issues. 
• Civil society’s expertise is regarded as a 
valuable asset in order to problem-solve. 
• Criterion 3: The COP describes 
engagement with all important 
stakeholders 
• Criterion 6 (10/14/18): (see above)  
• Best practice: Involve meaningful 
consultation with potentially af-
fected groups and other relevant 
stakeholders 
• Best practice: […] risks should not 
be limited to the company itself 
(material) but should also include 
risks to right-holders. 
Level of participation 
in collaborative CC-
initiatives 
• Membership in CC- initiatives 
• Including verification organizations 
• Share CC good practice examples and 
lessons learned.  
• Proactive engagement and efforts to inte-
grate companies that are not yet members. 
• Criterion 4: The COP describes 
actions taken in support of broader 
UN goals and issues 
a
The criteria for UNGC Advanced implementation listed in Table 2 are based on the ‘2012 Update’ of the “Cri-
teria for the GC Advanced Level” (acc. to Baumann-Pauly & Scherer, 2013). The 24 criteria remain exactly the 
same as in the original 2011 version underlying this study’s UNGC self-assessment dataset, while some best 
practices have been adapted. My analysis is not affected by the updates in the 2012 version (the only exception 
see below
b
), and is hence equally valid for both the original 2011 and the updated 2012 version. 
b
While key outcomes still need to be described, GRI reporting is no longer required in the ‘2012 Update’ as 
compared to the original 2011 version (Criterion 8). 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
a) Tabulation of frequencies per level of UNGC implementation 
UNGC implementation Frequency Percent Cumulated 
Learner 663 23.62 23.62 
Active 1,985 70.72 94.34 
Advanced 159 5.66 100.00 
Total 2,807       100.00  
 
b) Correlation matrix* 
 i ii  iii iv 
i UNGC implementation 1.0000    
ii Years of participation 0.1114 1.0000   
iii Employees (ln) 0.2271 0.3484 1.0000  
iv Strong local network 0.0027 0.0918  -0.0305 1.0000 
*Categorical control variables (region/country, industry, ownership type) excluded 
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Table 3a: Results of ordinal (logit and probit) and linear (OLS) regression analyses 
Ordered logit Ordered probit  OLS UNGC  
implementation Model 1 Model 2
a
 Model 3 Model 4
a
 Model 5 Model 6
a
 
Years of participation 0.076***    0.074***       0.044***    0.043***    0.016***   0.015*** 
Strong local network  1.050*  0.578*  0.211* 
Controls       
Size (employees, ln) 0.177***    0.179***       0.104***    0.105***    0.037***   0.037*** 
Region or country (“USA” omitted) 
Africa      0.028          0.025            0.069          0.068          0.017         0.017 
Asia, excl: -0.548         -0.549           -0.280         -0.280         -0.106        -0.106 
China -0.403         -0.410           -0.214         -0.217         -0.082        -0.083 
India -0.552         -0.552           -0.296         -0.295         -0.106        -0.105 
 Korea 0.354          0.349            0.233          0.230          0.076         0.075 
 Japan    0.675* -0.374 0.388*        -0.190  0.127* -0.083 
Central America -0.051         -0.051           -0.033         -0.033         -0.004        -0.004 
Eastern Europe -0.264         -0.344           -0.094         -0.134         -0.039        -0.055 
Turkey    0.777*        0.775*           0.461*        0.460*        0.162*       0.162* 
Latin America, excl: 0.186  0.184  0.127  0.126  0.045  0.045    
 Argentina -0.234 -1.283* -0.069 -0.646* -0.030 -0.240* 
Brazil -0.145         -0.146           -0.030         -0.030         -0.017        -0.017 
Colombia -0.329         -0.334           -0.125         -0.127         -0.050        -0.050 
MENA 0.955*        0.952*           0.562**      0.561**      0.198**     0.198** 
Oceania -0.185         -0.185           -0.105         -0.105         -0.036        -0.036 
Western Europe, excl: 0.175          0.174            0.111          0.110          0.037         0.037 
Austria -0.119         -0.126           -0.052         -0.056         -0.019        -0.021 
 Denmark 0.401          0.400            0.259          0.259          0.091         0.091 
France -1.466***   -2.515***     -0.765***   -1.342***   -0.308***   -0.518*** 
 Germany 0.006          0.005            0.024          0.023          0.003         0.003 
 Italy 1.126*        0.077            0.612*        0.035          0.216*       0.005 
 Spain 1.405***  0.357  0.799***  0.222  0.277***  0.066    
Sweden -0.116         -0.115           -0.015         -0.014         -0.016        -0.016 
 Switzerland 0.043          0.043            0.032          0.031          0.009         0.009 
UK -0.315         -1.364*         -0.155         -0.733*       -0.059        -0.270* 
Canada -0.277         -0.280           -0.138         -0.140         -0.052        -0.053 
Mexico -0.032         -0.033           -0.007         -0.008         -0.003        -0.003 
Supersectors (“Automobiles & Parts” omitted); only significant results reported 
Utilities 1.177**  1.170**  0.667**  0.663**  0.231**  0.229**  
Ownership type (“Private company“ omitted) 
Public company  0.400**      0.396*           0.207**      0.205*        0.076**     0.075** 
State-owned company -0.111         -0.110           -0.058         -0.058         -0.018        -0.017 
Subsidiary 0.509*        0.510*           0.267*        0.266*        0.100*       0.100* 
Intercept cut1                 0.384          0.385 0.261          0.263            
Intercept cut2 5.057***    5.062*** 2.927***    2.931***      
Constant     1.442***   1.441*** 
R
2
     0.150  0.151    
N = 2280 (for all 6 models). All coefficients are standardized ß coefficients. 
a
Including ‘strong local network’ dummy variable 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 3b: Ordered logit and probit model marginal effects and predicted probabilities 
Ordered logit marginal effects for 
UNGC implementation level ... 
Ordered probit marginal effects for 
UNGC implementation level ... 
 
Dependent 
variable ‚Learner’ ‚Active’ ‚Advanced’ ‚Learner’ ‚Active’ ‚Advanced’ 
Years of 
participation 
-0.011** 0.008** 0.003** -0.012*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 
Strong local 
network 
-0.153* 0.111* 0.042** -0.155* 0.107* 0.048* 
Size  
(employees, ln) 
-0.026*** 0.019*** 0.007*** -0.028*** 0.019*** 0.009*** 










23.62 70.72 5.66 23.62 70.72 5.66 
N = 2280. All coefficients are standardized ß coefficients. 
a
Marginal effects predicted at mean (of participation years) 3.78. 
b
in % 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 4: Mediation analysis 
a) Three-step test for ‘strong local network’ mediation (R. M. Baron & Kenny, 1986) 
 Ordered probit coefficients OLS coefficients 
Path
a















Years of  
participation 
0.267* 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.002*          0.016*** 0.015*** 
Strong local 
network!
  0.578*   0.211* 
Controls (region, industry sectors, ownership type) not reported here!
Intercept cut1                                                                                          11.447 0.261 0.263  
Intercept cut2  2.927*** 2.931***    
Constant    0.003           1.442***        1.441*** 
R
2
    0.978  0.150  0.151  
N = 2280. All coefficients are standardized ß coefficients. 
a
Paths a, b and c are illustrated in Figure 1. 
Strong local network 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
b) Ordered probit marginal effects 
Path b Path c UNGC  
implementation ‘Learner’ ‘Active’ ‘Advanced’ ‘Learner’ ‘Active’ ‘Advanced’ 




-.0118*** .0082*** .00364*** -.0116*** .0080*** .00355*** 
Strong local 
network 
   -.1549* .107* .048* 
Controls (region, industry sectors, ownership type) not reported here 
N = 2280. All coefficients are standardized ß coefficients. 
a
Marginal effects predicted at mean (of participation years) 3.78. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 5: Instrumental variable analyses 




UNGC implementation Model 1 
 
Model 2 (Maximum 
Likelihood estima-
tion) 
Model 3 (two-step 
estimation) 
Years of participation 0.062+ 0.016*** 0.016*** 
Strong local network 0.037 -0.047 -0.040 
Controls    
Size (employees, ln) 0.022+ 0.038*** 0.038*** 
Country (“USA” omitted; only significant results for countries with more than 3 observations reported) 
Czech Republic 0.338***   
Denmark 0.110+ 0.144+ 0.168* 
Ecuador 0.388+ 0.438* 0.456* 
Estonia 0.345***   
France -0.394*** -0.257*** -0.263*** 
India -0.202+   
Indonesia -0.320* -0.312* -0.330* 
Jordan 0.235+   
Italy  0.255** 0.241** 
Japan  0.235** 0.261** 
Kazakhstan 0.254**   
Lithuania -0.299+   
Luxembourg 0.452**   
Netherlands   0.177+ 
Philippines -0.781*   
Russian Federation -0.531+ -0.593** -0.606*** 
Réunion 0.367***   
Serbia -0.324*   
Singapore -0.203+   
Slovakia 0.117+   
South Africa  0.198+ 0.207+ 
Spain 0.211* 0.337*** 0.334*** 
Syrian Arab Republic 0.339*** 0.380** 0.416** 
Turkey 0.179* 0.157+ 0.153+ 
United Arab Emirates 0.292***   
Supersectors (“Automobiles & Parts” omitted) 
Banks 0.242+   
Construction & Materials 0.172+   
Health Care 0.170+ 0.135+ 0.144+ 
Utilities 0.242** 0.271*** 0.290*** 
Ownership type (“Private company“ omitted) 
Public company  0.024 0.075** 0.075** 
State-owned company -0.003   
Subsidiary 0.109* 0.103* 0.104* 
Constant 1.367*** 1.358*** 1.317*** 
 R
2  
= 0.109 Athrho Constant = 
0.147         
lnsigma Con. = 
0.783*** 
Mills Lambda = 0.105    
 
N 2261 5187 5187 
All coefficients are standardized ß coefficients. 
+
 p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Appendix 1: The ten Global Compact principles 
Area    Principles  
Human rights P1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of internation-
ally proclaimed human rights; and 
   P2: make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses. 
 
Labor conditions P3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effec-
tive recognition of the right to collective bargaining; 
   P4: the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour; 
   P5: the effective abolition of child labour; and 
P6: the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and oc-
cupation. 
 
Environment P7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environ-
mental challenges; 
P8: undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibil-
ity; and 
P9: encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally 
friendly technologies. 
 
Anti-corruption P10: Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, includ-
ing extortion and bribery. 
Source: UNGC (2012a) 
 
 89 
Appendix 2: Analyzing the self-assessed UNGC implementation ‘construct’ 




• the UNGC ac-
countability struc-
ture  
based on  




The framework indicates that standards which are a) clearly defined, 
b) have a high cost of adoption, c) require evidence of compliance 
and d) levy significant sanctions for non-compliance are typically less 
likely to be decoupled. While their former analysis suggests that the 
Global Compact lacks all these characteristics, the present analysis 
suggests an updated conclusion: 
a) Clear guidance on implementation is provided by the ‘Differ-
entiation Programme’. 
b) The cost of adoption has increased since the introduction of 
regular reporting requirements, i.e. the COP policy. 
c) All information that companies submit is made publicly avail-
able and collaborations with certification schemes have been put 
in place; both of these measures may have increased compliance 
even in the absence of direct monitoring. 
d) Companies that fail to comply with the UNGC become pub-
licly delisted and thus may risk damage to their reputation; how-
ever, direct sanctions for non-compliance are still lacking. 
All four characteristics are thus covered at least partially, a) being 
fully met. According to this theoretical framework, the likelihood of 




• inclusion in the 
Dow Jones 
Sustainability In-
dex (DJSI) World  
and  
• the level of self-
assessed UNGC 
implementation!
I consulted one of the most prominent sustainability assessments, the 
Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) World (2011), provided by the 
Zurich based RobecoSAM. Of the world’s 2,500 largest publicly 
traded companies considered in the assessment, the top 10% of com-
panies within each industry are included in the index (see SAM, 2012, 
p. 4). 360 of the universe of companies considered in the DJSI as-
sessment are included in this study’s UNGC dataset. For these 360 
UNGC business participants potentially eligible for DJSI World in-
clusion, I investigated the relationship between actual inclusion in the 
DJSI World – coding 1 if included and 0 if not - and the level of 
UNGC implementation as described in the data and method section. 
Before interpreting the results, we should note that the two measures 
have different underlying sustainability assessment criteria, so we 
should not expect the relationship between the two to be very strong. 
First, I ran an ordered probit analysis. The marginal effects suggest 
that, of the 360 companies, those included in the DJSI are 17% more 
likely to classify as Advanced in the UNGC ‘Differentiation Pro-
gramme’, 5% less likely to classify as Active and 12% less likely to 
classify as Learner. Furthermore, the marginal effect in a (standard) 
probit analysis, excluding UNGC participants at the Active level, 
suggests that, of the remaining 107 firms, those included in the DJSI 
are 37% more likely to classify as Advanced (compared to Learner) in 




Applying yet another model, the results of a linear regression analysis 
suggests that there is a highly significant positive relationship (ß = 
0.292***) between companies actually included in the DJSI World 














Demonstrating comprehensive levels of external verification is an 
essential part of advanced UNGC implementation (see Table 1: Crite-
rion 24). I thus consulted data on the level of external verification, or 
reliability, with regard to UNGC participant information as provided 
by BHP Brugger and Partners, Zurich, Switzerland (BHP, 2013). 
Among other criteria, BHP assesses on a level from zero to three the 
extent to which the information made available on the company web-
sites (e.g. sustainability reports, annual reports, company policies or 
code of conducts) convince the analyst that the company made great 
efforts to assure reliability of the information. Zero points are allo-
cated if no means of verification could be found, whereas a maximum 
of three points is allocated if the company displays strong evidence of 
external verification. 
Following the procedure above, I first ran an ordered probit analysis. 
The marginal effects suggest that, for the 51 companies assessed by 
BHP and included in my dataset, a one-unit increase of the BHP reli-
ability score increases the probability of classifying as Advanced in 
the UNGC ‘Differentiation Programme’ by 14% more, and reduces 
the probability of classifying as Active or Learner by 5% and 9% re-
spectively. The effects for the Advanced and Learner level are sig-
nificant at p<0.1, while the effect for the Active level is insignificant. 
Finally, excluding UNGC participants at the Active level, the mar-
ginal effect in a (standard) probit analysis suggests that, for the re-
maining 22 firms, a one-unit increase of the BHP reliability score 
increases the probability to classify as Advanced by 29% (compared 
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WHEN THERE IS NO CHOICE: WHY A LEGITIMACY SHOCK IS MORE LIKELY 
TO TRIGGER RADICAL CHANGE RATHER THAN REGULATORY SANCTIONS 
IN COMPLEX ANTI-CORRUPTION ENVIRONMENTS 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we study the corruption control strategies of three multinational companies 
(MNCs) before, during and after the disclosure of organizational corruption. In particular, we 
explore why after the transgression some MNCs exceed regulatory expectations and choose 
strategies that substantially influence their environment by defining a new benchmark of anti-
corruption practices, while others follow a more gradual and limited approach. We build on 
the concept of legitimacy in institutional theory and focus on three strategies that organiza-
tions may adopt to regain legitimacy: isomorphic adaptation, moral reasoning and strategic 
manipulation. Exploring the choice and appropriateness of these strategies, we found that 
when a transgression is accompanied by a strong legitimacy shock, transgressors perceive to 
have no other choice but to react both radically and instantly. On the strength of this finding, 
we identify two distinct extremes of strategic manipulation: decoupling and substantial influ-
ence. 
Keywords  




Research on organizational corruption has focused mainly on the antecedents of this phe-
nomenon (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Finney & Lesieur, 1982; Simpson, 2002; Staw & 
Szwajkowski, 1975; Sutherland, 1949). More recently, scholars started to examine how orga-
nizations respond after the disclosure of corruption (Bertels, Cody, & Pek, 2014; Pfarrer, 
Decelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008). Pfarrer et al. (2008) provide valuable insights into how 
corrupt organizations can become ‘reintegrated’ after the disclosure of corruption. Reintegra-
tion is defined as a process by which individuals or organizations repair their relationships 
with key internal and external stakeholders that are damaged by acts of individual or corpo-
rate wrongdoing (Goodstein, Butterfield, Pfarrer, & Wicks, 2014). Pfarrer et al. (2008) con-
ceptualize a four-stage reintegration process and argue that passing through these stages suc-
cessfully may increase the speed and likelihood of reintegration. Building on this model, 
Bertels et al. (2014) observed that certain regulatory procedures affect organizational reinte-
gration after a transgression. Such analyses tend to assume that corporations operate in an 
institutional environment with relatively homogeneous demands.  
However, extant literature on reintegration seems to neglect that in today’s globalized econ-
omy many multinational corporations (MNCs) operate in heterogeneous environments where 
they are ‘exposed to multiple and sometimes conflicting institutional demands’ (Pache & 
Santos, 2010, p. 455). MNCs with a home base in countries demanding highly developed anti-
corruption standards often operate in host countries with different societal and institutional 
conditions (Pache & Santos, 2010; Scherer, Palazzo, & Seidl, 2013) and often strong demands 
for engagement in corrupt practices (Quah, 2011; TI, 2012). As a result of these contradictory 
demands across different institutional environments MNCs operate under conditions of com-





Literature addressing such complexity in organizational environments has proliferated in re-
cent years (see also Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011; Jones & 
Fleming, 2003; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Scherer et al., 2013). The quest for legitimacy is 
commonly identified as a key driver for organizations to respond to demands in their envi-
ronment (Greenwood et al., 2011; J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). 
Legitimacy, i.e. the social acceptance of business organizations and their activities, is based 
on a “generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, 
or appropriate” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). A lack of legitimacy threatens or even impedes an 
organization’s access to resources and its support by important constituents (Ashforth & 
Gibbs, 1990). Consequently, maintaining legitimacy is regarded as a precondition for the ex-
istence and survival of organizations (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995).  
Institutional theorists have discussed a range of strategies to manage legitimacy in case of 
contradictory demands (Oliver, 1991; Scherer et al., 2013; Suchman, 1995). One such strat-
egy is referred to as ‘strategic manipulation’; that is organizations try to alter the content of 
institutional expectations and influence their promoters e.g. though strategic public relations 
(Pache & Santos, 2010). Scholars tend to regard ‘decoupling’, i.e. creating a gap between 
formal organizational policies and actual daily practices (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; J. W. 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977), as one form of strategic manipulation (Scherer et al., 2013). Al-
though previous legitimacy literature acknowledges that transgressions, crises and routine 
failures lead to concerns about legitimacy (see e.g. Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; J. W. Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977; Scherer et al., 2013, p. 262), it remains largely unaddressed how exactly crises 
such as corruption transgressions induce organizations to adopt legitimacy strategies. We 
therefore focus on legitimacy strategies of MNCs that aim to restore corporate legitimacy af-
ter their involvement in corruption cases and facilitate their reintegration with their institu-
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tional environment (or with multiple stakeholders, see Pfarrer et al., 2008; Sethi, 1979; 
Shapiro, 1991). Understanding this process is crucial, considering that recent transgressions 
e.g. at Siemens, ABB, Alstom, Daimler or MAN (see Gebhardt & Müller-Seitz, 2011; Scherer 
et al., 2013) have shown that corruption is still endemic in MNCs. 
Many MNCs have formulated anti-corruption policies and committed themselves to detecting 
and stopping corrupt practices – for example by participating in various international anti-
corruption initiatives. Despite such efforts and the fact that over the last few decades parts of 
the institutional environment have given priority to the fight against corruption, organization-
wide corruption of a large scale is still a significant phenomenon, as the 2006–2008 Siemens 
scandal has shown (Gebhardt & Müller-Seitz, 2011; GibsonDunn, 2013; OECD, 2012a). Be-
fore the disclosure of widespread organizational corruption, Siemens had already established 
relevant anti-corruption policies and was a member of Transparency International (TI) and the 
UN Global Compact (UNGC). After the disclosure, however, it became evident that the com-
pany policies had not been sufficiently embedded within organizational structures and proc-
esses – for example through awareness-building, aligning incentive structures and establish-
ing mechanisms of enforcement and control. In view of the above, the main research question 
underlying this study is: How do disclosed transgressions of MNCs (e.g. cases of organiza-
tion-wide corruption) trigger legitimacy strategies and organizational change processes of 
MNCs operating in complex environments? 
Our purpose is to contribute to the literatures on managing organizational corruption and on 
responses to institutional complexity by theorizing a model of corporate reintegration in a 
complex and changing anti-corruption institutional environment. We generate our theory in-
ductively and apply a longitudinal comparative case-study design focusing on three MNCs – 
ABB Ltd., Daimler AG and Siemens AG – whose engagement in transnational corruption was 
exposed in the recent past. We find that all three transgressors used very different strategies to 
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regain legitimacy due to specific combinations of transgression and reintegration process 
characteristics. First, the Siemens case revealed that the company faced a ‘legitimacy shock’ 
triggered by very strong social and regulatory burdens. In case of a legitimacy shock, all types 
of organizational legitimacy (pragmatic, moral and cognitive; see Suchman, 1995) are radi-
cally diminished. This legitimacy shock, affecting also personally Siemens employees world-
wide, triggered the company to develop and implement instantly and radically a variety of 
internal corruption controls, as well as to promote externally its new practices as a benchmark 
in the field. We refer to such an organizational response as a ‘substantial influence’ strategy. 
Second, in the absence of such a legitimacy shock, Daimler took the time to follow a gradual 
reintegration strategy and could learn from the leading practices at Siemens. However, the 
lack of sufficient social sanctions in the Daimler case made additional external regulatory 
pressure necessary to finally achieve a comprehensive compliance program. Third, the case of 
ABB revealed that having faced legal proceedings twice in the US (the first time in 2004), 
ABB employed legitimacy practices years before Siemens and Daimler. Surprisingly, al-
though regulatory sanctions were stronger than social ones, we found that the company fo-
cused on socially oriented rather than administrative measures. 
Based on these findings we argue that it is necessary to distinguish between two extremes of 
strategic manipulation, i.e. ‘decoupling’ and ‘substantial influence’, in order to accurately 
explain organizational responses to institutional complexity. We further propose that in case 
of a legitimacy shock the transgressor may focus on a ‘substantial influence’ strategy to re-
gain legitimacy through radical organizational change and attempts to reduce the complexity 
in its institutional environment. In the absence of such a shock, we suggest that reintegration 
is more likely to follow a gradual process in line with existing theoretical models, and that 
repeated regulatory pressure appears necessary to trigger substantial organizational changes. 




INSTITUTIONAL THEORY PERSPECTIVES ON TRANSGRESSIONS, 
CORRUPTION CONTROL AND LEGITIMACY STRATEGIES 
Organizational corruption and changes in the institutional environment 
Corruption can be generally defined as the ‘misuse of an organizational position or authority 
for personal gain or organizational (or sub-unit) gain’ (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2004, p. 
40). In line with existing studies on corruption from the institutional theory perspective that 
we apply (Gebhardt & Müller-Seitz, 2011; Misangyi, Weaver, & Elms, 2008), we refer to 
‘misuse’ as not only departures from regulatory norms, but also departures from accepted 
social norms and/or cognitive elements. We focus on systemic corruption at the level of the 
organization (see Ashforth, Gioia, Robinson, & Treviño, 2008, p. p. 673) and restrict our 
analysis to transnational cases of corruption that involve at least one foreign public official.  
Initiatives and legislation condemning transnational corruption are generally a recent phe-
nomenon. For a long time, existing legislation on e.g. cases of bribery extending beyond na-
tional borders was mostly not enforced (GibsonDunn, 2013; Weismann, Buscaglia, & 
Peterson, 2014). The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) may constitute the most promi-
nent example in this regard: with this act, passed by the US Congress already in 1977 and 
amended in 1988, the corporate corruption of foreign officials became legally prohibited and 
penalized, taking legislation on corporate corruption to a new level. This law covers all 
American companies, as well as foreign companies with securities traded on exchanges in the 
US. Although the FCPA has been in existence for more than three decades, the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) began to enforce it to 
a significant extent and to prosecute trespassers only recently (GibsonDunn, 2013). There are 
currently at least 78 corporations under investigation for possible FCPA violations and a total 
of $3.74 billion has been paid by 58 companies to settle corruption charges (Wayne, 2012). 
Many other countries have enacted similar laws. Nichols (2012, p. p. 362) provides a list of 
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more than 50 countries that criminalize transnational bribery and expects more countries to 
join this list. For instance, the United Kingdom enacted its ambitious UK Bribery Act in 2010. 
Besides regulatory changes, the fight against corruption also involves normative and cultural-
cognitive changes. Various international organizations like the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations (UN) have established inter-
national conventions (e.g. the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions or the UN Convention against Corruption) 
that criminalize transnational corruption. Similarly, multi-stakeholder initiatives (e.g. the 
UNGC or the World Economic Forum’s Partnering Against Corruption Initiative) and non-
governmental organizations like TI provide guidance on the fight against corruption (for good 
overviews of changes in the institutional environment to fight corruption, see: Gebhardt & 
Müller-Seitz, 2011; Hess, 2012). Despite these developments, however, there is no shortage 
of corruption transgressions involving MNCs. In the following, we will outline how certain 
kinds of corporate corruption transgressions may result in a legitimacy shock, as opposed to a 
mere legitimacy threat, and how the presence of such a shock can determine the legitimacy 
strategies the MNCs involved in such transgressions can be expected to apply. 
Legitimacy strategies in complex anti-corruption environments 
From a neo-institutional point of view, organizational survival is determined by the extent to 
which an organization is aligned with the institutional environment. In that respect, MNCs try 
to portray themselves as legitimate organizations by incorporating institutional elements of 
both internal and external origin (Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008). When an organization’s 
actual operations and social expectations of how it should operate are mismatched, the orga-
nization needs to adapt to the perceptions of its constituents. Incorporating global institutional 
demands relating to anti-corruption, however, poses serious challenges to MNCs: while the 
enforcement of legislation against transnational corruption originates mainly in developed 
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Western countries, many developing countries in which MNCs operate still present a high 
corruption risk (TI, 2012). Consequently, MNCs can easily become involved in corrupt prac-
tices, for example along their supply chains, that conflict with institutional demands in their 
home countries and hence diminish a corporation’s legitimacy.  
Scholars suggested to distinguish three broad types of legitimacy (see Suchman, 1995). (1) 
Pragmatic legitimacy “rests on the self-interested calculations of an organization's most im-
mediate audiences” (Suchman, 1995, p. 578). It can be maintained or regained, for example, 
by complying with anti-corruption regulations of a number of countries (Nichols, 1999). (2) 
Moral legitimacy is based on normative evaluations of the organization and is granted if the 
organization’s behavior is considered the ‘right thing to do’ (see also Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). 
(3) Cognitive legitimacy, in turn, is distinct from evaluation in that it refers to the “mere ac-
ceptance of the organization as necessary or inevitable based on some taken-for-granted cul-
tural account“ (Suchman, 1995, p. 582). How organizational responses to regain legitimacy 
may vary depending on which types of legitimacy are threatened remains largely unaddressed 
in previous reintegration studies (see Bertels et al., 2014; Pfarrer et al., 2008). 
Moreover, many earlier works on organizational responses to institutional pressures tend to 
assume that organizations have to choose one strategy to manage legitimacy (see e.g. Oliver, 
1991). Various approaches like the resource-based view (Christmann, 2000; Hart, 1995), dis-
course ethics (Stansbury, 2009) or institutional theory (Delmas, 2002; Schaefer, 2007), sup-
port the impression that a corporation only applies one legitimacy strategy at a time (Scherer 
et al., 2013). More recently, scholars have begun to discuss how a complex environment may 
lead to multiple legitimacy strategies – for example, the variety of responses to institutional 
complexity has been discussed in the context of divergent institutional ‘logics’ (Greenwood et 
al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2008). Another stream of literature discusses the ‘paradox’ of hav-
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ing to accommodate several conflicting legitimacy strategies at the same time (see e.g. Lewis, 
2000; G. Schreyögg & Steinmann, 1987; Smith & Lewis, 2011). 
By incorporating complexity in strategic response models, scholars acknowledged that corpo-
rations are required to manage trade-offs, engage in negotiations (Scherer et al., 2013; 
Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010) and acquire distinct capabilities (Jarzabkowski, Smets, Bednarek, 
Burke, & Spee, 2013; Li, Peng, & Macaulay, 2013). Generally, more recent studies tend to 
discern a greater degree of choice and flexibility in organizational responses (S. M. Ansari, 
Fiss, & Zajac, 2010; S. Ansari, Reinecke, & Spaan, 2014; Durand, 2012; Quirke, 2013; 
Smets, Morris, & Greenwood, 2011) and to explore the possibility of companies adopting 
simultaneously multiple legitimacy strategies (Scherer et al., 2013; Georg Schreyögg & 
Sydow, 2010; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Scherer et al. (2013) suggest that in heterogeneous envi-
ronments, posing conflicting demands, the parallel use of different and potentially conflicting 
legitimacy strategies is more successful than the use of a single strategy. 
Scholars have identified three different types of legitimacy strategies: isomorphic adaption, 
moral reasoning and strategic manipulation (Driscoll, 2006; Oliver, 1991; Scherer et al., 
2013; W. Richard Scott, 2007; Suchman, 1995). By using an isomorphic adaption strategy, 
the organization adapts its organizational practices to social expectations – e.g. an MNC may 
choose to report increasingly on corruption in its annual reports if it perceives that this is an 
emerging practice in its industry or the country in which it operates. By using a moral reason-
ing strategy (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Scherer et al., 2013), organizations may enter a dis-
course with focal stakeholders and societal groups about the acceptability of the organiza-
tion’s status quo and behavior. In this process of open communication and argumentation no 
party dominates from the beginning the process and the resolution to be found (Palazzo & 
Scherer, 2006; Scherer et al., 2013; Suchman, 1995). For example, joining a multi-stakeholder 
initiative like the UNGC to discuss with peers ideas on how to fight corruption at the initia-
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tive’s network meetings may be part of a moral reasoning strategy. Third, as indicated above, 
companies may use a strategic manipulation strategy by influencing how its constituents per-
ceive the way in which the organization appears to benefit them (Pache & Santos, 2010). The 
key instruments associated with manipulation strategies are strategic public relations and im-
pression management tactics that involve advertising campaigns, dissemination of (mislead-
ing) information or lobbying (Fombrun, 2001; Oliver, 1991; Scherer et al., 2013). Arguing 
that organizations that use a manipulation strategy do not change the practices criticized by 
some of their stakeholders, scholars highlight the parallels of this strategy with the concept of 
decoupling (Scherer et al., 2013, p. 266) (see also Palazzo & Richter, 2005; Weaver, Treviño, 
& Cochran, 1999). ‘Decoupling’ was introduced in the institutional theory literature by the 
seminal work of J. W. Meyer and Rowan (1977) and refers to a gap between formal structures 
and actual practices. The application of decoupling as a strategy to respond to conflicting in-
stitutional demands assumes that organizational structures and activities can be protected 
from evaluation (J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 357). The recent wave of disclosed corrup-
tion at MNCs involving large-scale investigations (see e.g. Gebhardt & Müller-Seitz, 2011) 
suggests that protection from evaluation is not always possible. 
Disclosed transgressions and strategies of regaining legitimacy 
Institutional theory scholars acknowledge that legitimacy concerns arise particularly when 
routines fail and a transgression or crisis occurs (see e.g. Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; J. W. 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scherer et al., 2013, p. 262). However, how such events trigger par-
ticular legitimacy strategies that aim to reintegrate the company into its environment remains 
largely unaddressed in this literature. Our own aim is to close this gap by exploring how dis-
tinct elements of transgressions influence organizational strategies for regaining legitimacy in 
the institutional environment. A transgression generally refers to an unethical act that places 
its stakeholders at risk (Coombs, 1995). We look at – disclosed – corrupt behavior as one par-
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ticular type of an unethical act, or transgression (see also Pfarrer et al., 2008). Transgressions 
constitute a particular type of crisis. While organizational recovery has been discussed in the 
crisis literature with a focus on cases situated in the legal domain, such as accidents or prod-
uct liability recalls (e.g. Benoit, 1995), a transgression includes the moral and potentially even 
the cognitive domain. Moreover, in contrast to many crisis situations, corrupt 
acts/transgressions involve a diffuse set of victims including indirect ones (see also Lamin & 
Zaheer, 2012). Finally, reintegration after disclosed corrupt acts may be distinct from reinte-
gration after crises in general, given that a dominant template for organizational strategies 
meeting the rising expectations in a complex (anti-)corruption environment has yet to be 
evolved – potentially by the transgressor him/herself. 
In general, we expect that the costs of organizational change and the consistency of societal 
expectations are two central factors that affect the choice of legitimacy strategies (Scherer et 
al., 2013). Regarding the former factor, and in line with economic theory (e.g. Hart, 1995), we 
observe that Western enforcement agencies, especially the SEC and the DOJ (in the US), play 
a key role in enforcing anti-corruption regulations, such as the FCPA, and imposing severe 
monetary sanctions on transgressors. These sanctions often involve further major costs related 
to the implementation of compliance requirements. For example, enforcing the FCPA often 
entails Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs), i.e. proceedings that are closed only after 
the successful completion of the agreed terms (see e.g. Gebhardt & Müller-Seitz, 2011; 
Schwarz, 2011). As a result, what ‘resources’ are available to the transgressor is crucial to 
choosing the appropriate legitimacy strategies (see Child & Rodrigues, 2011; Paul J 
DiMaggio, 1988; Misangyi et al., 2008). 
As to the latter factor, and in line with institutional theory (see Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache 
& Santos, 2010; Scherer et al., 2013), a disclosed transgression may influence how the trans-
gressor perceives the consistency of societal expectations regarding corruption. Some de-
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mands may be more prominent or urgent than others – for example, in the course of tackling a 
transgression, the demands of (Western) authorities that a transgressor actively fights corrup-
tion may be more pressing than the demands the same organization faces for informal pay-
ments in a developing country. In particular, the prominence of certain anti-corruption de-
mands that an organization is called to meet in the course of a corruption transgression may 
be amplified in cases of unprecedented transgressions (putting the transgressor into the role of 
a ‘first mover’), or when the transgressor is prominent and thus highly visible to stakeholders 
(Pfarrer et al., 2008). 
Despite this close relation between a corruption transgression and the two central factors that 
influence the choice of legitimacy strategies, few studies have explored how specific aspects 
of such transgressions interact with the organization’s responses in a complex anti-corruption 
environment. We found one empirical study on the reintegration of Siemens in its institutional 
environment, which, however, was published soon after the transgression and was not yet able 
to sufficiently analyze the effectiveness and success of Siemens’s response strategies 
(Gebhardt & Müller-Seitz, 2011). More importantly, the study was restricted to a single com-
pany. Our study hence aims to identify whether and why MNCs choose different strategies of 
regaining legitimacy after a transgression, how different elements of a transgression moderate 
the choice of legitimacy strategy, which factors play a crucial role during the reintegration 
process, and ultimately how successful the different MNC strategies are in the eyes of key 
stakeholders. Having shed light on these questions, we will attempt to theorize a framework 
for regaining legitimacy in the institutional environment after a corruption transgression. Due 
to the lack of sufficient existing research and data, we decided to conduct our investigation 





Research design and sampling 
We applied a multiple dynamic case design to compare and interpret our findings, which 
cover the period 2012–2014, across our target firms (Yin, 1984), as well as over time and 
space (Gerring, 2007), and aggregated data where appropriate. In selecting our sample, we 
followed the sampling approach (see Strauss & Corbin, 1998) of choosing ‘extreme’ cases 
wherein the phenomenon of interest (here, the disclosed corruption transgression) is ‘trans-
parently observable’. In all cases, we were able to interview firm representatives towards the 
end of the regulatory reintegration process (the period in which the transgressors operate un-
der the Deferred Prosecution Agreement – the DPA – imposed by the SEC or the DOJ) and 
after the termination of these regulatory burdens. 
We selected only cases of MNCs implicated in recent transnational transgressions that in-
volved the bribery of foreign public officials but differed in key aspects, most notably subse-
quent social and regulatory burdens. Our assumption was that the analysis of transgressions 
that were similar in some respects but differed in others would differentiate our conclusions 
about the reintegration process and the choice of legitimacy strategy in each case (see Doz, 
1996; Pfarrer et al., 2008). According to the literature, the central aspects of a transgression 
and the subsequent reintegration process include the prominence and timing of the transgres-
sion and transgressor (Pfarrer et al., 2008), the costs related to fines, the bribes paid and the 
investments in organizational change (see e.g. Gebhardt & Müller-Seitz, 2011). Access to 
resources is also identified as a key element of the reintegration process (e.g. Battilana, Leca, 
& Boxenbaum, 2009; Lawrence, 1999). 
At the same time, we aimed to control for factors other than transgression characteristics: We 
focused on firms from the high technology manufacturing sector, generally known to face 
moderate to high corruption risks (TI, 2011). Furthermore, we chose only MNCs headquar-
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tered in Switzerland or Germany. Both countries are perceived to have similarly low corrup-
tion risks (TI, 2012), have similarly strict anti-corruption legislation and are at an advanced 
stage of implementing anti-corruption measures that derive from the OECD Convention 
Against Corruption (see OECD, 2012a). 
Because the phenomenon we are studying is transnational, we examined it both from the cor-
porate headquarters’ perspective and from the perspective of different subsidiaries. We chose 
to conduct interviews in Australia to assess the transgressors’ perspectives in a country that is 
geographically very distant, yet displays similarly low levels of corruption risk to those in 
Switzerland and Germany (see TI, 2012). Like Switzerland and Germany, Australia has also 
reached the third phase of implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (OECD, 2012c). 
Lastly, we added the perspective of corporate and non-corporate actors from a region with 
mostly high levels of perceived corruption (TI, 2012): Southeast Asia (Indonesia Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand; with Singapore as an exception in this region).  
On the basis of our sampling approach, we initially selected the following companies: Sie-
mens AG (Siemens), Daimler AG (Daimler) and Asea Brown Bovery Ltd (ABB). In addition, 
we include anecdotal evidence on anti-corruption processes at other MNCs obtained from 
primary (e.g. interviews or annual reports) and secondary (e.g. previous research) data 
sources. This allows us to follow Eisenhardt’s recommendation (1989, p. 537) of analyzing 
four to ten cases, while maintaining a manageable scope. 
Case context 
Siemens is among the leading technology companies worldwide, operating in more than 190 
countries and headquartered in Munich and Berlin, Germany. The company has four business 
divisions, listed according to decreasing turnover: energy, industry, infrastructure and cities, 
and healthcare (Siemens, 2013). Siemens has a total of around 370,000 employees and its 
annual turnover generally exceeds €80 billion (Siemens, 2013). According to the SEC’s com-
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plaint, “between March 12, 2001, and September 30, 2007, Siemens created elaborate pay-
ment schemes to conceal the nature of its corrupt payments, and the company’s inadequate 
internal controls allowed the conduct to flourish” (press release, SEC, 2008a). Siemens paid 
“more than $1.4 billion in bribes to government officials in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle 
East, and the Americas [and] the pattern of bribery […] was unprecedented in scale and geo-
graphic reach” (press release, SEC, 2008a). 
Daimler is a multinational automotive corporation with headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, 
and locations in every continent; it focuses on Europe, Asia and North America. The company 
has five divisions, of which the two most important are Mercedes-Benz Cars and Daimler 
Trucks (Daimler, 2013). Daimler’s annual turnover of over €100 billion (Daimler, 2013) ex-
ceeds that of Siemens, although the company has fewer employees (around 275,000) and op-
erates in fewer countries. According to the SEC, “Daimler paid at least $56 million in im-
proper payments over a period of more than 10 years. The payments involved more than 200 
transactions in at least 22 countries. Daimler earned $1.9 billion in revenue and at least $90 
million in illegal profits through these tainted sales transactions, which involved at least 6,300 
commercial vehicles and 500 passenger cars” (SEC, 2010c).  
ABB is one of the leading firms worldwide in energy and automation technologies. The com-
pany has its headquarters in Zurich, Switzerland, and operates in more than 100 countries 
(ABB, 2013). ABB has around 146,000 employees and an annual turnover of around $40 bil-
lion (ABB, 2013). On September 29, 2010, the SEC charged “ABB Ltd with violations of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) for using subsidiaries to pay bribes to Mexican offi-
cials to obtain business with government-owned power companies, and to pay kickbacks to 
Iraq to obtain contracts under the U.N. Oil for Food Program” (SEC, 2010a). According to the 
SEC “ABB’s subsidiaries made at least $2.7 million in illicit payments [...] to obtain contracts 




Organizational corruption controls. The literature on organizational control and on corrup-
tion control provides valuable insights into the concepts and processes associated with the 
control of organizational corruption. Lange (2008) recently merged these two streams of lit-
erature to conceptualize an ‘Organizational Corruption Control Circumplex’. Importantly, 
Lange (2008) included the organizational environment in his model. He distinguishes between 
a social/cultural and an administrative/regulatory dimension of corruption control, which is a 
central aspect of legitimacy according to institutional theory (see e.g. W. Richard Scott, 
2007). Apart from environmental controls, Lange lists three types of social/cultural controls 
and another three types of administrative controls. 
Lange calls for the deeper exploration of how and why certain types of controls may be ap-
plied in combination (2008, p. p. 724). He posits that these social/cultural and administrative 
controls are compatible. However, a potentially critical limitation of his model, especially 
with regard to the relationship between environmental and intra-organizational corruption 
controls, is that it considers organizational corruption controls in a rather static context. For 
the purpose of our study, we put this model in a dynamic context by treating a disclosed cor-
ruption transgression as a form of environmental sanction and studied the impact of such 
sanctions on how other types of controls are combined and applied. The different control 
types are listed in the right column of Table 1. In line with Lange (2008), we expect that so-
cial sanctions may trigger predominantly social/cultural forms of control whereas le-
gal/regulatory sanctions may trigger administrative forms of control. 
Given that our paper deals with corruption cases that included settlements with the SEC, we 
also considered the criteria for ‘Effective Compliance and Ethics Program[s]’ of the US Sen-
tencing Commission (USSC, 2010, p. §8B2.1.). Finally, in order to sufficiently address cor-
ruption controls that go beyond regulatory requirements, we also consider interactive and/or 
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voluntary types of organizational measures as depicted in the corporate citizenship assessment 
model by Baumann-Pauly and Scherer (2013). Table 1 illustrates the synthesis of these three 
models (Organizational Corruption Control, US Sentencing Commission Guidelines, Corpo-
rate Citizenship) depicting the central dimensions of corruption control in the left and middle 
columns and the respective references to the original models in the right column. 
---------------------------------- Insert Table 1 about here ---------------------------------- 
Corruption transgression sanctions. Building again on the model for corruption control that 
Lange (2008) developed and on previous research on corruption transgressions (Gebhardt & 
Müller-Seitz, 2011; Pfarrer et al., 2008), we distinguish two central types of institutional sanc-
tions in the context of corruption transgressions: a) regulatory sanctions – fines and costs in-
volved, and b) social sanctions – prominence/negative media coverage of transgression. 
In our study, regulatory sanctions mainly consist in the disgorgement and penalty payments 
listed in the settlement agreements between our case firms and the SEC but include other le-
gal expenses – e.g. for lawsuits, lawyers or consultants. We identified the level of social sanc-
tions mainly according to the extent of negative press coverage our transgressors received in 
the course of disclosure, settlement and reintegration. A key determinant of the prominence of 
each transgression and the extent of the subsequent social sanctions is the timing of the trans-
gression, i.e. whether it was the first of its kind in a certain industry or region (see Pfarrer et 
al., 2008). Applied to the legitimacy literature (Scherer et al., 2013), a) may refer to costs or 
organizational change and b) to the consistency of social expectations.  
Data collection and analysis 
Following established guidelines for the constant comparison of data (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967), we analyzed our data as we collected them. To reduce biases wherever possible, we 
use interview as well as documentary data, which we both triangulated by incorporating vari-
ous perspectives (Eisenhardt, 1989; Flick, 1992) as summarized in Table 2. Given that our 
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interview data spans across three years including repeated interviews with several actors, and 
our documentary data even covers the period from 2003 to 2014, we are able to analyze the 
organizational situation before, during and after the respective corruption transgressions. 
------------------------------- Insert Table 2 about here ------------------------------- 
From 2012 to 2014, we conducted 40 interviews in total each lasting between 45 and 90 min-
utes. Central informants at the headquarters of each case firm – and a lawyer and FCPA ex-
pert at Gibson Dunn – were interviewed annually or around some special event at the target 
firms. We interviewed representatives of the case firms and third parties like lawyers, judges, 
auditors, NGOs and officials in the MNC headquarter region. To further triangulate our data, 
we conducted interviews with corporate and non-corporate actors in distant subsidiaries lo-
cated in countries with low (Australia) and high (Southeast Asian countries) perceived corrup-
tion risks (TI, 2012). In addition, we consulted academics like Christian Gebhardt, an experi-
enced researcher who investigated the Siemens corruption case and whose (2011) study 
serves as a starting point for central parts of our analysis. The fact that some of our informants 
served ‘multiple roles’ facilitated the comparison of our case firms. For example, our infor-
mant at Gibson Dunn was involved in the regulatory proceedings at Siemens and Daimler; a 
central Siemens representative serves both as compliance officer (CO) for the Building Tech-
nologies division, headquartered in Switzerland, and as regional CO for the Swiss Siemens 
subsidiary; one interviewee in the Philippines who had worked for ABB became a sales repre-
sentative for Siemens. 
Key sources of documentary data comprise company sustainability reports, codes of conduct, 
regulatory proceedings and press releases. Here, we compare documents that reflect the com-
pany perspective, such as company reports on sustainability, with documents that reflect the 
public perspective, such as media reports on corruption risks (provided by RepRisk AG) or 
other data on perceived corruption (provided by TI). Crucial for our purpose are especially the 
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documents relating to criminal proceedings (e.g. complaints, DPAs, monitor reports) provided 
by the SEC and the DOJ. Three undergraduate and postgraduate students helped us with the 
initial analysis of the company documents we consulted for our analysis. Our analysis com-
prises three main steps:  
1. At the beginning of our analysis in 2012 we considered a variety of documentary sources 
(Yin, 1984), ranging from regulatory proceedings related to the FCPA to company reports and 
media reports, to form a picture of the corruption transgressions our case firms faced. On that 
basis, we jointly developed the guideline for the first interviews at the companies’ headquar-
ters and with the FCPA expert at Gibson Dunn, focusing on what characterized each trans-
gression and on the initial reactions of the transgressors. To minimize potential interviewer 
bias, we conducted these first interviews together and reflected on the key events of each 
transgression and the actions of the transgressors directly after each interview. 
Building on these first insights, we developed our interview guideline further. As regulatory 
proceedings came towards the end in the course of 2013, we gained further insights into the 
transgressors’ reintegration processes and observed corporate actions in ‘real time’. Such ‘real 
time’ changes (e.g. in key personnel or the organizational structures) were addressed in sub-
sequent interviews. We also drew on those first interviews and documentary data to conduct 
the first round of open coding (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
2. In the next step, we turned to academic literature to relate our first empirical data to rele-
vant theoretical concepts and frameworks. Iterative comparisons between information pro-
vided by respondents and scholarly insights are a central aspect of grounded theory-building. 
For example, the repeated references to a ‘shock’ (at Siemens), ‘external pressure’ (at Daim-
ler), and a ‘complex world’ (at ABB) helped us identify dominant themes that we incorpo-
rated in our theoretical model. To develop this model, we adhered to recommendations for 
building grounded theory on the basis of a two-order code scheme (Corley & Gioia, 2004; 
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Gioia et al., 2013; Ravasi & Phillips, 2011). According to this approach, first-order codes 
reflect as closely as possible the language used by the informant. In contrast, second-order 
codes are mainly based on the analysis and synthesis of first-order codes. The authors devel-
oped this coding scheme jointly: one author would prepare the first draft on the basis of proc-
essing and discussing the interview and archival data with the other author. The co-author 
then commented on the first draft to resolve discrepancies and produce a more fine-grained 
version that was used for further testing. 
3. In the third step, we discussed possible relationships among the themes that had emerged. 
This process relates to axial coding techniques (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). In this step, we fo-
cused more on institutional complexity by adding data from Southeast Asia, a region widely 
perceived as high corruption-risk (TI, 2012). This allowed us to analyze the actual scope of a 
‘substantial influence’ strategy. Figure 1 illustrates how the first-order codes that were de-
rived directly from the language of our informants relate to the second-order codes and over-
arching themes that we synthesized subsequently. 
------------------------------- Insert Figure 1 about here ------------------------------- 
To increase the reliability of our results, we discussed the emerging themes and our own in-
terpretations in follow-up interviews with respondents from ABB, Daimler and Siemens and 
incorporated their feedback into our analysis (see Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 11). Moreover, 
to avoid misunderstandings, we transcribed all of our interview data and sent it for validation 
to our respondents. In cases where we were not allowed to record the interview, we took notes 
during the conversation and sent an edited version to the respondents afterwards. For the sake 
of clarity and to reflect the inductive character of our investigation, we present our findings in 
three broad steps that represent roughly the structure of our analysis over time and we synthe-
size these separate steps thereafter. In addition, we provide a representative selection of quota-
tions from our interview data supporting our interpretations in Table 3. 
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------------------------------- Insert Table 3 about here ------------------------------- 
FINDINGS 
Step 1: Classifying the types and magnitude of transgression sanctions 
Table 4 depicts the transgression sanctions of our case firms by distinguishing a) le-
gal/regulatory sanctions (fines and costs involved), and b) social sanctions (promi-
nence/negative media coverage of transgression). 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------- 
Overall, we found that the very high, or even unprecedented, social and regulatory sanctions 
at Siemens put the organization in a state of shock. All three types of legitimacy were se-
verely challenged (see Suchman, 1995): Siemens’s pragmatic (or regulatory) legitimacy was 
clearly at risk given the threat of immense regulatory fines, imprisonment and the very sur-
vival of the organization. The immense media coverage and criticism also from family and 
friends triggered personal contestation among Siemens staff worldwide putting the organiza-
tion’s cognitive legitimacy at risk. Finally, its moral (or normative) legitimacy was lost as 
result of the moral contestation of Siemens staff and the termination of TI membership. 
As regards Daimler, while regulatory sanctions and the prominence of the transgressor can be 
assessed as high, we found the social sanctions to be medium to low. This suggests that prag-
matic legitimacy was at risk whereas the other two types of legitimacy were largely unthreat-
ened. Finally, we assessed social and regulatory transgression sanctions at ABB as low or 






Step 2: Analyzing the corruption controls over time 
To analyze how the corruption controls developed in relation to the disclosure of the trans-
gressions, we distinguished three periods: before (t1), during (t2) and after (t3). The first pe-
riod (t1) starts around the time of the first (minor) settlement between the SEC and ABB in 
2004. For our purposes, the middle period (t2) starts with the large-scale investigation that 
German officials carried out at the Siemens headquarters in November 2006 and ends at the 
time when the settlements between the SEC and the three case firms were agreed on (Siemens 
in 2008, ABB and Daimler in 2010). The final period (t3) covers the time from the date on 
which these agreements were signed to roughly the time when their terms were fulfilled – 
marked by the end of SEC monitorship and/or of the DPA in late 2012 and early 2013. Our 
analysis, as summarized in Table 5, is therefore structured along the following three periods: 
before (t1: 2003–2005), during (t2: 2006–2010) and after (t3: 2011–2013). While our inter-
views refer retrospectively to t1 and t2, we use our documentary data spanning across all three 
periods to compensate for potential biases in respondents’ historical view. 
------------------------------- Insert Table 5 about here ------------------------------- 
Siemens. In the period before the transgression (t1), Siemens had already installed 
plenty of bureaucratic controls that mainly consisted in a vast set of formal rules, codes and 
policies to fight corruption. Moreover, the company had partly embedded interactive corrup-
tion controls by participating in several voluntary initiatives like the UNGC and TI. Other 
types of corruption controls were either rudimentary or absent. 
In the middle phase (t2) and especially shortly after the disclosure of the transgression, there 
was a sudden and unprecedented increase in all the types of corruption controls considered in 
our model. As regards leadership, Siemens hired Peter Löscher – the first externally promoted 
CEO in the MNC’s history – as new CEO to manage the transgression. According to Löscher, 
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“[w]ithin months of my taking over, we replaced about 80% of the top level of 
executives, 70% of the next level down, and 40% of the level below that. I fun-
damentally changed how our managing board made decisions. We also worked to 
streamline and simplify our global operating units.” (Löscher, 2012, p. p. 40)  
Overall, the staff dedicated to the compliance program at Siemens increased from around 60 
(including part-time) to around 600 fulltime employees. Moreover, Löscher’s statement “only 
clean business is Siemens business – everywhere, everybody, every time” (Moosmayer & 
Winter, 2011, p. p. 4) was unequivocally clear. This leadership approach was complemented 
by comprehensive anti-corruption training and whistle-blowing procedures. Besides these 
social/cultural corruption controls, respondents like the lawyer at Gibson Dunn outlined that 
Siemens implemented a comprehensive set of administrative controls, including voluntary 
measures such as a strictly centralized structure of value flows and approval processes, a bo-
nus–malus system to align incentives, and specialized audits on top of general tasks of the 
audit department (see also Gebhardt & Müller-Seitz, 2011; Graeff, Schroeder, & Wolf, 2009). 
In addition, Siemens introduced interactive corruption controls; most notably, the Collective 
Action program that emerged in the context of the 2009 agreement with the World Bank 
Group, wherein Siemens agreed to co-operate to change industry practices and engage in col-
lective actions to fight fraud and corruption (WBG, 2009). In direct response to this agree-
ment, Siemens launched its global Integrity Initiative promoting organizations and projects 
that fight corruption and fraud through collective action, education and training. The total 
budget of US$100 million is spent over the next 15 years. In the first round, Siemens selected 
31 organizations and projects and supported them with a total of US$37.7 million (Siemens 
Sustainability Report, 2012). Our interviews revealed that, globally, respondents are aware of 
the Siemens Integrity Initiative, although it is directed mainly from the headquarters and fo-
cuses on projects in high-risk regions. Respondents in Australian, low-risk, subsidiaries per-
ceived that “the Australian business environment is very mature in the compliance field (…) 
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So there's not a perceived need to go out there and probably change the world, because the 
world's pretty good already” Siemens, CO Australia, Mar. 2013). 
Compared to the massive changes at Siemens during t2, the changes we noted in t3 where of 
much smaller scope. The company’s main concern during 2012 was to increase the efficiency 
of the implemented compliance system. Another issue in t3 was to focus collective actions 
more on particular business requirements than in the past. For example the company defined 
measures such as fair competition partnerships between bidders for large contracts or promot-
ing voluntary self-commitment of industry federations to compliance standards (Siemens An-
nual Report 2012, p. 30). The goals stated in our first round of interviews in late 2012 had 
been largely realized by the time of the second round in late 2013. As a Siemens CO outlined 
“in several areas where no incidents had been detected in the preceding years, the respective 
controls and compliance staff had been reduced and the thresholds for projects requiring ‘ap-
proval’, e.g. by compliance staff, had been eased”. However, at the time of this interview in 
December 2013, our respondent was not yet able, or willing, to interpret the executive board’s 
decision (executed by Peter Solmssen in November 2013) to abandon the compliance board 
mandate. 
Daimler. At Daimler, before the transgression (t1) the corruption controls were mainly 
bureaucratic (e.g. formalized rules and policies) and to a limited extend social/cultural or in-
teractive (e.g. participating in voluntary initiatives like the UNGC). However, in 2005, before 
the transgression and earlier than Siemens, Daimler introduced further – at least basic – 
measures to derive a more balanced set of corruption controls, as Table 5 shows. Our docu-
ment analysis revealed that social/cultural corruption controls were fostered e.g. through a 
clear leadership statement against corruption by Dieter Zetsche outlining that “no business 
deal can ever justify putting our company’s reputation at risk“ (translated into English, speech 
at general assembly, April 2006; see also Daimler Business Partner Brochure), as well as 
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relevant training and a whistle-blowing procedure. Furthermore, we found evidence that 
Daimler increased its administrative corruption controls in 2005 by monitoring and following 
up cases of corruption (see GRI indicators SO2, SO3 and SO4 in Table 5). 
Although Daimler faced less severe regulatory sanctions and significantly fewer social sanc-
tions during t2 than Siemens (see Table 4), we identified in our first round of interviews in 
2012 (t3) that its compliance program consists of a comprehensive and well-balanced set of 
corruption controls that in many aspects comes close to that of Siemens. As Table 5 shows, 
Daimler’s compliance program contained strong social/cultural controls, including clear sig-
nals from and to the leadership against a ‘self-servicing’ mentality, a close integration of 
compliance in the 2011 established board-level brief “Integrity and Legal Affairs”, compre-
hensive anti-corruption training and a whistle-blowing procedure. Administrative controls 
include risk assessments, monitoring and sanctions such as dismissals. Furthermore, third-
party bank accounts, regularly used for bribery payments in the past, were significantly re-
duced, although value flow centralization was lower than at Siemens, as Daimler representa-
tives and external parties such as a lawyer at Gibson Dunn assessed. 
Nevertheless, we were initially unable to explain satisfactorily the overlaps between the Sie-
mens and Daimler compliance programs despite the significant differences, especially in so-
cial sanctions. Our dissatisfaction led us to investigate the factors that may have influenced 
the reintegration process after transgression disclosure. We consulted the literature on contin-
gencies before conducting further empirical research. From the literature, press coverage and 
personal interviews with an experienced lawyer at Gibson Dunn, we understood that deferred 
FCPA prosecution agreements (DPAs) allow an externally imposed FCPA monitor to gain 
insights into the company that go significantly beyond regular audits. The monitor can request 
access to all sorts of compliance-related documents, interview people in various hierarchical 
positions and visit foreign subsidiaries (Hartmann, 2012; Schwarz, 2011). 
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Our analysis revealed that in t2 and early t3, corruption controls were implemented rather 
slowly and insufficiently. As the Spiegel (2011) reports about information regarding the 
strictly secret ‘First Follow-up Monitor Report’ by Louis Freeh (FCPA monitor at Daimler): 
“The Daimler-internal investigations of suspicious cases are too slow (…) At the moment, 
[Daimler] would not fulfill the criteria of the US stock exchange supervision SEC.” We now 
understand that several of the strong social/cultural and administrative elements of Daimler’s 
compliance program in t3 were only implemented in response to this criticism of the monitor. 
That is, additional regulatory pressure and further social attention/sanctions through the media 
were necessary to realize a comprehensive compliance system at Daimler. The Spiegel (2011) 
highlights some of the company’s responses: “Since August last year Daimler has, according 
to an internal list, dismissed 30 managers without notice, nine leaders received a contractual 
notice of dismissal. In addition Daimler restricted from business in various countries, per-
ceived as highly corrupt.” Later in t3, Daimler respondents highlighted in follow-up inter-
views that the company chose to maintain a board brief for ‘Legal and Integrity’ even after 
the regulatory proceedings had ended, which we interpret as an indicator for the continuity of 
compliance efforts at Daimler. 
ABB
1
. Our analysis of ABB’s corruption controls took a different course compared to 
the two other cases: Our ABB interview partners focused mainly on ABB’s present state (t3) 
of corruption controls. Moreover, ABB’s personal and written communication focuses more 
on the social/cultural control dimension, e.g. as reflected in the dominant reference to integ-
rity, instead of compliance, observed in our content analysis of ABB communication. 
In t3 we identified several strong and comprehensive social/cultural controls; notably, training 
based on a case-study of real (though anonymized) past incidents of corruption, a sound and 
offensively communicated whistle-blowing procedure (including a dedicated information 
                                                
1 We are not allowed to use any quotes from our interviews with respondents at the ABB headquarters. 
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desk in the HQ lobby) and strong leadership support (including a separate board position). 
However, apart from these strong social/cultural controls and certain interactive controls – 
e.g. membership in TI, the UNGC and the Partnering Against Corruption Initiative (PACI) of 
the World Economic Forum – our interview partners were reluctant to provide us with de-
tailed information on administrative controls. Nevertheless, we can reasonably assume that 
ABB has installed at least basic administrative controls, considering, among other things, that 
it managed to successfully terminate its DPA. However, the partially ambiguous responses 
from our ABB interviewees together with the assessments from third parties suggest that the 
scope of ABB’s administrative controls is smaller than the scope of its social/cultural con-
trols. As the CO of an industry peer puts it: 
“In the control system [referring to administrative controls], I believe, ABB has weak-
nesses today (…) We compare notes on this issue (…) and ABB also openly commu-
nicates that they did not invest as much in the implementation of a control system …”, 
2013). 
A gap between the ABB headquarters perception and our own observations, as well as those 
of external observers, about the company’s handling of the transgression is evident in the 
processes of risk assessment, monitoring, following up of incidents, and sanctions. For exam-
ple, ABB mainly relies on annual surveys and the audit department to conduct corruption-risk 
assessments. However, our analysis revealed that at Siemens special ‘compliance’ teams con-
duct such assessments in addition to the audit department’s investigations. Furthermore, we 
found that ABB’s reports on sanctions and follow-up assessments are less comprehensive 
than the ones by Siemens. 
We should recall that in t2 ABB faced lower regulatory sanctions (notably, there was no ex-
ternal monitor) and almost negligible social sanctions (see Table 5) compared to Siemens. 
While respondents from all three firms mentioned the powerful role of the SEC, ABB inter-
viewees tended to deny that the 2008–2010 wave of transgression disclosures and settlements 
affected significantly the company’s anti-corruption strategy. They admitted that there was a 
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whole list of organizational requirements that the company had to fulfill in order to comply 
with the FCPA, but their rhetoric revealed a confidence that the company would not have to 
introduce drastic changes in order to comply and that ABB had never suffered from a sys-
temic culture of organizational corruption. 
The reasons behind ABB’s introduction of considerable corruption controls in t1 became ap-
parent only after the second round of interviews and analysis: a key driver may have been an 
earlier settlement between ABB and the SEC in 2004. The smaller-scale settlement (bribes of 
US$1.1 million and a penalty of US$10.5 million, compared to the 2010 settlement involving 
at least US$2.7 million in illicit payments and a penalty of US$39.3 million) and the early 
date may explain why we did not initially notice it. Nevertheless, our analysis revealed that it 
came at the beginning of the wave of such settlements enforced by the SEC (GibsonDunn, 
2013), putting ABB in the role of a ‘first mover’. Table 5 shows that ABB was indeed the first 
of our three case firms to install certain corruption controls, especially social/cultural ones, in 
t1. The comparatively large scope of anti-corruption reports, a clear zero-tolerance statement, 
information on training, the installation of a whistle-blowing procedure and participation in 
several voluntary initiatives (PACI, TI, UNGC) are examples of the leading innovative prac-
tices that ABB implemented before Daimler and Siemens. 
Step 3: Deducing the legitimacy strategies from the interaction between corporate corrup-
tion controls and the organization’s institutional environment 
Siemens. As mentioned earlier, Siemens’s corruption controls in t1 were limited to a 
combination of formal rules and policies and rather passive participation in voluntary interac-
tive initiatives like the UNGC and TI. Corruption controls aiming at translating these formal 
policies and structures into daily practices (e.g. through leadership support, training, a com-
plaints procedure or monitoring) were lacking. (“In my point of view it was simply lacking 
awareness for theses issue (…) and for consequent dealing when formalities were not met” 
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Siemens, Senior CO, Nov. 2012). In line with theoretical notions of gaps between policies and 
practices (J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977), we label Siemens’s anti-corruption strategy in t1 as 
‘decoupling’. 
From t1 to t2, the disclosed transgression triggered a sudden and radical shift of anti-corruption 
strategies at Siemens from one extreme to the other. A senior CO at Siemens summarizes this 
shift: 
“[S]uch a scandal helps and we were at the point where we could only change the 
course or sink. And in this first step I think we have taken the necessary measures that 
(…) have helped us, to leave this deep valley of scandal and turn towards a success 
story. (…) Then the process of change started, but not gradually, but this compliance 
system was implemented under brute force.” (Nov. 2012) 
Referring to the immense speed and substance of change at Siemens, the former FCPA moni-
tor at Siemens assessed that “a tremendous act of rehabilitation has occurred within one year”. 
He specified that “Siemens has done more than what regulators both in the US and Germany 
expected”, a judgment that was supported widely by various respondents as illustrated under 
code ‘we do more than we have to’ in Table 3. For example, the lawyer at Gibson Dunn high-
lights that “this is a voluntary step of Siemens, which is not present at many competitors” 
referring to the centralization of payment transactions. Siemens’s collective action activities 
also go well beyond the terms of the World Bank agreement, as our document analysis clearly 
shows. Already the title of the program “How we can drive Collective Action” (K. Meyer & 
Waldschmidt, 2012, p. p. 22) indicates that the company’s approach is strongly proactive 
rather than passively reactive. In sum, with the radical implementation of all types of corrup-
tion controls shortly after the disclosure of the transgression (see step 2), Siemens aimed at 
‘over-fulfilling’ the requirements imposed on the company of single constituents. 
This new proactive approach of Siemens also extends to another central theme (or: code) we 
identified: ‘We want to make sure everybody else does it too’. “[O]ne of our goals is to trans-
port our knowledge and experience towards the outside, make it available to others and build 
  
 121 
alliances with other market participants, simply to work together on fair competition” (Sie-
mens, Senior CO, Nov. 2012). Beyond the World Bank agreement, Siemens promotes its new 
anti-corruption practices e.g. at international industry, government and NGO meetings (“… 
every quarter we have what we call, a best practice session. Siemens did one in September 
last year.” TI Malaysia, Apr. 2014) and engages in collaborations with academia. This new 
strategy in t2 focusing on elements of ‘we do more than we have to’ and ‘we want to make 
sure everybody else does it too’ cannot reasonably be associated with legitimacy strategies 
defined in previous research. Therefore, we chose to define it as a new legitimacy strategy, 
which we label ‘substantial influence’. Based on our observations, we define ‘substantial in-
fluence’ as an organization’s radical and substantial effort to change its own organizational 
practices as well as influence the perceptions and practices in its environment.  
The MNC’s Collective Action program, especially in the first years of implementation, can be 
considered part of Siemens’s ‘substantial influence’ strategy rather than classifying as a 
‘moral reasoning’ strategy. The language used in Siemens’s reports (e.g. “we selected”, “our 
aim is”, “we plan to focus”) and in public presentations ("how we can drive", "aproach public 
sector customers/competitors", K. Meyer & Waldschmidt, 2012) suggests that the company 
determined independently which types of controls to implement and when. Siemens focused 
on elements of ‘moral reasoning’ only later, especially in t3, once the new compliance meas-
ures had been implemented. The perception that “we first stood under very strong pressure 
[referring to t2] … Then we focused very strongly on roundtable discussions with other mar-
ket actors [referring to recent activities in t3]” (Senior CO, Siemens Switzerland, Dec. 2013) 
illustrates this shift. 
Daimler. Daimler applied a rather mixed set of legitimacy strategies in t1, however the 
scope of transgressions disclosed at Daimler in t1 reveals that systemic corrupt practices con-
tinued well into this period, so ‘decoupling’ was a key strategy at that time (“Until the year 
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2008 we did not do that in a quality that we considered and consider as necessary” Daimler, 
Senior CM, Nov. 2012). The fact that Daimler has already implemented several types of 
compliance controls some of which had been previously applied elsewhere (for example at 
ABB) indicates elements of ‘isomorphic adaptation’. Furthermore, Daimler applied already 
elements of ‘moral reasoning’, e.g. by participating in voluntary initiatives. 
After the disclosure of the transgression, Daimler focused in t2 on a slow adaptation to regula-
tory pressures. The company applied an ‘isomorphic adaption’ strategy aimed at gradually 
conforming with regulatory demands, which becomes evident for example considering that 
“Daimler has not changed its leadership team. Daimler played it differently [than Siemens]” 
(Lawyer, Gibson Dunn, Nov. 2012). The reasoning at Daimler on why to abstain from a mas-
sive leadership exchange involves considerations of fairness and open-ended communication 
with the Daimler workforce reflecting elements of ‘moral reasoning’: 
“[M]any leaders grew up and studied in a world in which the perception existed that in 
some countries making business without facilitation payments, to name it that way, is 
not possible (…) I think it is fair to first inform and enable them to cope with this new 
context” (Senior CO, Daimler HQ, Nov. 2012). 
However, recalling that some changes at Daimler even occurred too slowly and insufficiently 
(e.g. “Daimler does not scrutinize the efficiency of the initiated processes” or “The enterprise 
has not prevented ‘unethical behavior of managers’ consistently”) (compliance monitor; cited 
in Spiegel, 2011), suggests that elements of ‘decoupling’ may have persisted as well in t2. 
Interestingly and in stark contrast to Siemens, while changes between t1 and t2 appeared rather 
slowly, the speed considerably increased from t2 to t3. A senior CO at Daimler depicts these 
developments over time and attributes the increased speed to the pressure of the monitor: 
“Therefore we have [implemented] in the last three years, particularly though in the 
last two years as the monitor has pointed out very much stimulations in his first report, 
(…). Especially in the last two years an immense acceleration in our compliance man-
agement system has taken place.” 
Daimler representatives convincingly outlined the particular processes behind this change, 
including systematic processes to prevent and detect wrongdoing and efforts to change the 
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previously criticized self-servicing mentality. Considering that these changes are backed by 
the positive judgment of the compliance monitor ("the weaknesses have become much smaller 
in the past two years and the strengths have become much larger") in an interview with the 
German daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in mid-2012 (Newswires, 2012), we can rea-
sonably assume that decoupling is no longer a major strategy at Daimler in t3. Furthermore in 
this period, Daimler took a more active role in the UNGC by being among the first to join the 
UNGC LEAD initiative initiated in 2011 (“We meet [to discuss] the tenth principle twice a 
year, now really also to address corruption prevention” Senior CO, Daimler, Nov. 2012). This 
evidence is indicative of a comprehensive ‘moral reasoning’ strategy (marked with a now 
continuous line surrounding this strategy in Figure 2). 
Interestingly, after the monitor’s criticism in the first report, the same monitor stated about 
one year later that Daimler was willing to go even beyond regulatory requirements and be-
come a compliance benchmark worldwide: “Daimler AG’s management has in many respects 
done more than required in a settlement with U.S. institutions (…) Daimler really wants to 
become world champion in compliance” (see Newswires, 2012). Furthermore, our respondent 
at the law firm Gibson Dunn mentions that “Daimler, like Siemens, has included voluntarily 
questions on pressure to perform in anonymous questionnaires”. These elements are indica-
tive of a ‘substantial influence’ strategy in this period (marked with a dashed line in Figure 2, 
as our evidence is generally less comprehensive than at Siemens). 
ABB. ABB also applied a mixed set of legitimacy strategies in all three periods. In t1, 
ABB was the first of our three case firms to install a set of social/cultural controls and partici-
pated in many voluntary anti-corruption initiatives, which points to strategies of ‘moral rea-
soning’ and ‘strategic influence’. However, ABB’s strategic influence remains rather ambigu-
ous, given that we did not find evidence that ABB proactively tried to diffuse the so-
cial/cultural controls it installed in that period. Nonetheless, some of ABB’s practices (train-
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ing, whistle-blowing) became established thereafter. The ambiguity of ABB’s ‘substantial 
influence’ strategy is with a dashed frame in Figure 2. Finally, considering that the SEC found 
ABB’s integrity program deficient on several counts in the 2010 settlement (“ABB, through 
its officers, agents and subsidiaries, failed to detect and prevent the illicit payments revealing 
a lack of effective internal controls“ SEC Complaint, 2010, p. 19), ‘decoupling’ was also part 
of ABB’s strategy portfolio. 
In t2, the company continued to apply social/cultural controls; however, the isomorphic adap-
tation strategy became dominant: In contrast to the 2004 settlement, ABB now had a compre-
hensive list of compliance program requirements to fulfill to avoid criminal conviction (ABB 
DPA, 2010). Statements like “following discovery of the bribery, ABB (...) voluntarily and 
timely disclosed to the (...) SEC the misconduct“ and “ABB Ltd conducted a thorough inter-
nal investigation of that and other misconduct“ (ABB DPA, 2010, p. 4) may speak against the 
application of a ‘decoupling’ strategy. In t3, however, our interviews revealed a gap between 
the ways in which ABB as opposed to other interview partners perceived the 
comprehensiveness of ABB’s administrative controls. This leaves us with uncertainty as to 
whether some elements of ‘decoupling’ may have persisted at ABB in periods t2 and t3. The 
dashed frame and question marks in Figure 2 signal this high degree of uncertainty. 
------------------------------- Insert Figure 2 about here ------------------------------- 
Synthesis of steps 1 to 3 
All three case firms completed successfully their monitoring and/or DPA period and we could 
not find any indications of new systemic corruption cases during our interviews and media 
analysis. However, although all three transgressors managed to finally regain legitimacy and 
to fulfill several similar compliance requirements, there are considerable differences in their 




Radical change and ‘over-fulfillment’ to recover from a ‘legitimacy shock’ 
Our analysis indicates that Siemens’s ‘substantial influence’ strategy was successful for the 
organization in regaining legitimacy after a transgression that severely challenged all three 
types of legitimacy (see W.R.  Scott, 2001; Suchman, 1995) as outlined in step 1. We refer to 
this shock status observed among Siemens staff worldwide as a ‘legitimacy shock’. This le-
gitimacy shock triggered the general perception at Siemens that the only chance to recover 
was to respond radically, substantially and proactively. Due to the global awareness of the 
transgression and the personal contestation of Siemens employees worldwide, all organiza-
tional members seemed to fully support the introduced changes. As Peter Löscher (the new 
CEO hired to manage the transgression) continuously reminded his audience “never [to] miss 
the opportunities that come from a good crisis” (Löscher, 2012, p. p. 40), adding that Siemens 
certainly did not miss theirs.  
Siemens managed to achieve a 180-degree turn in its compliance strategy – from an organiza-
tional structure of widespread corruption and façade-building to representing a benchmark in 
compliance worldwide. As our analysis revealed, Siemens exceeded the imposed require-
ments for implementing the whole range of compliance measures and implemented all pre-
scribed regulatory and social corruption controls (see Lange, 2008), including many elements 
of voluntary interactive strategies. 
Gradual but comprehensive reintegration in response to external monitoring and strong 
regulatory sanctions but weaker social sanctions 
Daimler faced a corruption transgression of similar (geographic) scope to the Siemens affair, 
involving high regulatory sanctions; however, ‘Daimler played it differently’ (interview part-
ner at Gibson Dunn). Our analysis suggests that Daimler generally followed a more linear and 
gradual reintegration path than Siemens, more in line with conceptual reintegration models. 
Pfarrer et al. (2008) distinguish four reintegration stages: discovery, explanation, penance and 
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rehabilitation. According to this model, during the ‘discovery’ stage, i.e. until most facts had 
been collected and disclosed, Daimler followed a more passive approach than Siemens. In the 
‘explanation’ and ‘penance’ stages, Daimler took the time to reflect on why the transgression 
happened and how the organization should respond, whereas Siemens had practically skipped 
the ‘explanation’ stage. Because the disclosure of the transgression was far less geared to-
wards the media and social sanctions were mild, Daimler had, or even needed, time to make 
its global workforce aware of the transgression. As outlined in step 2, internal penance (e.g. 
replacement of top management) was far less severe than at Siemens; the transgression was 
partly attributed to the educational background of managers – for a long time foreign corrup-
tion was tax-deductable in Germany (Glynn, Kobrin, & Naim, 1997) – and the perceived 
common use of corruption in several other countries worldwide. 
Although, compared to Siemens, Daimler’s initial response to its own corruption transgres-
sion was less radical and more passive, by the end of the ‘rehabilitation’ stage Daimler had 
implemented a comprehensive and fairly balanced compliance program that in many respects 
resembles Siemens’s own program. Further documentary analysis and interviews revealed 
that the presence and criticism of an external compliance monitor imposed by the SEC may 
have shaped significantly Daimler’s final comprehensive compliance program. Overall, our 
analysis shows that having power and resources is a necessary rather than sufficient precondi-
tion for becoming a leader in compliance standards worldwide: in the Siemens case, we found 
the immense legitimacy shock to be the major trigger of substantial change. As Figure 2 
shows (Siemens boxes in t2 and t3), the monitor played a relatively minor role in triggering 
these changes. In Daimler’s case, however, where the legitimacy shock was milder, we identi-
fied the external monitor imposed by the SEC as a major factor in Daimler’s successful com-
pletion of its compliance program (see Daimler boxes in t2 and t3 in Figure 2). The quotations 
in Table 3 support this finding. 
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Mixed, partly inconsistent or paradoxical anti-corruption strategies in response to repeated 
minor corruption transgressions 
ABB’s reintegration process appears sometimes inconsistent or even paradoxical to us. As 
Figure 2 shows, ABB displayed the most diverse spectrum of legitimacy strategies in our 
sample. This may be explained partly by the fact that ABB was involved in two moderate 
transgressions that did not demand an immediate and decisive response. However, existing 
models of organizational corruption control (e.g. Lange, 2008) do not explain why ABB fo-
cused its response on social controls, although it faced mainly regulatory, rather than social, 
sanctions, so we need to consider other contingencies. 
The elements of over-fulfillment we found in ABB’s strategy mainly relate to social/cultural, 
rather than administrative, corruption controls and reflect an approach based on ‘intrinsic ori-
entation’ instead of ‘autonomy reduction’ or ‘consequence systems’ (see Lange, 2008). As 
noted, ABB introduced social/moral controls around the time of the first SEC settlement in 
2004. Similarly, after the second SEC settlement, ABB focused almost exclusively on integ-
rity-based training and communication strategies and promoted its whistle-blower hotline. In 
contrast to Siemens’s direct attempts of ‘substantial influence’, ABB opted for an open, 
value-based legitimation approach dominated by a ‘moral reasoning’ strategy. At the same 
time, ABB’s strategy contained conflicting or even paradoxical elements that may relate to 
some sort of decoupling (see step3). Furthermore, the gap between the image of ABB as a 
leader in anti-corruption management, which our interviewees painted, and the gaps between 
ABB’s administrative controls and the industry’s best practices that we identified, and an in-
dustry peer and other external experts corroborated, reveal that certain forms of decoupling 
were also present after the second settlement. This ambiguity is underscored by the fact that 
ABB engaged in integrity-oriented activities, but was less willing to communicate these ac-
tivities transparently to us. We were hardly able to obtain precise information, especially on 
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administrative controls and follow-ups, but also on the causes of the corruption transgression 
and on the reintegration process; furthermore, our key informants at the ABB headquarters 
repeatedly asked us not to interview other ABB representatives.  
We identified the role of the external monitor and the scope of the investigation team as key 
to explaining this apparent contradiction: in contrast to Daimler and Siemens, ABB was not 
scrutinized by an external monitor, while lawyers, consultants and auditors conducted far 
more limited investigations than at Daimler and especially at Siemens. Overall, it cannot be 
said that external authorities left ‘no stone unturned’ in ABB’s case. Consequently, instead of 
establishing a system that would help it achieve full transparency about every business proc-
ess, ABB chose the possibly less resource-intensive approach of preventing corrupt behavior 
by attempting to change the mindset of its employees. 
Especially after the second SEC settlement, it appears that ABB began to adopt elements of 
an ‘isomorphic adaptation’ strategy and to orient itself more to the practices already imple-
mented at competitors like Siemens. A comparison of the slogans of each company’s compli-
ance program (Siemens: ‘Prevent, Detect, Respond’; ABB ‘Prevent, Detect, Resolve’) sup-
ports this impression. Similarly, Siemens’s slogan ‘Only clean business is Siemens business – 
everywhere – everybody – every time’ (see Moosmayer & Winter, 2011, p. p. 4) is echoed in 
ABB’s code of conduct: ‘We expect this [acting ethically and with integrity] of every single 
ABB employee, in every location, every day’ (ABB Code of Conduct, 2013, p. 4). 
From these findings we can conclude that (a) for a transgression to trigger a set of holistic, 
innovative and comprehensive anti-corruption processes, i.e. a substantial influence strategy, 
a certain level of shock or urgency is necessary, even if it places the transgressor in the role of 
a first mover and (b) the combination of (elements of) a substantial influence strategy together 
with other legitimacy strategies appears problematic and may cause further legitimacy crises. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The main purpose of this case study was to investigate how corruption transgressions influ-
ence the choice of organizational strategies for regaining legitimacy in a complex and chang-
ing institutional environment. We found that only the combination of high regulatory and so-
cial pressure leading to a legitimacy shock, which we observed in the Siemens case, may trig-
ger radical change in a firm’s anti-corruption strategy. Siemens acted instantly and drastically, 
choosing a clear strategy of ‘substantial influence’ and its best practices served as examples 
for other transgressors and industry peers. In addition, the intensive legal investigations and 
screenings created an unprecedented level of transparency at Siemens, enabling the company 
to break the taboo and openly communicate its corrupt history as well as its lessons from im-
plementing substantial corruption controls. 
So far, most research has focused either on strategies of managing legitimacy in complex and 
heterogeneous environments or on reintegration into the environment after a corruption trans-
gression or a similar unethical transgression, paying little, if any, attention to the institutional 
environment in which the transgression occurred (see e.g. Pfarrer et al., 2008). Both tasks – 
managing the complexity of such an environment and becoming reintegrated in it after a cor-
ruption transgression – are crucial for MNC survival, and the fact that all recent corruption 
transgressions occurred in a very complex, i.e. heterogeneous and changing, environment in-
dicates that understanding the institutional environment is key to theorizing issues of legiti-
macy and transgression.  
Our findings offer a starting point for developing the relevant theory, highlighting the differ-
ences in the effects of a legitimacy shock and those of mere regulatory pressure on the process 
of regaining legitimacy after a corruption transgression. We emphasize three components of 
such a theory that are elaborated in the following subsections. First, our study clarifies previ-
ous assumptions on employing strategic manipulation to regain legitimacy (Oliver, 1991; 
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Scherer et al., 2013; Suchman, 1995) by distinguishing between two extremes: decoupling 
and substantial influence. Second, we identify and outline how a legitimacy shock may trigger 
a ‘substantial influence’ strategy, questioning the assumptions that transgressors pursue a 
strategy of gradual reintegration on which previous anti-corruption models rely (Bertels et al., 
2014; Pfarrer et al., 2008). Third, this study highlights how recent trends in regulatory proce-
dures – so-called restorative justice or creative sentencing (Bertels et al., 2014) – may be 
similarly successful in triggering substantial changes in the transgressor, albeit much more 
gradually than a legitimacy shock does. Finally, our study sheds light on the conditions under 
which the use of multiple legitimacy strategies or the focus on a single strategy leads to the 
repair of corporate legitimacy in complex heterogeneous environments.  
Before we discuss the theoretical implications of our empirical study in more detail below, we 
should first emphasize potential limitations of our study, most of which arguably deal with the 
generalization of our findings. Our findings apply to the cultural context of MNCs with head-
quarters in Germany and Switzerland (or Central/Western Europe). We do not take into ac-
count potential cultural differences between MNCs originating from this context as opposed 
to, for example, the US, South American or Chinese context. Finally, even for the context 
chosen in our study, future research on other cases is needed to test and potentially further 
specify our theoretical framework proposed below. At least, our limited analysis of BMW AG 
(so far untroubled by a disclosed transgression) and Royal Dutch Shell (SEC settlement in the 
past) tend to support our overall conclusions on the powerful role of a transgression as regards 
organizational change and the willingness to share information on the same. 
The two extremes of manipulation strategies: Decoupling versus substantial influence 
On the basis of Siemens’s radical shift from one extreme – i.e. decoupling – to the other – i.e. 
the ‘substantial influence’ strategy – in order to regain legitimacy, we argue that the existing 
literature on legitimacy fails to capture fully the characteristics of this strategy (see e.g. 
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Oliver, 1991; Scherer et al., 2013; Suchman, 1995). A main reason for this shortcoming is that 
although previous research mentions the ‘active’ nature of manipulation strategies (Child & 
Rodrigues, 2011; Oliver, 1991), ‘activeness’ refers merely to the organization’s attempt to 
influence public perceptions rather than change internal organizational processes. Scherer et 
al. (2013, p. p. 266, p. 266), for example, refer to manipulation strategies mainly as a public 
relations tool that organizations employ to manipulate the perceptions of critical stakeholders, 
without actually modifying the practices that these stakeholders criticize. Our findings re-
vealed the need to specify the role of ‘activeness’ in the context of manipulation strategies. 
We distinguish between two extreme forms of strategic manipulation: (1) decoupling and (2) 
substantial influence. Figure 3 (bottom) illustrates the difference between the two extremes. 
------------------------------- Insert Figure 3 about here ------------------------------- 
Our findings support the suggestion in recent legitimacy literature (Scherer et al., 2013) that a 
strategic manipulation strategy (Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995) can be mostly equated with a 
‘decoupling’ strategy (J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977) (see bottom left of Figure 3). The con-
cepts of strategic manipulation and decoupling are both based on the assumption that organi-
zations achieve legitimacy by constructing a façade of organizational structures and processes 
that reflects institutional myths (shaped e.g. by expectations concerning proper business prac-
tices) without adjusting their organizational practices to match the projected image. Before 
the respective transgressions, all three case firms in our study had demonstrated commitment 
to the fight against corruption by increasingly reporting on this issue and joining initiatives 
like the UNGC or TI; at the same time, however, they failed to implement necessary anti-
corruption organizational structures.  
We furthermore suggest that the other extreme strategy – the active attempt to manipulate 
public perceptions through active change in the organizational practices and structures – 
should be defined as ‘substantial influence’ strategy (see bottom right of Figure 3). While 
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elements of this strategy do appear in previous studies on legitimacy strategies – e.g. Nike’s 
decision to disclose the names of its supply-chain partners (Scherer et al., 2013, p. 268) – 
those earlier works focused on cooperation with civil society organizations and described this 
approach as a ‘proactive moral reasoning’ strategy. However, in contrast to ‘proactive moral 
reasoning’, the ‘substantial influence’ strategy, as we understand it, does not involve open-
ended discourses between organizations and their stakeholders, but clear and predefined tar-
gets. In the context of corruption, a company that has fundamentally changed its organiza-
tional practices and structures (e.g. by aligning its incentive structures, introducing integrity 
training and whistle-blower protection and following up incidents of corruption) and now 
manipulates public perceptions in order to make its own standards the benchmark in its insti-
tutional environment (e.g. for organizational peers, investigators, regulators, policy-makers, 
NGOs) can be said to exert ‘substantial influence’.  
Distinguishing between the strategies of decoupling and substantial influence allows us to 
explain the strategies of organizations undergoing radical change after a severe transgression, 
crisis or ‘failure of routine’ (Scherer et al., 2013, p. 263). In our study, Siemens best illustrates 
the clear shift from the one extreme of strategic manipulation, decoupling, to the other ex-
treme, i.e. exerting substantial influence on the institutional environment. This is one of our 
contributions to the literature on the reintegration of corrupt organizations (e.g. Pfarrer et al., 
2008) and on corporate legitimacy strategies (Oliver, 1991; Scherer et al., 2013). 
This distinction also establishes important links between the literature on institutional deter-
minism (e.g. Paul J. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and the literature on institutional entrepre-
neurship (e.g. Battilana et al., 2009). Defining ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ as actors who ini-
tiate changes that help transform existing or create new institutions (Battilana et al., 2009; 
Paul J DiMaggio, 1988), we argue that MNCs that pursue a ‘substantial influence’ strategy 
can be closely associated with institutional entrepreneurs. While previous works assume that 
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changing both organizational structures and public perceptions requires enormous organiza-
tional resources (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; Scherer et al., 2013), the literature on institu-
tional entrepreneurship acknowledges the ability of organizations to develop such resources. 
As regards anti-corruption, transgressors should use their resources to disrupt the resource 
structure that supports the defenders of a corruption favoring status quo, e.g. by means of in-
centives, access to and the support of the media, as well as the role of international judges 
(Misangyi et al., 2008). Siemens follows such an approach and has already influenced its 
peers, the public and regulators as outlined in our analysis. Figure 3 illustrates the set of four 
separate legitimacy strategies that we propose, in the context of reintegration into the institu-
tional environment after a corruption transgression.  
The legitimacy shock as a trigger of substantial influence 
In contrast to the suggestions of previous research that companies facing an unprecedented 
transgression – like Enron, WorldCom or Tyco – may not recover due to the enormous stigma 
that ‘first movers’ suffer (Goffman, 2009; Pfarrer et al., 2008), our study reveals that ‘first 
movers’ may indeed be able to regain legitimacy and thus secure organizational survival by 
managing to influence their environment substantially. We furthermore argue that a legiti-
macy shock, i.e. a radical reduction of pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy, raises the 
chances that transgressors will be willing to make wholesale and radical changes and will be 
successful in achieving them. Our findings further suggest that the conventional models of 
reintegration (Bertels et al., 2014; Pfarrer et al., 2008) may fail to explain accurately the proc-
ess by which transgressors regain legitimacy after such a legitimacy shock. 
More specifically, previous models pictured MNCs as organizations consisting of rational top 
management and staff and characterized by well-thought-out decisions based on all relevant 
facts and options. Pfarrer et al. (2008, p. 735), for example, describe the outcome of the ‘dis-
covery stage’ as the ‘facts of the transgression’. Similarly, although the reintegration process 
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that Bertels et al. (2014) describe is more nuanced (outlining e.g. the escalation paths of regu-
latory pressure), the authors consider primarily rational factors and largely ignore the emo-
tional factors that determine the transgressor’s response to a transgression. In contrast, our 
empirical data from the interviews at Siemens suggest that the facts of the transgression (e.g. 
monetary fines and regulatory sanctions) affected staff emotionally less than the shock result-
ing from the disclosure of the transgression. On those grounds, we argue that emotions 
(Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007) are key to conceptualizing how transgressors 
reintegrate themselves into their environment after a transgression.  
Creed, Hudson, Okhuysen, and Smith-Crowe (2014) provide a cross-level analysis of the 
mechanisms through which shame, a self-directed emotion, affects people’s willingness to 
participate in institutional processes. Recognizing that maintaining social bonds is a ‘crucial 
human motive’ (Scheff, 1990, p. 4), the authors argue that shame signalizes to those who ex-
perience it that social bonds are at risk and triggers efforts to preserve these bonds 
(Baumeister et al., 2007). Our findings add to the idea of Creed et al. (2014) that shame can 
act as a means of intersubjective surveillance and self-regulation by outlining that personal 
emotions like shame trigger the quest for substantial organizational change to secure or re-
establish social bonds. The public-oriented gathering of 200 police men and officials at the 
Siemens headquarters in Munich can thus be regarded as an instance of shaming (see Creed et 
al., 2014). 
Previous research focused on how emotions spread collective corruption within an organiza-
tion (Smith-Crowe & Warren, 2014). In contrast, our findings outline how emotions can be 
used to trigger efforts against organizational corruption. Interviewees at Siemens described 
the shock of Siemens employees who used to read with pride in the media about their techno-
logical inventions and all of a sudden were confronted with a big public transgression, as well 
as the moral concerns of family and friends. While interviewees from the other two case com-
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panies also mentioned repeatedly that their organization had to reach the ‘hearts and minds’ of 
employees, this task had yet to be achieved by the time of the interviews and we attribute this 
to the absence of a legitimacy shock comparable to that which shook Siemens. 
Regulatory sanctions and reintegration in the absence of a legitimacy shock 
In the absence of a legitimacy shock, e.g. if ‘only’ pragmatic legitimacy is at risk whereas 
cognitive legitimacy (the taken-for-granted acceptance of the organization) remains unchal-
lenged, several aspects of previous reintegration models (Bertels et al., 2014; Pfarrer et al., 
2008) appear to hold, according to our findings. Transgressors (here: Daimler and ABB in the 
case of its second transgression) may then judge that they can afford to wait until they have 
all the facts before they seek and provide appropriate explanations, enter into regulatory 
agreements by way of penance, and implement organizational changes in line with these 
agreements, following the four stages (discovery, explanation, penance and rehabilitation) 
that Pfarrer et al. (2008) identified.  
Furthermore, our findings suggest that in the absence of a legitimacy shock, continued regula-
tory pressure plays a crucial role in forcing the transgressor to reintegrate in the institutional 
environment. Repeated or escalating external pressure may be necessary for transgressors to 
develop comprehensive controls and implement leading practices in the fight against corrup-
tion, as the model put forward by Bertels et al. (2014) suggests. Our findings show that regu-
latory approaches that include measures of reintegration are more effective than approaches 
that focus exclusively on sanctions. Among our case companies, ABB illustrates clearly the 
different effects of these two approaches: after its first transgression, ABB was only obliged 
to pay monetary fines. The company failed to implement substantial organizational changes; 
however, after the second transgression, ABB successfully completed a DPA prescribing a list 
of organizational changes to be made. Finally, our findings, especially on Daimler, identify 
external compliance monitors as very effective – though overlooked in recent research – 
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means of triggering organizational change through escalating pressure. The Daimler case in 
particular illustrates that the presence of an external monitor during the process of regaining 
regulatory legitimacy influenced significantly the transgressor’s reintegration strategy. This 
finding is also of interest to practitioners and scholars concerned with CSR initiatives or stan-
dards in general. In the context of schemes such as the UNGC, our study shows that in situa-
tions where the transgression and the transgressor’s power are not extreme (Daimler as op-
posed to Siemens), imposing external and stringent monitoring on the disgraced members 
may facilitate and accelerate their learning progress (see Schembera, 2012). While the UNGC 
so far lacks the resources to install direct monitoring (Rasche, 2009), one pragmatic solution 
would be to establish a fund to collect the necessary resources for appointing teams that moni-
tor UNGC members. Both UNGC members and other stakeholders should be interested to 
contribute to the fund to maintain and enhance the credibility of the initiative. 
Multiple versus single legitimacy strategies: What works when? 
Theoretical assumptions on the use of legitimacy strategies vary greatly and we perceive the 
need to clarify the conditions under which the different assumptions hold true. The contradic-
tions between different approaches – namely, the resource-based view (Christmann, 2000; 
Hart, 1995), discourse ethics (Stansbury, 2009) and institutional theory (Delmas, 2002; 
Schaefer, 2007) – give the impression that a corporation only applies one legitimacy strategy 
at a time. Palazzo and Scherer (2006) as well as Scherer et al. (2013) argue that choosing be-
tween different legitimacy strategies in a complex globalized economy does not work as 
smoothly as it once did (see Oliver, 1991). Scherer et al. (2013) therefore suggest that in het-
erogeneous environments that place conflicting demands on corporations, the best choice to 




Our findings on Daimler and ABB reveal that nowadays MNCs indeed tend to apply a mix of 
different legitimacy strategies in order to manage the heterogeneous anti-corruption expecta-
tions they have to meet. However, our study on Siemens indicates that a transgressor faced 
with a serious transgression, or legitimacy shock, succeeds in regaining legitimacy by limiting 
its range of legitimacy strategies to exercise ‘substantial influence’ aimed at reducing com-
plexity in the institutional environment. Applying only elements of ‘substantial influence’ 
together with several other legitimacy strategies tends to be less successful in regaining le-
gitimacy as the reoccurrence of regulatory sanctions at ABB illustrate. Overall, we hope that 
our arguments and findings provide valuable insights that will enable researchers to develop 
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Figure 2: Analysis of the interplay between corruption transgressions and legitimacy 





Figure 3: Theoretical Framework – Institutional expectations, transgression characteris-
tics and legitimacy strategies 
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Table 1: Synthesis of Corruption Control Elements 




Leadership support (e.g. CEO 
statement) 
• SC guidelines: high-level personnel as 
overseer 
• CC tool (dimension I): strategic integra-
tion and leadership support 
 Training 
(e.g. communication, awareness 
building, seminars, case studies)  
• SC guidelines: effective communication 
• CC tool: training 
• See also OCC circumplex, type 7: self-
controls 
 Whistle-blowing procedure 
(e.g. anonymous complaint hot-
line) 
• OCC circumplex, type 6: vigilance con-
trols; Type 8: concertive controls (hori-
zontal surveillance by coworkers) 






Bureaucratic controls  
(e.g. formalized rules, policies, 
hierarchical and centralized 
structure, specialized positions) 
• OCC circumplex, type 1: bureaucratic 
controls 
• SC guidelines: compliance standards and 
procedures; due care in delegating sub-
stantial discretionary authority 
 Alignment of incentives 
(e.g. via compensation plans) 
• OCC circumplex, type 3: incentive 
alignments 
• CC tool (dimension II): alignment of 
incentive structures 
 Monitoring and follow-up 
(e.g. risk assessment, audits, 
sanctions) 
• SC guidelines: monitoring, auditing, re-
porting; enforcement and disciplinary 
mechanisms; response upon detection 
• OCC circumplex, type 2: punishment 
(measuring, monitoring and sanctions) 




Collective Action  
(e.g. integrity pacts, stakeholder 
dialogue, participation in volun-
tary anti-corruption initiatives) 
• CC tool (dimension III): quality of 
stakeholder relationships; level of partici-
pation in collaborative CC initiatives 
• Beyond requirements of Lange (2008) and 
Sentencing Guidelines 
Legend: 
• CC = Corporate Citizenship (Baumann-Pauly & Scherer, 2013) 
• OCC = Organizational Corruption Control (Lange, 2008) 
• SC = Sentencing Commission (USSC, 2010) 
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Table 2: Data sources and corresponding perspectives in the analysis 
Data types 











3 2 2 (2 infor-
mants each) 



















3 1 (2 infor-
mants) 
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2013) 





Table 3: Representative evidence from interview data 




Code: Discrepancies between local social norms and legislation 
‘Sometimes it is not just the political will, it’s the whole culture of getting things done. (...) And 
for people who don’t understand the cultural difference between the two countries, they won’t 
accept that as normal’ (Singapore Global Compact Network, President, Mar. 2014). 
‘There are differences in the understanding of corruption and the tolerance level. (...) So in 
some cultures, certain practices, although people know it is not right, they are commonly ac-
cepted’ (Daimler Greater China, (Chinese) CM, Mar. 2014). 
‘Malaysia's got some of the best legislation in the world, but the political and social will to 
enforce it is often lacking’ (TI Malaysia, Program manager, Apr. 2014). 
Code: MNC facing heterogeneous corruption risks 
‘Of course there are different risks in different countries’ (Daimler, Senior CM, Nov. 2012).* 
‘Someone in Australia might say “you tell me I need to do x,y,z, but because I am low risk, I 
am going to do the low risk strategy” whereas “because I am in China, I am going to do the 
high risk strategy”’ (Large professional services firm, Australia, Senior manager, Mar. 2013). 
‘The Australian culture is less prone to corruption because it is not seen as a cultural norm, 
whereas in other countries … (ABB Australia, IO & Regional counsel, May 2013). 
‚Insofar corruption quite is an everyday issue in Indonesia. This is of course completely differ-
ent in Germany’ (KADIN Business Support Desk Indonesia, Mar. 2014).* 
‚So they are basically killing themselves in a market like the Philippines. That's what they real-
ized. It's like inflicting pain on yourself. You are allowed to bribe in this country here, wel-




Code: Growing legislation on corruption of foreign officials 
‘UK pressed ahead with the criminal liability of facilitation payments. FPs are not exempted 
from criminal liability in the UK Bribery Act’ (Lawyer, Gibson Dunn, Nov. 2012).* 
‘Compliance and its increasing significance have to be regarded in its historical context. You 
know, until 1999 these topics were tax-deductible as beneficial expenditures’ (Daimler, Senior 
CM, Nov. 2012).* 
‘Singapore has a law similar to the UK Bribery Act, or the FCPA, wherein they can be prose-
cuted for foreign corrupt acts’ (CSR ASEAN, Manager, Mar. 2014). 
Code: Growing enforcement of legislation 
‘The department of public prosecution in Munich has discovered criminal conviction in the 
context of this legislation as some source of income. (…) There are high pressure mechanisms 
in the US’ (Lawyer, Gibson Dunn, Nov. 2012).* 
Code: Rising significance and awareness of corruption 
‘But there was no great awareness for compliance issues. This was not something specific to 
Siemens, but it was also not present as an issue in society (Siemens, Senior CM, Nov. 2012).* 
‘There’s something developing in the awareness of the public (in the Swiss market), and we are 
also contacted by clients to make things transparent’ (Siemens, Senior CM, Nov. 2013).* 
Context of transgression 
Legitimacy 
shock 
Code: Strong emotional shift from pride to consternation 
As a company, we had not been in the press with any scandals or crises until that point of time. 
And we were also a tight-knit community in the sense of: Wow, we are a successful company, 
160 years in business. And as a company and an employee of that company experiencing daily 
negative headlines, daily bashing, utterly leads to as an employee being personally affected. It 
also went so far that people reported that it in their families this was the main topic, or that 
friends asked how one could work for such a company and whether one ever knew about that. 
That they always thought that it was so nice that one was working for Siemens. Thus it was 
really personal. And a personal crisis for everyone. And I claim that there were extremely many 
people who had no idea about what was happening and there was a huge disappointment in the 
former Chairman and the top management (…) With these accusations and emotions it was 
clear to everyone that profound change must happen’ (Siemens, Senior CO, Nov. 2012).* 
‘The psychology changes - people working for decades for the same company are now a facing 
this new situation’ (Siemens Australia, HR manager, Feb. 2014). 
‘The scandal and the media behavior surely were the main trigger and also what has influenced 
the people in the organization the most … also worldwide. (...) It was a broader system and thus 
the consternation was a significantly higher one. (...) But the consternation, that is really shaken 
the corporate group as such and that it could also have developed quite differently, this has 
really permeated towards every single employee’ (Siemens, Senior CO, Nov. 2013).* 
Code: No choice but to radically and instantly react 
  
 150 
‘A crisis helps, and such a scandal helps and we were at the point where we could only change 
the course or sink. And in this first step I think we have taken the necessary measures that (…) 
have helped us, to leave this deep valley of scandal and turn towards a success story. (…) Then 
the process of change started, but not gradually, but this compliance system was implemented 
under brute force. (...) It was just said do it, implement it, do it and everyone now has to do it. 
(...) The scandal, we had no chance. We had Public Prosecution Service in the house and as a 
New York Stock Exchange listed company of course also the SEC, so there was no choice’ 
(Siemens, Senior CO, Nov. 2012).* 
‘”No other way“ Löscher said back then. (...) If 200 Bavarian officers, police with official cars 
are standing on Wittelsbacher Platz and finally enter and confiscate everything, even the com-
puter, then this is not a little something’ (Siemens FCPA monitor, Oct. 2013).* 
‘The other thing at the back of Siemens' head is, if they get caught again, would it be a blow 




Code: Pressure of external FCPA monitor 
‘This situation, the pressure of the monitorship no doubt has led us (…) to being forced to es-
tablish a compliance management system. (…) In my judgment however we have also estab-
lished under the monitorship pressure at some positions a tight net of measures, processes and 
controls. (…) But overall, against the background of our history, we are ahead compared to 
many others. So I am not blaming them’ (Daimler, Senior CM, Nov. 2012).* 
‘This was a crisis situation. With the end of the monitorship the situation has changed. (…) But 
we also needed this challenge, the critical point of view’ (Daimler, CM, Nov. 2013).* 
‘There was a kind of agreement between the Group Compliance and Louis Freeh and his moni-
tor team to install a local compliance office (...) We have undergone at Daimler a development 
in the last years facilitated by the monitorship’ (Daimler Greater China, CM, Mar. 2014). 
Code: High scope and intensity of FCPA monitorship 
‘A monitorship is much more intense than usual auditing’ (Lawyer, Gibson Dunn, Nov. 2012).* 
‘The monitor gave a lot of suggestions in his first report’ (Daimler, Senior CM, Nov. 2012).* 
‘In 2011, the monitor team was 14 days in Australia’ (Daimler Australia, CO, Apr. 2014).* 
‘First and foremost, the monitor has made visits also to China. Some of his visits have also led 
him to the JVs. So they are also aware at that time of their thinking’ (Daimler Greater China, 
CM, Mar. 2014). 
MNC legitimacy strategy 
Decoupling Code: MNC policies not well communicated or enforced 
‘There were formalities and people dealing with compliance of these formalities (…). In my 
point of view it was simply lacking awareness for theses issue and as a result of that (…) it was 
also lacking awareness for consequent dealing when formalities were not met’ (Siemens, Senior 
CO, Nov. 2012).* 
‘Until the year 2008 we did not do that in a quality that we considered and consider as neces-
sary’ (Daimler, Senior CM, Nov. 2012).* 
‘Siemens did not know how many accounts it had’ (Siemens FCPA monitor, Oct. 2013).* 
‘Before I joined, we had a colleague who covered Greater China from Germany. She travelled 
to China from time to time’ (Daimler Greater China, (Chinese) CM, Mar. 2014). 
‘So we single handedly started for example in Malaysia, it was a one man show’ (Siemens 
ASEAN, Regional CO, Apr. 2014). 
Isomorphic 
adaptation 
Code: Compliance with external rules 
‘[The FCPA consultant] came out with a number of improvements which we implemented and 
which we reported on very regularly - with the Department of Justice and the SEC’ (ABB Aus-
tralia, IO & Regional counsel, May 2013) 
‘Mercedes went to the Government in the States and said, what we request, is rather than fining 
us this much, fine us this much and let us use this much to change our company. And they put it 
an FBI judge as their Chief Integrity Officer to give oversight’ (TI Malaysia, Apr. 2014). 
Code: Gradual organizational change 
‘The difference between Siemens and Daimler is that Daimler has not changed its leadership 
team. Daimler played it differently’ (Lawyer, Gibson Dunn, Nov. 2012).* 
‘We proceed step-by-step, so to speak’ (Daimler, Senior CM, Nov. 2012).* 
‘The employees first of all shall be informed and then also qualified to deal with this context’ 
(Daimler, Senior CM, Nov. 2012).* 
‘Perhaps in the first year when the monitor started, the feedback did not get back in a harmo-
nized way from all over the world – politically speaking. (...) You cannot change a culture from 
one day to the other. This takes time.’ (Daimler Australia, CO, Apr. 2014).* 
‘It was a constant amelioration of the CMS. (…) At latest with the DPA also the last employee 
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knew the signs of the times’ (Daimler, CM, Nov. 2013).* 
‘Mercedes said it took eight to ten years to really fix the company from top to bottom’ (TI Ma-
laysia, Program manager, Apr. 2014). 
Code: Orientation towards leading business practices 
‘Daimler adopted Siemens‘s Business Partner Tool’ (Lawyer, Gibson Dunn, Nov. 2012).* 
‘I would say that the first two to three year we were quite ahead. In the meantime we realize 
that our peers follow (…). The issue controls, the pillar “detect” in many cases is not as devel-
oped as in our system, but regarding the “prevent” side I would say that there are comparable 
systems among our peers’ (Siemens, Senior CO, Nov. 2013).* 
‘For ABB during that time (2010), when I was still there, we were in the start or in the process 
of implementation. (…) On ABB side, they have followed the same track’ (Siemens Philippi-
nes, Sales manager (formerly at ABB), Apr. 11, 2014). 
Code: Increase the efficiency of new compliance strategy 
‘Here the main task insofar has relocated from coping with the acute situation and the need for 
the establishment of new processes towards the amelioration and sustainable implementation of 
achievements’ (Daimler, compliance manager, Nov.2013).* 
‘The issue improvement in efficiency was one of the focus topics last year within the compli-
ance organization’ (Siemens, Senior CO, Nov. 2013).* 
Moral rea-
soning 
Code: What is right and wrong? 'What should I do?' 
“The world has changes and that is good. (…) I think it is fair to first inform and enable them 
(business leaders) to cope with this new context” (Daimler, Senior CO, Nov. 2012). 
(We are not allowed to display the quotes from ABB headquarters.) 
Code: What is the ethical role of a MNC? 
‘We don't want to be seen as culturally insensitive, as a European company trying to preach to 
others’ (ABB Australia, IO Australia & Regional counsel South Asia, May 2013). 
Substantial 
influence 
Code: 'We do more than we have to' 
‘One audit department cannot deliver a big coverage for businesses in 190 countries. The con-
trol system as such, that we have introduced for our regulations and processes, is the more effi-
cient one in that case I think’ (Siemens, Senior CO, Nov. 2012).* 
‘All Siemens payments worldwide are centrally administrated via Munich. This is a voluntary 
step by Siemens, which cannot be found at most of the competitors. (…) Siemens lately volun-
tarily reported to the public prosecutor department three persons that were involved in the Ku-
wait affair. An internal solution, such as dismissal, however would have been sufficient’ (Law-
yer, Gibson Dunn, Nov. 2012).* 
‘We replicated the required global program throughout the Australian organizations despite the 
fact that we haven't had any issues’ (Siemens Australia, Regional CO, Mar. 2013). 
‘I am convinced that Siemens is on top of the list. (…) Siemens has done more than what the 
legislator in America as well as in Germany expects’ (Siemens FCPA monitor, Oct. 2013).* 
‘Siemens still is the gold standard in compliance’ (Lawyer, Gibson Dunn, Nov. 2013).* 
‘The entire Collective Action Personal as well as the strategy process are not financed through 
the World Bank or other settlements’ (Siemens, Head of CA, Feb. 2014)* 
‘We have developed a full-blown business partner tool, which I think is a very comprehensive 
tool. I doubt many of these organizations would have such a comprehensive tool’ (Siemens 
Singapore, Regional CO ASEAN, Apr. 2014). 
Code: 'We want to make sure everybody else does it too' 
‘[Siemens is] due to the scandal now surely the company with the most developed compliance 
system, which also triggers a high eagerness for knowledge among other companies to learn 
from that and to take over these issues. Not everyone has to invent something new. (…) Under 
the title “Collective Action” one of our goals is to transport our knowledge and experience 
towards the outside, make it available to others and build alliances with other market partici-
pants, simply to work together on fair competition’ (Siemens, Senior CO, Nov. 2012).* 
‘In Collective Action Siemens also assumes a pioneering task. A separate person is responsible 
for the initiative, which underlines the seriousness of the initiative’ (Lawyer, Gibson Dunn, 
Nov. 2012).* 
‘The Round Table in Switzerland is mainly pushed by Siemens’ (HTW Chur, Jan. 2014) 
‘It helps to communicate it and make it public’ (Siemens, CO regional entities, Mar. 2014).* 
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Table 4: Classification of transgression sanctions 
Company Type of sanction Magnitude of sanction 
Siemens Legal/regulatory 
sanctions  (fines and 
costs involved) 
In December 2008, Siemens entered an agreement to settle the FCPA-
related charges it had been called to pay, including the installation of an 
external monitor for a period of four years until December 2012 (SEC, 
2008c). The fines imposed by US and German regulatory authorities 
amount to more than $1.6 billion; the organizational costs for rehabilitation 
are expected to surpass this figure. The costs for organizational changes 
made in response to these regulatory requirements are probably even 
higher. Altogether, we can ascertain with confidence that fines and costs 
involved in this Siemens corruption transgression are unprecedented. 
 Social sanctions  
(prominence of 
transgression) 
As we learnt in the course of our interviews, the disclosure of the transgres-
sion was rather unique and had an immense effect on social sanctions: In 
November 2006, i.e. before the SEC investigation, around 200 policemen 
and officials turned up at the Munich headquarters to confiscate material 
relevant to the corruption cases at Siemens. This action is likely to have 
made the magnitude of the problem obvious to almost every Siemens em-
ployee around the world and triggered an unprecedented level of negative 
media coverage on corporate corruption (see RepRisk, 2013). Even more, 
closely after this event, the prominent normative anti-corruption institution 
Transparency International Germany terminated Siemens’s membership in 




The fines Daimler paid to settle the SEC charges with the SEC and the DOJ 
amounted to around $185 million in total. Furthermore, an external monitor 
was installed pointing out major organizational compliance deficits 
(Spiegel, 2011); hence, the organizational costs to achieve rehabilitation are 
likely to be substantial. Comparing the magnitude of these costs to the costs 
that burdened Siemens, the overall level of fines and related costs at Daim-
ler can be described as high. 
 Social sanctions The corrupt practices were disclosed by the SEC in March 2010 and the 
agreed DPA lasted from March 2010 to March 2013, so the Daimler trans-
gression erupted at least one and a half years after the Siemens transgres-
sion. This may also explain why Daimler was not as much in the spotlight 
as Siemens, reflected in the significantly lower level of media coverage on 
corruption risks at Daimler (RepRisk, 2013). In the Daimler case, there was 
also no big and sudden investigative act to trigger instant and massive pub-
lic awareness. The level of social sanctions can thus be described as me-
dium to low. 
ABB Legal/regulatory 
sanctions 
To settle the SEC charges, ABB agreed to pay more than $39.3 million. In 
this case, no external monitor was appointed, which together with the re-
quirements listed in the DPA (DOJ, 2010) indicates that the organizational 
costs for rehabilitation are considerably lower than those of Siemens and 
Daimler. 
 Social sanctions The three-year DPA agreed with the SEC started in September 2010, al-
most two years after the Siemens agreement; moreover, the scope of the 
corrupt practices was limited to a few countries. This may indicate the 
rather low media coverage on compliance risks, especially compared to the 
Siemens case (see also Table 2) supports our assessment: from 2006 to 
2013, we found only 10 entries on corruption-related reputation risk con-
cerning ABB in the RepRisk database, compared to 138 for Siemens and 40 
for Daimler (RepRisk, 2013). The level of social sanctions can thus be 
described as low. 
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Table 5: Analysis of corruption controls before, during and after the corruption trans-
gressions 
 
Dimension Criteria Before  
(t1: 2003–2005) 
• 1st ABB SEC 
settlement 
(2004) 
During (t2: 2006–2010) 
• 2006: Investigation 
at Siemens HQ 
• SEC/WB settle-
ments: Siemens 
(2008, 2009), Daimler 
and 2nd ABB (2010) 
After  
(t3: 2011–2014) 







 • Strongest anti-
corruption statement 
by CEO 
• Separate board posi-
tion 











 • Most* details on com-
plaint procedure 
(*always compared to 





cies and rules 
• Strongest centralized 
structure and approval 
processes 
• Most compliance staff  














 • Additional audits by 
compliance team, SO2 







• TI terminated 
membership 
(2005) 
• Own integrity initiative 
• TI membership re-
newed 








• Separate board posi-
tion 




Training • First to par-
tially cover 
SO3  














cies and rules 













• First to par-
tially cover 
SO2 and SO4  
• SO4 fully covered • Strong assess-






• Participation • SO5 fully covered • SO5 fully cov-
ered 








• Separate board posi-
tion 
• Board position 
maintained after 
end of DPA 
Training • SO3 partially 
covered 








• First to report 
on complaints 
procedure 
• Prominently promoted 






cies and rules 












 • SO4 partially covered 
(2006) 
 







• First to join 
PACI 
• Most voluntary mem-




• DPA = Deferred Prosecution Agreement; monitorship = external monitor imposed by SEC 
• Bullets: information mainly retrieved from document analysis (not comprehensive; most significant aspects 
merely listed) 
• Shading: Comprehensiveness of criteria coverage ranging from not/fractionally covered (white) to very 
comprehensively covered (dark grey). Assessment also incorporates focus and details obtained through in-
terviews; this remains partially subjective, due to constraints in scope of investigation. 
• SO2–SO5 (Global Reporting Initiative indicators): SO2 (percentage and total number of business units ana-
lyzed for risks related to corruption); SO3 (percentage of employees trained in the organization’s anti-
corruption policies and procedures); SO4 (actions taken in response to incidents of corruption) 
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MAKING SENSE OF DECOUPLING THROUGH NARRATION:  
THE CASE OF FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN GLOBAL BUSINESS 
Abstract 
Previous organizational research on decoupling in the context of socio-environmental govern-
ance has suggested a trade-off between compliance and goal achievement, meaning that 
remedying the decoupling of policies and practices tends to jeopardize efforts to remedy the 
decoupling of means and ends. We expand on previous research on the trade-off between 
compliance and goal achievement by examining the spatiotemporal processes of sensemaking 
by which the meaning of compliance and achievement is negotiated among multiple actors. 
Taking a qualitative analytical approach we examine the evolution of anti-corruption policies 
at Siemens and other actors, and describe how different anti-corruption narratives have devel-
oped over time at different locations and how they have been linked to each other. We explain 
that through narration actors develop a shared understanding of what it means to be compliant 
and successful and that through communicative interaction compliance and achievement are 
mutually constituted. Our study contributes to decoupling research by examining the idea-
tional underpinnings of the compliance-achievement gap. 
Keywords 
Compliance, Decoupling, Fighting Corruption, Goal Achievement, Sensemaking 
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INTRODUCTION 
Decoupling is a prominent concept in organization theory ever since the seminal contribution 
by Meyer and Rowan (1977). For a long time, scholars focused on the analysis of deviations 
between actual practices and formal policies of organizations, i.e., they explored instances of 
policy-practice decoupling (for an overview, see e.g. Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008). More 
recently, the deviation between practices and intended outcomes has caught scholarly atten-
tion and was identified as another type of decoupling, “means-ends decoupling” (Bromley & 
Powell, 2012; Wijen, 2014). Wijen (2014), for example, has theorized the existence of a 
tradeoff between strict compliance with formal policies and the achievement of intended out-
comes. He suggests that policy adherence is not conducive to goal attainment but can in fact 
jeopardize organizational objectives in cases where the links between policies and outcomes, 
due to their complexity, are not well understood. 
A deeper analysis of the existence, causes, and relationships between different kinds of de-
coupling is particularly relevant in the context of globalization: In this setting, multinational 
corporations (MNCs) operate in complex institutional environments across multiple geo-
graphic spaces, are often confronted with heterogeneous demands and have to balance differ-
ent expectations with regard to the appropriate design of socio-environmental governance 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). On the one hand, MNCs are pressured 
to adopt globally practices and norms that have been institutionalized at the home country 
level. On the other hand, implementing a unified set of practices in the whole MNC network 
is difficult in the presence of conflicting demands imposed by various stakeholders and host 
country actors (Scherer, Palazzo, & Seidl, 2013), because “satisfying some demands requires 
defying others” (Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 455). In this view, policy-practice decoupling is 
not only relevant in a mono-spatial context of conflicting demands within a school or hospital 
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(Meyer & Rowan, 1977) but particularly prevalent in the multi-spatial MNC context 
(Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008; Pache & Santos, 2010). 
Nonetheless, there is an increasing demand in the institutional environment of organizations 
for enforcing transparency and accountability to ensure compliance, i.e. the tight coupling of 
policy and practice (see Kostova et al., 2008; Wijen, 2014). In the context of complex and 
opaque socio-environmental governance, however, scholars have suggested that enforcing 
compliance is unlikely to yield the results formal policies intend to achieve; compliance may 
affect negatively the flexibility to cope with complex institutional demands (Greenwood, 
Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010; Scherer et al., 2013) 
thereby undermining prospects of goal achievement (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Wijen, 2014). 
In other words, the trade-off between compliance and goal achievement seems particularly 
pronounced for MNCs. 
While advancing our understanding of the challenges in socio-environmental governance, this 
stream of research has not yet sufficiently addressed the role of multiple actors, interests and 
interpretive schemes that are involved in the heterogeneous settings of global business, as 
well as the role of developments over time that may render decoupling a transitory or at least 
flexible phenomenon. Notions of ‘compliance’ and ‘achievement’ are therefore highly con-
tested; their meaning is not fixed but negotiated within a dynamic and non-linear process of 
sensemaking (Haack & Schoeneborn, 2015; Weick, 1995). In the context of socio-
environmental governance, sensemaking results from cognitive and linguistic processes and 
involves the construction of a shared interpretation of ethically contentious issues (Basu & 
Palazzo, 2008; Reinecke & Ansari, 2015). Communication is central for actors to make sense 
of a practice and the underlying means-ends relations and to eventually accept and enact be-
havioral prescriptions (Green, 2004). Acknowledging that sensemaking happens in and 
through communication or storytelling in particular (Boje, 1991, p. 106), here we focus on the 
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analysis of ‘narratives’, i.e. recurrent practices of storytelling that include a causal interpreta-
tion of a time sequence involving focal actors, events, motivations, activities and outcomes. 
Narratives contribute to the process of sensemaking by embodying “a sense of what is right 
and wrong, appropriate or inappropriate” with respect to the achievement of a certain objec-
tive (Pentland, 1999, p. 712). Empirical analyses hence need to be concerned with identifying 
and thoroughly scrutinizing the pivotal role of narratives for making sense of compliance and 
achievement. 
We will analyze narratives on compliance and goal achievement and their mutual relationship 
by exploring the case of the global fight against corruption. We define corruption as the “mis-
use of an organizational position or authority for personal gain or organizational (or sub-unit) 
gain, where misuse in turn refers to departures from accepted social norms” (Anand, Ash-
forth, & Joshi, 2004, p. 40). In particular, this paper focuses on anti-corruption at the German 
MNC Siemens AG (Siemens) and includes a diverse set of related corporate and non-
corporate actors in the anti-corruption field. After rehabilitating from a corruption scandal of 
unprecedented scope in 2006/07, Siemens has gone through a process of radical change while 
public authorities have closely inspected its structures and procedures (Gebhardt & Müller-
Seitz, 2011). Siemens is now considered the benchmark in corporate anti-corruption programs 
and in many respects the company acts as a corporate pioneer in the global anti-corruption 
environment. Other Western MNCs such as Daimler AG or ABB Ltd. have also significantly 
increased their anti-corruption efforts after having faced corruption scandals in the recent past 
(Schembera & Scherer, 2014). Therefore, one can assume that formal policies – reflecting 
Western anti-corruption norms – and actual daily practices at Western MNCs such as Siemens 
are likely to be closely aligned (Hartmann, 2012; Schembera & Scherer, 2014). At the same 
time, however, severe corruption risks continue to persist in many countries across the globe 
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(TI, 2012). This may point to difficulties of achieving desired goals and question the impact 
of single actors in the global fight against corruption. 
We examine the possible tension between compliance and goal achievement in the global 
fight against corruption by asking: Through which narratives do actors in the anti-corruption 
field make sense of the relationship between compliance and goal achievement? How do nar-
ratives relate to each other and develop over time and space? In turn, how do narratives af-
fect the compliance-achievement relationship among central actors in the anti-corruption 
field?  
Our analysis of sensemaking among central actors in the anti-corruption field suggests that 
through narration actors develop a shared, yet space and time contingent, understanding of the 
relation between compliance and achievement allowing them to cope with complexity in the 
anti-corruption environment. Scholars recently identified the effect of the interplay of space 
and time on comprehensions of everyday life (Lefebvre, 2004) and MNC internationalization 
or resource planning (Haley & Boje, 2014; Quattrone & Hopper, 2005), and we expand that to 
compliance and achievement in fighting corruption. We argue that even compliant MNCs and 
various types of non-corporate actors from the Western hemisphere implicitly accept practice-
policy decoupling of actors from certain high corruption-risk geographic spaces for a certain 
period of time. Crucially, they perceive this interaction of compliant and (transitory) noncom-
pliant actors to be a necessary means towards achieving anti-corruption goals in the longer 
term. Our analysis thus shows that rather than treating compliance and achievement as objec-
tively observable or specifiable, their meaning is mutually constituted and thus subject to 
change. 
We contribute to scholarship in organization theory by showing how taking into account nar-
ratives in the interaction of different actors across space and time puts the postulated tradeoff 
between compliance and goal achievement (Wijen, 2014) into perspective. That is, the trade-
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off itself is a product of social construction. Furthermore we discuss the implications of our 
findings for fighting organizational corruption and corporate social responsibility (CSR) in 
general. Specifically, our research clarifies that the mainstream notion of a universalistic ap-
proach of anti-corruption is unlikely to achieve desired outcomes. We demonstrate that the 
meaning of corruption is locally embedded and is negotiated over time, with unknown and 
often unanticipated results.  
Below, we describe the evolution, context and assumptions as well as the limitations of exist-
ing theoretical perspectives on decoupling. Based on this review, we craft our research ques-
tions before introducing the case context and methodological approach to answer these ques-
tions. Finally, we present the findings and discuss the contributions of our study. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Coping with institutional complexity: Theoretical perspectives on decoupling 
In the following, we identify and compare two theoretical perspectives on decoupling in pre-
vious research, which we label ‘the classic view’ and ‘the instrumental view’. Based on our 
review of these perspectives and the empirical findings obtained in this study, we suggest 
further down a third ‘integrative view’ on decoupling expanding the two previous perspec-
tives, and provide an illustrative overview of the three perspectives. 
The classic view: Policy-practice decoupling 
The concept of decoupling has received much scholarly attention ever since the seminal con-
tribution by Meyer and Rowan (1977). These authors described decoupling as a response to 
cope with complex or even contradictory demands in an organization’s environment by creat-
ing a gap between formal policies and actual organizational practices. According to this “clas-
sic” notion of decoupling (Haack & Schoeneborn, 2015), the adoption of formal policies and 
structures in conformance with external expectations allowed organizations to maintain le-
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gitimacy, i.e. the social acceptance among its key constituents (e.g. Suchman, 1995). A main 
focus especially in empirical studies within this perspective was to confirm the presence of 
decoupling, i.e. scholars have sought organizations whose practices do not comply with is-
sued policies (see Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008, p. 85). For example, the presence of policy-
practice decoupling has been studied in the context of affirmative action officers in United 
States colleges and cities (Edelman, 1992; Edelman, Petterson, Chambliss, & Erlanger, 1991) 
or a railway company in Sweden (Brunsson & Olsen, 1993). We understand the presence of 
policy-practice decoupling as being synonymous to noncompliance; vice versa, we treat com-
pliance and policy-practice coupling as equivalents in this paper. 
A central assumption of policy-practice decoupling is the avoidance of social evaluation, un-
derstood as outside monitoring and inspection (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Meyer and Rowan 
(1977, p. 357) assume that: 
“[i]nstitutionalized organizations protect their formal structures from evaluation on the 
basis of technical performance: inspection, evaluation, and control of activities are 
minimized, and coordination, interdependence, and mutual adjustments among struc-
tural units are handled informally.“ 
Decoupled organizations can maintain legitimacy despite a lack of coordination and control 
due to the prevalence of “confidence and good faith” among their internal and external con-
stituents. The logic of confidence and good faith, in turn, is upheld through a variety of prac-
tices, including the ascription of great autonomy for organizational subunits to allow for 
avoidance and discretion (Goffman, 2005), or the maintenance of face among individual par-
ticipants (March & Simon, 1958). Further underlying this decoupling perspective, especially 
in earlier studies, is an understanding of actors as passive recipients of external constraints 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Like the exemplary works on decoupling mentioned above, many studies within this classic 
view of decoupling tend to restrict their analysis on one geographic space: they examine de-
coupling within a college, city, hospital or government agency among other (see also 
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Goodrick & Salancik, 1996; Greenwood et al., 2011; Heimer, 1999; Tilcsik, 2010). Moreover, 
for a long time this theoretical perspective evoked the impression that decoupling may be a 
stable means to cope with institutional complexity (in particular, see Meyer & Rowan, 1977), 
albeit more recently scholars also refer to the potential volatility of this phenomenon 
(Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008, p. 88; Scott, 2007; Tilcsik, 2010). 
The instrumental view: Means-ends decoupling 
In contrast to the classic decoupling view addressing a gap between policies and practices, the 
instrumental view describes decoupling as a gap between means and ends. Rather than inves-
tigating noncompliance this perspective focuses on the uncertain relationship between imple-
mented practices and the achievement of goals envisaged by developers and implementers of 
these policies (Bromley & Powell, 2012; see also DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Wijen, 2014). 
There are two central reasons for the emergence of this different perspective on decoupling: 
First, scholars observed that in recent decades external pressures on organizations toward ac-
countability, assessment, and transparency have intensified leading to an ‘audit society’ or 
‘audit culture’ (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Power, 1999; Strathern, 2000). Through increasing 
NGO pressure (Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007) and regulatory influences, organizations are 
pushed “to align their policies and practices more closely and to conform to external evalua-
tive criteria” (Bromley & Powell, 2012, p. 484) making decoupling of policies and practices 
increasingly difficult and instable. Applied to the context of globally operating corporations, 
Kostova et al. (2008, p. 1000) explain the current trend towards compliance as follows: 
“because MNC actions worldwide are increasingly transparent, it would be risky to 
engage in manipulation of compliance instead of actual adoption. The actions of MNC 
units are also visible and transparent when the intraenvironment is considered. Subunit 
activities are likely to be monitored and controlled internally through formal and in-
formal mechanisms.” 
In sum, growing monitoring and control efforts increasingly displace the logic of confidence 
and good faith in today’s business environment. 
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Second, and parallel to growing demands for transparency, organizations are more and more 
expected to take over the role of corporate citizens addressing transnational problems in 
spheres like the environment or labor norms (Matten & Crane, 2005; Scherer & Palazzo, 
2007). Today, many stakeholders have growing expectations vis-à-vis global corporations and 
demand that these firms help solving societal problems that may well extend or even be far 
removed from the corporate objective of producing goods and services efficiently (Brunsson, 
1989). Scholars refer to this trend of corporations increasingly taking on public responsibili-
ties as rationalization of the institutional environment (Boli, 2006). While the transparency 
trend challenged central assumptions of the classic decoupling perspective, the environmental 
rationalization trend then led to the emergence of the instrumental means-ends perspective 
rather than displacing the decoupling concept as a whole (Bromley & Powell, 2012). 
In this instrumental decoupling view, it has been suggested that especially in the complex and 
opaque context of socio-environmental governance where practices, causality, and outcomes 
are hard to understand and trace, mitigating policy-practice decoupling is unlikely to yield the 
results for which policies have been designed (Wijen, 2014). Some scholars have even sug-
gested a trade-off between substantive compliance and goal achievement arguing that “institu-
tional entrepreneurs who remedy the policy-practice decoupling may enhance the disparity 
between means and ends, and vice versa“ (Wijen, 2014, p. 302). ‘Institutional entrepreneurs’ 
thereby refers to resource- and powerful actors who create new or change existing institutions 
(Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Hardy & Maguire, 2008). This claimed trade-off is 
justified by the conclusion that the adopted policies are inappropriate. Remedying means-ends 
decoupling has then become the key research interest in this debate. 
The instrumental view further differentiates itself from the classic view by highlighting more 
centrally the role of agency, for example by referring to the concept of institutional entrepre-
neurs, thereby acknowledging the possibility of more active responses of organizational actors 
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to conflicting environmental expectations. Even more, by focusing on global socio-
environmental governance and sustainability standards (Wijen, 2014), this view expands the 
mono-spatial or local focus typically applied in the classic view to a global dimension. 
Limitations in previous perspectives on decoupling 
The classic and instrumental views of decoupling significantly enrich our understanding of 
the relation between policies and practices, means and ends. However, both perspectives con-
tain limitations that may obscure a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon. 
Most notably, our literature review of existing decoupling perspectives revealed a limited 
understanding of decoupling with regard to three criteria: (1) the role of developments over 
time, (2) the role of (geographic) space, and (3) the applied epistemological stance. 
(1) Underlying the lines of reasoning in the recently emerged means-ends decoupling debate 
and especially in earlier studies within the policy-practice decoupling perspective is a static 
conceptualization of decoupling. By ‘static’ we refer to the missing analysis of social dynam-
ics in the decoupling process and the presumption that decoupling is stable and lasts for good. 
Arguing that either institutional entrepreneurs ensure substantive compliance among adopters, 
thereby compromising the achievement of intended (socio-environmental) goals, or they favor 
flexibility in compliance to warrant goal achievement, thereby risking symbolic adoption 
Wijen (2014, p. 313) evokes the impression of taking a static view on decoupling. Addressing 
the complex nature of socio-environmental problems, Wijen (2014, p. 310) highlights that 
“institutions such as sustainability standards that are conducive to compliance prescribe and 
incentivize adherence to clear rules” may create a ‘waterbed effect’, i.e. solving one problem 
while creating another (see also Dasgupta, 2000; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). While ac-
knowledging the importance of time (Wijen, 2014, p. 313), dynamics in the relation between 
compliance and achievement have not yet been incorporated in the central line of reasoning in 
the means-ends perspective. 
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(2) While the classic view originally focused on decoupling in local mono-spatial settings 
such as colleges, hospitals or government agencies, the instrumental perspective expands the 
geographic space by focusing on the global context of socio-environmental problems. Wijen 
(2014, p. 313) refers to the potential benefit of introducing context-specific ‘niche institu-
tions’, i.e. arrangements classifying in between individualized agreements and universal insti-
tutions, for reducing the compliance-achievement tradeoff. We aim to expand that by address-
ing whether and to what extent the relation between compliance and achievement varies de-
pendent on a particular regional space within this one global context. 
(3) Several more recent studies in the classic decoupling perspective (e.g. Hallett, 2010; 
Tilcsik, 2010) and central studies in the instrumental view (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Wijen, 
2014) tend to assume that a gap between policies and practices or means and ends is objec-
tively observable, i.e. they often take an objectivist epistemological stance (see also Haack & 
Schoeneborn, 2015; Haack, Schoeneborn, & Wickert, 2012). An ‘objectivist’ view on decou-
pling emphasizes the importance of studying the nature of relationships among the elements 
constituting decoupling as a stable structure. In the instrumental means-ends perspective, the 
tradeoff between compliance and achievement tends to presume that envisaged societal goals 
are rather fix and do not allow for interpretability or flexibility. Examples such as categorical 
bans on child labor or FAIRTRADE insisting that small farmers join cooperatives referred to 
in this debate illustrate this postulated rigidity (Wijen, 2014). 
However, these conceptualizations of decoupling and the trade-off between compliance and 
goal achievement do not fully acknowledge the fact that in the heterogeneous settings of 
global business multiple actors, interests, and interpretive schemes are involved. In such a 
complex and multi-spatial context, notions like ‘compliance’ and ‘achievement’ may not al-
ways be uncontested. Arguments from scholars taking a social-constructionist viewpoint, 
which presumes that the social world amounts to a continuous process which is enacted 
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through individuals (Morgan & Smircich, 1980), address this issue. From this point of view, 
one may expect that the meaning of compliance and achievement as well as the relationship 
between the two is no longer fixed but negotiated within a dynamic and non-linear process of 
sensemaking (see Haack & Schoeneborn, 2015; Weick, 1995). Communication is central in 
this process allowing actors to make sense of a practice and the underlying means-ends rela-
tions and to eventually accept and enact behavioral prescriptions (Green, 2004). In line with 
previous research on the communicative underpinnings of standardization (Haack et al., 
2012), we perceive the analysis of narratives to be particularly useful to explore the sense-
making processes of the compliance-achievement trade-off. Language, or narration, in this 
view is not literally reflecting reality but also creates and influences attitudinal and behavioral 
dispositions affecting actual choices (Cunliffe, Luhman, & Boje, 2004; Green, 2004; 
Pentland, 1999) such as the enactment of compliance of organizational policies and practices. 
Addressing the identified limitations in previous decoupling perspectives by taking a dy-
namic, multi-spatial and social-constructionist view on decoupling based on an analysis of 
compliance and achievement narratives this study aims to explore: Through which narratives 
do actors in the anti-corruption field make sense of the relationship between compliance and 
goal achievement? How do narratives relate to each other and develop over time and space? 
In turn, how do narratives affect the compliance-achievement relationship among central 
actors in the anti-corruption field?  
Case context: (De)coupling in the global fight against corruption 
In this study, we want to empirically analyze the challenges identified in the classic and in-
strumental views of decoupling, particularly with regard to their assumptions with respect to 
time, space and social reality. Organizational corruption in today’s globalized economy is the 
predestined setting to examine the decoupling phenomenon in all its types and occurrences 
spanning multiple heterogeneous geographic spaces and depicting significant dynamics in 
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recent years. No corporate actor has undergone more severe organizational changes and 
nowadays plays a bigger role in this global anti-corruption field than Siemens, as we will out-
line in the following. 
With the process of globalization, corruption has expanded transnationally, i.e. the involved 
corrupt actors and practices span multiple states. For example, an MNC with headquarters in 
one country may supply bribes to a government official in another country. Indeed, scholars 
argue that some forms of corruption, bribery in particular, are criminalized in every country of 
the world (Hess & Dunfee, 2000, p. 613; Nichols, 2012, p. 352). However, considerable het-
erogeneity exists with regard to what counts as corruption, tolerance levels and cultural ex-
pectations across countries and regions (Quah, 2011; TI, 2012). Under these conditions it is 
difficult for MNCs to determine behavior that is acceptable both in the host and in the home 
country context. When a business firm complies with social norms that are accepted in one 
context (e.g. the host country) this may lead to the deviation from different norms and expec-
tations in another context (e.g. the home country) (Scherer et al., 2013). On the one hand anti-
corruption legislations and business conventions of Western origin expect MNCs to apply 
globally uniform anti-corruption rules. On the other hand the cultural values and social norms 
in other parts of the world, especially in emerging economies, often demand certain forms of 
business practices that contradict with Western standards (see Salbu, 1999; TI, 2012). This 
complexity and heterogeneity in the MNC environment resulting from a combination of uni-
versal rules and locally diverging business norms appears to be tailor-made for policy-practice 
decoupling. 
However, as a result of increasing enforcement of Western transnational anti-corruption law 
(GibsonDunn, 2013), more and more Western MNCs were recently hit by a wave of corrup-
tion scandals and are now pressured to closely align their anti-corruption policies and prac-
tices (Gebhardt & Müller-Seitz, 2011; Schembera & Scherer, 2014). Between 2006 and 2008, 
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German and US investigators discovered a corruption scandal at Siemens that was unprece-
dented in scale and geographic reach: “The corruption alleged in the SEC’s complaint in-
volved more than $1.4 billion in bribes to government officials in Asia, Africa, Europe, the 
Middle East, and the Americas” (Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, SEC press 
release, Dec. 15, 2008). As a response to this scandal, also the company’s efforts in setting up 
anti-corruption processes and universally applying strict anti-corruption processes worldwide 
were unprecedented (Gebhardt & Müller-Seitz, 2011; Hartmann, 2012; Schembera & Scherer, 
2014). Other Western MNCs such as Daimler, ABB, General Electric or Shell developed 
compliance programs that nowadays come close to the one at Siemens in many regards 
(Schembera & Scherer, 2014). Such MNCs (now) tend to strictly comply with the universal 
prescriptions of transnational anti-corruption laws of Western origin such as the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act (FCPA) or the UK Bribery Act (Nichols, 2012). We thus expect that the 
recent enforcement trend has made policy-practice decoupling for MNCs originating in the 
Western hemisphere increasingly difficult.  
Despite this potential compliance, i.e. policy-practice coupling, trend among Western MNCs 
and the ubiquity of laws condemning corruption, corruption is perceived to persist in every 
country of the world and in some regions even appears to remain the standard way of doing 
business (TI, 2012). To respond to the persistence and heterogeneity of corruption risks in its 
institutional environment and promote organizational compliance with anti-corruption rules, 
Siemens has put strong focus on ‘collective action’, i.e. “methods, activities, and alliances to 
jointly combat corruption” (Pieth, 2012c), involving peers, government and society (Zindera 
& Forstnig-Errath, 2013). Indeed, Siemens agreed on a settlement with the World Bank re-
garding allegations of systemic corruption in 2009 (World_Bank, 2009). The company com-
mitted “to pay $100 million over the next 15 years to support anti-corruption work” 
(World_Bank, 2009, p. 1). Nonetheless, it appears safe to say that Siemens’s collective action 
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efforts, from the establishment of a whole collective action organizational unit to comprehen-
sive and continuous communicational efforts, go well beyond the terms of the World Bank 
agreement and aim to achieve a homogenization of organizational anti-corruption processes in 
its environment (see also Schembera & Scherer, 2014). 
In sum, although the recent trend of enforcing transnational anti-corruption law has pushed 
several MNCs to comply with globally uniform rules or even actively engage themselves in 
the fight against corruption, the general perception in society remains that corruption persists 
in global business (TI, 2012) suggesting that goals have not yet been achieved. 
METHODS 
Research design 
Studying the relation of compliance and achievement in the context of fighting corruption in 
global business from a social-constructionist standpoint is a rather novel endeavor. Conse-
quently, it appears not possible to deduce testable hypotheses from previous studies on this 
matter. We therefore chose to pursue an inductive and dynamic research design in order to 
identify and analyze narratives on compliance and achievement. As outlined in our review of 
the decoupling perspectives, a sensemaking view on compliance and achievement appears 
promising to examine how establishing a shared understanding of compliance and achieve-
ment is a dynamic context specific and interactive process which spans multiple actors, locali-
ties and periods. We thus want to examine the role of narratives and narration in the anti-
corruption field. In particular, we seek to answer through which narratives actors in the com-
plex and heterogeneous anti-corruption field make sense of the relationship between compli-
ance and goal achievement. We further aim to shed light on the relation and development over 
space and time of these narratives. Ultimately, we may provide tentative evidence on how 
these narratives affect the compliance-achievement relationship at Siemens. 
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This analysis requires engagement with different types of actors in different institutional con-
texts with regard to anti-corruption. First, with regard to actors, we identified one central cor-
porate multinational actor that has been affected and now itself affects the anti-corruption 
field – the German based MNC Siemens AG. Taking this firm as a sort of starting base for 
and red line through our analysis, we approach further corporate and non-corporate actors that 
are directly or indirectly related to Siemens. Second, with regard to institutional contexts, we 
selected two ‘extreme cases’ with respect to the phenomenon of interest (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998), one displaying very low levels of perceived corruption risks and the other very high 
levels: Western Europe on the one hand and Asia on the other (TI, 2012). 
Data collection 
Our collected data consists of two primary sources, which we will present in the following: 
(1) 42 semi-structured interviews with representatives of Siemens and various other actors in 
the anti-corruption field, and (2) documentary data such as annual reports, handbooks or me-
dia coverage. In Table 1 we provide an overview of interviewees, organizational affiliation 
and interview type (face-to-face, phone) as well as sources of documents. 
Interviews. From November 2012 to April 2014, two of the authors conducted a series 
of 40 formal face-to-face and telephone interviews with central actors in the anti-corruption 
field. The range of interviewees includes representatives from different MNCs, NGOs (non-
governmental organizations), IGOs (inter-governmental organizations), government, business 
chambers and field experts from practice and academia. However, reflecting our chosen focus 
on the case of Siemens, the central corporate actor in the anti-corruption field (Gebhardt & 
Müller-Seitz, 2011; Schembera & Scherer, 2014), many of these interviews either involve 
representatives of Siemens or interviewees connected to the case of Siemens, e.g. through 
their professional role. In addition, one author conducted two informal interviews with local 
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people not directly acting in the anti-corruption field, a taxi driver and a small guesthouse 
owner formerly affected by corruption in the shipping industry. 
For a first ‘grounding’, we collected interview data in low corruption risk contexts as part of a 
wider research project on fighting corruption. Having asked about the organization of corrup-
tion controls after a scandal in a first part of these interviews, we learned why and how certain 
actors have installed comprehensive compliance systems (Schembera & Scherer, 2014) and 
proceeded in the latter part of these initial interviews with questions on how these clean busi-
ness process work in high-corruption risk contexts. We thereby looked for narratives on com-
pliance and goal achievement with regard to the global fight against corruption. While this 
data mostly represented a centralized headquarters (HQ) perspective, we expanded our analy-
sis in a second round of interviews to include local perspectives from actors in high corrup-
tion-risk countries. We chose the Southeast Asian region plus China considering that many 
countries in this region exhibit not only fundamental differences in cultural values and social 
norms compared to many Western countries, but also some of the highest corruption risks 
(Luo, 2002; TI, 2012). Furthermore, pragmatic reasons such as English (except for China) as 
a common communication language and the presence of several collective action programs in 
SE Asia (Siemens, 2013) as well as good access to experts helped us to create important in-
sights from this case. Interviews lasted between 45 to 120 minutes. They were tape-recorded 
and transcribed, except for the very few cases where the interviewee refused. For validation 
purposes, we sent all transcripts back to the interviewees, and in few cases received edits most 
of which clarified acoustical misunderstandings.  
------------------------------- Insert Table 1 about here ------------------------------- 
Documentary data. Parallel to and interconnected with the interview data collection we com-
plemented our qualitative analysis by including documentary data. Most notably, we collected 
documents relating to the organizations of the interviewed actors. This included email corre-
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spondence, annual reports, corruption publications such as brochures, handbooks or guides, 
and press coverage. These documents were of particular help to follow-up on interviewee 
cues and trace developments in the anti-corruption field over time. 
Data analysis 
To make best use of the dynamic process of data collection, we chose an inductive analytical 
approach meaning that our analysis of narratives started when data collection began (Corbin 
& Strauss, 1990; Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013; Hardy & Maguire, 2010). After each 
small set of interviews, the interviewer(s) took notes and discussed emerging themes among 
the coauthors. This allowed us to adjust and fine-tune our interview guides in order to follow-
up on specific cues in a next round of interviews. Once we had a comprehensive set of inter-
views and documentary data collected, we applied a systematic process of open coding using 
qualitative analysis software NVivo to develop and validate emerging structures in our data 
(Hardy & Maguire, 2010). Along this process of working through the various interviews and 
documents, we iteratively refined, consolidated or separated emerging codes. The coding 
structure was discussed among coauthors at various points along this process to address any 
ambiguities. 
For example, we asked informants in our interviews how they perceive corruption risks in 
different regions worldwide and whether they think that there are different local understand-
ings of corruption. Responses were mostly in accordance with well-established corruption 
perception indicators such as the corruption perception index (CPI) by Transparency Interna-
tional (TI) yet in certain instances also revealed ambiguities as to what counts as corruption. 
Further, we asked corporate respondents about the biggest challenges they face with regard to 
corruption when doing business abroad and how they deal with such challenges. Such ques-
tions triggered plenty of stories on compliance and noncompliance of actors from various 
regions of the world. Another central part of the interviews was to ask about recent develop-
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ments in the fight against corruption and about goals envisioned by different actors. Answers 
typically included elements of stories on achievements and non-achievements, while re-
sponses with regard to anti-corruption goals hardly ever referred to clearly defined indicators 
but most often triggered metaphors including some kind of moving or flexible element. 
Observing such a frequent use of metaphors and anecdotes in the interview responses rein-
forced our chosen focus on the analysis of narratives. We started our systematic narrative 
analysis by identifying recurrent utterances and narrative patterns (Hardy & Maguire, 2010), 
which we structured along the geographic space and time perspective addressed in the inter-
view and documentary data. On this first, and lowest, level of analysis we aimed to identify 
codes that closely reflect the wording of our interview partners (see also Gioia et al., 2013), 
termed ‘story elements’ in our study. We added a focus classification for each of these story 
elements, stating headquarters (HQ) if it was predominantly used with respect to the Western 
hemisphere, subsidiary (sub) if it refers mainly to the Asian (high corruption-risk) context, 
and global if it applies worldwide. Similarly, we noted if the ‘story elements’ refer to the past 
(t0), present (t1) or future (t2; tx emphasizing continuous processes). We then aggregated these 
story elements on a second level into whole ‘stories’, which themselves can be defined as 
fragmented yet recurring patterns that together constitute an overarching narrative (see Haack 
et al., 2012). Consequently, we use the term ‘narrative’ on the third and highest level of ag-
gregation. ‘Stories’ combine the wording of respondents with information gained through the 
research process, whereas ‘narratives’ are then mainly informed by the research process. This 
three-level approach of structuring our data is well in line with recent inductive qualitative 
analyses (Gioia et al., 2013) and appears best appropriate to us to balance specificity and clar-
ity. Figure 1 summarizes the 5 narratives, 9 stories and 23 story elements jointly comprising 
our data structure. 
------------------------------- Insert Figure 1 about here ------------------------------- 
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FINDINGS 
We focus the presentation of our findings on sensemaking of compliance and achievement 
with regard to corruption in global business across space and time. In the following, we first 
focus on the present use of narratives across different geographic spaces before looking at 
developments of narratives over time within and across geographic spaces in a second step. 
Third and subsequent to the discourse analysis, we do include a set of prominent anti-
corruption indicators to analyze the effects of the assessed sensemaking process on recent 
anti-corruption developments. Two data displays are part of this findings section. Figure 2 
illustrates the coupling process model over time and space by distinguishing three time di-
mensions (to: past, t1: present, tx: future) and three space dimensions (West, East, Global) ac-
cording to previous space-time conceptualizations (Bakhtin, 1986; Haley & Boje, 2014). Ta-
ble 2 shows further supporting data to provide additional evidence for our findings. 
Making sense of the present 
With respect to making sense of the status quo of fighting corruption in global business, our 
systematic data analysis outline above revealed three central narratives: the compliance de-
spite non-achievement narrative, the noncompliance as means for achievement narrative, and 
the collective action narrative. 
Compliance despite non-achievement 
The compliance despite non-achievement narrative, applied by various actors mostly referring 
to the Western context, can be summarized as follows: 
Compliance despite non-achievement. More and more Western MNCs have now im-
plemented strict compliance programs as a result of corruption scandals and law en-
forcement in the recent past. These MNCs often have no other choice but to adhere to 
Western laws of global reach despite the fact that in many parts of the world corrup-
tion is still regarded as a common business practice. 
This narrative combines two main surface stories, i.e. fragmented yet recurring narrative pat-
terns (Haack et al., 2012), that are often used in context with each other: a substantive com-
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pliance story on the one hand and a no-level-playing-field story on the other hand. The former 
story draws on three main elements: ‘complying with the rules’, ‘identifying clean business’, 
and confident voices in the sense of ‘yes we can’ (conduct clean business in dirty contexts). 
The baseline element of this story is the perceived need for MNCs originating in the Western 
hemisphere to comply with global anti-corruption rules despite the continuous heterogeneity 
of perceived corruption risks across the globe (TI, 2012), often construed as a result of having 
faced or observed numerous scandals and increasing enforcement in the recent past 
(GibsonDunn, 2013). This story element is used by different types of actors, including corpo-
rate (e.g. “The public prosecutor’s office was investigating at our premises and, as a listed 
company at the New York Stock Exchange, of course the SEC as well. There was no choice.” 
Division and Regional Compliance Officer Siemens Switzerland) (see also Schembera & 
Scherer, 2014), and non-corporate actors (e.g. “hit by a lot of violation sanctions already, your 
controls have already matured to the point that you cannot afford any grey area in your poli-
cies.“ Programme Director ASEAN CSR Network (ACN)). As a direct consequence to this 
construed lack of alternatives to strict compliance, corporate actors state that “[o]ur intention 
is basically to identify good partners“ (Siemens ASEAN Compliance Officer), for example by 
applying due-diligence processes like the Siemens Business Partner Tool in the business part-
ner selection. Third, to make sense on why clean business is actually possible even in dirty 
contexts, we found plenty of encouraging reasoning à la ‘yes we can’ at Siemens but also at 
several other powerful MNCs. As the Finance Director of Shell Philippines Exploration puts 
it: 
“We are a known brand. So yes, you could say it’s a market power, because Shell is a 
big player and we are known not to go into any under-the-table deals. (...) So, when we 
say no, they don’t insist. And we are still able to go through with our partners.” 
The downside – i.e. latter part – of the compliance despite non-achievement narrative be-
comes evident in the no-level-playing-field story told by various actors explaining why com-
pliance not necessarily leads to achievement referring to persisting differences of corruption 
 177 
risks and conceptualizations between Western and Asian geographic contexts. It is composed, 
on the one hand, of ‘limiting the impact or responsibility of individual actors’ and the ‘persis-
tence of corrupt or intransparent business elsewhere’. These story elements reflect the argua-
bly widely diffused perception, e.g. as evident in the Corruption Perception Index (TI, 2012), 
that there is clean (or fair) business in the West and corrupt (or unfair) business in many other 
regions worldwide. Or, as the Programme Director of ACN summarizes the industry rumors 
on the challenges of Siemens: “we guys, we need to play fair, you local guys are not playing 
fair“. Thereby, actors highlight challenges of transferring Western practices to high corrup-
tion-risk countries: “Siemens alone cannot make a change“ (Compliance Officer for ASEAN, 
Siemens) or “as far as the JVs (joint ventures) are concerned, ... we also do not have the pos-
sibility and the right to now - let’s say - force them to take over Daimler compliance tools or 
methodologies“ (Regional Compliance Office at Daimler Greater China).  
On the other hand, there are elements of the no-level-playing-field story that question the 
‘common’ distinction between clean and dirty, or fair and unfair. Actors refer to the global 
‘ambiguity of what actually counts as corruption’ for example with respect to tipping and lob-
bying in the US (interview with TI Malaysia, among others), or the role of ‘managing percep-
tions’ e.g. as to how financial hubs like Singapore – or even Switzerland – are perceived as 
clean despite the fact that funds from risk zones come in and exit (Siemens ASEAN Compli-
ance Officer). Most interestingly, actors make sense of such ambiguities as providing possi-
bilities for ‘complying with rules but violating principles’: 
“So you can work with the letter of the law, but leave out the spirit. So you can be 
100% compliant, but no system is 100% perfect. So you can deal with all the rules, 
and you can still bypass them at key points, and get what you want. And that is the dif-
ference between compliance and integrity.” (Business Integrity Programme Manager, 
TI Malaysia) 
This crucial story element combines the limits of anti-corruption law, the ambiguity in anti-
corruption definitions and the difference between compliance and integrity. It thereby synthe-
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sizes not only major parts of the no-level-playing-field story but also of the overarching com-
pliance despite non-achievement narrative. 
To conclude, the compliance despite non-achievement narrative suggests that certain actors 
originating from Western Europe or the US appear to have taken a pioneering role by install-
ing a comprehensive set of compliance processes that, potentially, allow them to do business 
in a ‘clean’ way despite the persistence of considerable heterogeneity with respect to corrup-
tion levels across different geographic spaces. Interestingly, however, due to the inherent 
definitional ambiguities and the perceived lack of a waterproof anti-corruption law – beside 
certain firm characteristics – such formally strict compliance processes do not necessarily 
result in a lack of (Western) actor flexibility. 
Noncompliance as means for achievement 
Parallel to this narrative, we find stories clustering around what we call the noncompliance as 
means for achievement narrative. While originally sponsored mostly by actors originating 
from high-corruption risk context, now actors also from the Western hemisphere tend to use 
this narrative. It interprets the context of initial anti-corruption norm adoption in high-risk 
contexts like Southeast Asia (SE Asia) and can be summarized as follows: 
Noncompliance as means for achievement. Firms originating in high-risk regions like 
SE Asia come from a very different context and are at a very different stage of devel-
opment compared to Western MNCs. Quick wins are not always possible in such a 
heterogeneous situation. Getting noncompliant actors on board first is necessary to 
gain momentum toward the achievement of global anti-corruption goals. 
While substantive compliance is increasingly perceived as the only option for Western 
MNCs, the vast majority of interviewed actors regards – a transitional phase of – non-
compliance for actors originating in high corruption-risk contexts as inevitable. Even more, 
they perceive this initial step of committed, albeit non-compliant, adopters as a promising if 
not necessary mean to gradually achieve compliance and anti-corruption goals globally. Ac-
cordingly, this narrative is captured through two main stories: acknowledging heterogeneity 
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and reaching out. Concerning elements of the former, actors of different type are ‘highlight-
ing others’ particularities’ with respect to high corruption-risk regions and engage in ‘perspec-
tive-taking’. While the previous no level playing field story was restricted on identifying het-
erogeneity, actors are now also making sense of and even relativize heterogeneity. High-
lighted particularities for example refer to the country level … 
„ … the agreement was [that] there is no ranking and in a way it also makes sense, be-
cause you cannot really compare apples and oranges, you know, countries with very 
different backgrounds, with very different level of content, very different contexts.“ 
(Regional Anti-Corruption Adviser SE Asia and Pacific, UNODC) 
… or firm level: small firm size is repeatedly used as a reason leading to repercussions like 
delays when rejecting to bribe (Finance Director, Shell Philippines). Interestingly, actors even 
express understanding for others’ particularities when taking their perspective, as done for 
example by the Regional Compliance Officer for ASEAN at Siemens: 
It’s about the person who’s not earning so much and sees now someone’s giving me 
more. What would I do? I take that. So there are so many different dimensions to it. 
Singapore government, basically, their administers are paid as much as a CEO of a 
company is paid. 
As we picture it, this acknowledging heterogeneity story about actors making sense of why 
others are different and being able to take different perspectives is crucial to understand the 
narrative’s other story on the need for reaching out. Having identified or even acknowledged 
such heterogeneity in the anti-corruption field, actors of all types (excluding a former repre-
sentative of Singapore’s anti-corruption law enforcement agency CPIB) argue for the impor-
tance of ‘getting others on board first’ in order to be able at all to ‘gaining momentum and 
conditioning people’s minds’. To let the data speak, the Regional Anti-Corruption Adviser for 
SE Asia and the Pacific at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) explains 
that “our first agenda is usually ... we get them on board, because once they do that ... then we 
have a clear framework to work with them. (...) to get them on board you need to use a system 
they are all open to“. The Secretary General of TI Malaysia gets right to the point when not-
ing that “[w]e have to go across the board. The more the merrier, my friend“. Most of the 
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times, this element is directly succeeded by the other reaching out story element, arguing that 
“[o]nce they have actually ratified, they have obligations. (...) it also creates a momentum in 
countries to do it, because sometimes even the national authorities may want to do it, but they 
may not have the momentum or the support ...“ (UNODC, SE Asia and Pacific). Appealing to 
people’s principles and values, a representative of the Integrity Initiative in the Philippines 
financed by Siemens even notes that, compared to a hard approach of fighting corruption,  
“[i]t’s the better approach actually (to) make people go back to their values, reflect on 
them, because at the end of the day that’s really what’s happening in the world – … 
you are too selfish about your own needs, you won’t think of other people. It’s all 
ethical issues. These are not legal issues.” 
Collective action 
Up to now, we identified the parallel existence of two – on first sight opposing – narratives 
both incorporating extremes within themselves: one making sense about compliance and non-
achievement, the other dealing with noncompliance and achievement. An outside observer 
ignoring the discourse among central actors may have observed contradictions between these 
two narratives. However, the process of conferring meaning to the perceived differences as 
evident in the various stories told by actors seems to resolve or at least reduce such contradic-
tions. In particular, actors from low and high corruption-risk contexts make sense of certain 
linking mechanisms between the two narratives, which taken together we identified as a col-
lective action narrative. Figure 2 illustrates the relation of the three narratives. This narrative 
focuses on the relation between actors from different geographic and institutional contexts 
and can be summarized as follows: 
Collective Action. There is so far globally a different functional understanding of cor-
ruption that has to come together. Joint efforts between different actors are necessary 
to exchange knowledge and practices and identify common grounds for areas of col-
laboration. 
Linking the two narratives above, we found the collective action narrative to be made up of 
two central story elements, educating and leveling the playing field, told mostly from actors 
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with origins in the West. Concerning the first, we noted with interest that this narrative is not 
understood as a one way message falling on deaf ears; rather there are story elements on both 
‘leading by example’ and ‘willingness to learn/need for guidance’. On the side of the sender, 
we heard Western actors in high-risk regions say that “[s]ome of these experiences and les-
sons learnt, … we also want to share with our JVs.“ (Daimler, Greater China). The Finance 
Director of Shell Philippines provides clear evidence on best practice sharing and makes 
sense of it: 
“ ... (at) the quarterly leadership forum, I gave our contractors our hotline. I told them 
‘if you think there is something you need to report, use this hotline or get in touch with 
your contract holder. … like I said earlier, be the example, because … the difference 
between an intelligent person and a wise person (is) the intelligent person learns from 
his mistakes. The wise person learns from the mistakes of others.” 
Commenting on the current situation in the Philippines, a representative of Integrity Initiative 
acknowledges that “[t]his is really unique in the Philippines. It’s the private sector trying to 
change the landscape.“ 
Various actors from high-risk contexts receive such initiatives with benevolence, stating that  
“[i]n all areas there is a learning requirement. (…) the advanced companies, we are 
counting on these guys to really help us spread the word. (...) because of Siemens, we 
were able to access a resource that’s critical in fueling our efforts, because there is no 
other mechanism working like that anywhere in the world. Even FCPA, if they get the 
fees from the penalties, it doesn’t go into the fight against corruptions.” (Integrity Ini-
tiative, Philippines) 
Even governments appear to be willing to learn from private actors, as the Regional Compli-
ance Officer for ASEAN at Siemens highlights: “he (Jericho Petilla, young new energy secre-
tary of the Philippines) says ‘we need the support from various sectors, in this case Siemens’. 
And that I believe is one form of a vision also for a government to improve.” NGOs like TI 
Malaysia express their appreciation of transferring best practices by mentioning “[o]therwise, 
we would be talking to companies: how do we fulfill compliance?”. The process of sending 
and receiving best practices is also often told in direct combination: “we’re encouraging the 
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advanced companies to provide the best practices, the templates, the tools, to have the lower-
rated guys improve and reach that advanced level also” (Integrity Initiative, Philippines). 
The collective action narrative is not limited to the educating story, but includes a leveling the 
playing field story. Whereas in the compliance despite non achievement narrative stories were 
told focusing on a lack of a level playing field, in the collective action narrative the leveling 
the playing field story focuses on the means to achieve desired ends; the framing is construc-
tive and links already to a future oriented narrative, which we will turn to in the next section. 
One crucial story falling under this narrative is the need for ‘uniting actors and their thinking’ 
which is often seen as the only option to navigate through complex waters, as pictured by the 
Secretary General of TI Malaysia: 
“in this world, we are now 173 ships, (but) nowadays, we have to be one hundred and 
seventy three cabins in a big liner. And this is where we are working together. ... 173 
countries moving around the ocean. We are really lost. (...) we can no longer become a 
ship, we are 173 cabins in one big ocean liner working together.” 
With regard to specific uniting mechanisms, actors see potential in „creating a round table 
with all integrity officers from multinationals to private sectors to government linked compa-
nies to company agencies (...) to start openly talking about topics, networking, creating basi-
cally a stakeholder concept “ (Regional Compliance Officer ASEAN, Siemens).  
Beyond the construed need of getting together, the leveling the playing field story also entails 
elements on actually ‘finding common grounds’. NGOs like Integrity Initiative in the Philip-
pines see their role to assist foreign firms dealing with corrupt governments: “this is where we 
come in. We try to expose the deal in such a way that it is a level playing field. That’s why we 
are important here.“ Our interview partner at Shell Philippines, proudly shared with the inter-
viewer the company’s successful interaction with the Philippine government: “we engaged 
the department of finance in coming up with a tax regulation saying that in order to prevent 
smuggling, ... why don’t you impose tax on all products and then if the company is able to 
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prove that they re-exported it, then they get a refund on their tax.” However, finding common 
grounds is not always as straight forward as in this case involving a powerful corporate actor 
and a willing government to close regulatory loopholes. Instead, the Leader of Collective Ac-
tion at Siemens uses the metaphor of a “flowerbed, where it is uncertain which bulbs will bear 
fruit”. 
Crucially, by including the analysis of anti-corruption documents, we found that this shared 
understanding about and educative and gradual approach to level the playing field though 
collective action only evolved over time. In earlier documentary data we found a much higher 
reference to so-called project specific ‘integrity pacts’, whose objective is to “[c]reate (a) 
level playing field ... by external monitoring of processes“ (Collective Action guide devel-
oped by the World Bank, UNGC, TI and Siemens among other, 2008). Monitoring of compli-
ance, sanctions and external auditors have been identified as central elements in collective 
action that have to come into play directly after a first start-up workshop. Having recently 
interviewed representatives from Siemens, TI and the UN and examined very recent anti-
corruption collective action publications, we can assess that now these actors refer much less 
to compliance-focused ‘integrity pacts’ and much more on commitment-oriented dynamic 
‘integrity pledges’, whose ultimate goal is to “gradually move toward self-assessment” (Col-
lective Action publication, ACN, funded by UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2014). 
------------------------------- Insert Figure 2 about here ------------------------------- 
Whereas this shift of story elements over time occurred with one overarching (collective ac-
tion) narrative, we will turn in the following section to developments and shifts of story ele-
ments across different narratives, highlighting that the interviewed actors identified time as 
the crucial element in fighting transnational corruption. In fact, without acknowledging dy-
namics over time the interviewed actors would not be able to make sense of the two extremes 
of compliance despite non-achievement on the one hand and noncompliance as means for 
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achievement on the other. We elaborate on the role of time in making sense of 
(non)compliance and (non-)achievement in the following section. 
Making sense of the future (and past) 
Progress as achievement 
Often directly succeeding actors’ narration about differences of compliance and achievement 
across multiple geographic spaces, we identified several storytelling patterns that can be 
summarized as a progress as achievement narrative. This narrative is nowadays shared by 
different types of actors from different institutional contexts. Rather than merely referring to 
changes in high corruption-risk regions it includes (positive) effects of anti-corruption devel-
opments for Western corporate actors and anti-corruption institutions thereby spanning across 
the global context of anti-corruption goal achievement: 
Progress as achievement. Progress takes time, but our efforts start bearing fruits. 
Western MNCs like Siemens helped to openly discuss corruption in public, which was 
not possible some years ago. Cases in high corruption-risk regions pop up in the media 
and people go to jail. 
Despite the fact that various actors referred to strict compliance with regard to several West-
ern actors in the compliance despite non-achievement narrative, on a global level actors do 
not seem to picture a fully compliant or corruption free world any time soon; they do not 
make sense of strict compliance as a reachable goal. Rather than referring to global anti-
corruption goal achievement in absolute terms, actors construe any type of progress in this 
global context as achievement per se. “The end-goal of the Corporate Integrity Pledge is to 
have its collaborators work together with all the signatories in taking the pledge forward …” 
(Collective Action publication, ACN). Put differently, in such a complex context involving 
corporate and sovereign non-corporate actors, the journey itself becomes the destination. 
We detected the two stories progressing step-by-step and open-ended process as constitutive 
of this narrative. ‘Allowing for time to progress’ is a central element of the former story. Rep-
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resentatives from MNCs in the headquarters and subsidiaries believe that “these [collective 
action] processes take a lot of time” (Vice President Compliance, Siemens HQ) concluding 
that “you are going to take baby steps with this topic“ (Sales Representative, Siemens Philip-
pines). Similarly, NGOs like TI Malaysia note “most of us want to see success overnight, but 
you would not get this success of fighting corruption overnight. It takes some time“. 
To support their logic of small steps, actors highlight that the seeds planted in the past are 
already ‘bearing fruit’. For example, a representative of Integrity Initiative Philippines per-
ceives that “[n]o, actually his administration is bearing fruit” when asked about a potential 
disappointment of the high hopes regarding the new Philippine president Aquino over the 
next years. The Compliance Officer for ASEAN at Siemens uses both story elements jointly 
highlighting that “[y]ou have to accept the fact that it’s going to take time to make change. 
But said that, from where it was 10 years ago to where it is [now], there is change.” Instead of 
referring to any specific performance oriented anti-corruption indicators, actors identify cer-
tain perception-based cues as signs of progress. For example, the Regional Anti-Corruption 
Adviser for SE Asia at the UNODC notes “the global discourse has changed a lot in the past 
20 years. Corruption has become an issue that is discussed globally. There is much more 
awareness about it. (...) it is still sensitive politically, but it’s not a taboo that it used to be.“ 
Similarly, although knowing that TI’s corruption index (CPI) is purely perception based, 
many actors in the anti-corruption field refer to developments of CPI rankings over time as an 
indicator for progress in the fight against corruption. Finally, actors from within the high-
corruption risk context highlight that small progresses from a Western perspective are actually 
big when regarded from their perspective: “these changes happen in very small cycles but 
they are considered big changes.“ (Compliance Officer for ASEAN, Siemens). 
What has already implicitly shone through in the progressing step-by-step story is now ex-
plicitly outspoken in the open-ended (or even: never ending) process story. Actors regard full 
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compliance on a global level as being out of reach portraying the fight against corruption as 
an ‘ongoing effort demanding constant recalibration’: 
“It means that you have to continuously do things. It’s not only about the laws you 
have to pass. You have to have systems in place. You have to have prevention systems 
in place. You have to be implementing those laws. You need to have institutions 
which are capable of implementing all these normative frameworks. They need to 
have the capacity to do that and so on. (...) And these reforms I think it’s very naïve to 
think that you can pass these laws, and you can have an anti-corruption agency and 
everything, and you solved the corruption problem.” (Regional Advisor ASEAN, 
UNODC) 
The Secretary General of TI Malaysia highlights the need for continuous recalibration when 
noting: “… the weakness is that people take advantages. Or, it is that they find more loop-
holes existing in law and regulation. So you come back to the square one.” Similarly, by using 
the flowerbed metaphor on the uncertainty of which bulbs may bear fruits, the Leader of Col-
lective Action at Siemens expresses the need to remain flexible with regards to means and 
outcomes in the fight against corruption. When looking at the global picture, actors even tend 
to relativize the presence or possibility of full compliance in the Western context: “I think it is 
very difficult in the area of anti-corruption to say that ever about any country: ... you are per-
fectly implementing“ (UNODC, ASEAN). Rounding up this open-ended process is the ele-
ment of framing goals in terms of ‘gradually raising the bar’: 
“Now, what ... [we] want to do with the ASEAN CSR Network is to create a regional 
network gradually; first with countries which are ready, but then bring all of them. 
And that has two purposes. One is to create another level of commitment among com-
panies from the region …, to bring them all on the same level with their compliance 
system, to help coordinate, help exchange. But on the other hand, I also hope that they 
could bring more pressure on their governments, demanding actions from the govern-
ment.“ (ACN) 
This element makes sense of the goals that are underlying the leveling the playing field story 
and the collective action narrative as a whole. Rather than formulating goals as specific out-
comes such as ‘eliminating informal side payments in project bids globally by 2030’ or 
‘eradicating intransparent financing of a business partner’s children’s education by 2020’, 
goals are stated in abstract terms such as raising commitment, help coordinate and leveling 
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the playing field. It thereby seems to presume the fluid nature of defining means and ends in 
the fight against corruption as told in the previous story element.  
To sum up, the phenomenon we identified in this sensemaking process in the global anti-
corruption field is that actors from both the Western and Asian context speak with confidence 
about future progresses and seem to share a common understanding on what is acceptable and 
what is not. This shared meaning is observed despite – or rather because of – the fact that all 
actors do not have a predefined set of goals in mind and all seem to share the underlying con-
viction that eradicating corruption will never be possible. 
Noncompliance 
Finally, focusing on the past context when making sense of developments over time, we iden-
tify the almost uniform use of a noncompliance narrative by all interviewed actors with re-
gard to Western MNCs in the time before having faced a recent series of scandals. Although 
actors often avoid referring directly to noncompliance in the past, through actors’ compari-
sons of the present and past, we at least indirectly identified elements of ‘insufficient anti-
corruption processes’ and ‘lacking awareness and/or wrong mindset’ in the past clustering 
around a symbolic adoption story (Schembera & Scherer, 2014). With regard to the global 
context, both story elements are generally told. In contrast, when talking about the Western 
HQ context, actors tend to attribute noncompliance as a result of the latter element. The Re-
gional Compliance Officer for ASEAN at Siemens perceives this distinction as follows: 
So we single handedly started for example in Malaysia, it was a one man show. We 
built up a three men team. We went into trainings. We went into process improvement, 
implementation and roll-outs. And then today, it’s up to a state where it is sustainable 
business, so to speak.  
Also contrasting the present against the past and focusing on the latter story element on the 
lack of principles, a German Daimler representative now responsible for compliance in China 
remembers: “There was a huge effort to involve the entire company in formulating this new 
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integrity code to make it better understandable (…). So I think it is a totally different culture, 
and you can’t compare it to the one many years ago.” 
To sum up, as illustrated in Figure 2, we found that central (non)compliance and 
(non)achievement narratives can develop and change with respect to one certain geographic 
context over time, and can coexist across multiple geographic spaces at the same time. In the 
Western hemisphere, we have clearly observed a shift from noncompliance to compliance 
despite non-achievement in line with arguments regarding the transparency trend and conse-
quences of a set of corruption scandals of Western MNCS in the recent past. This latter narra-
tive referring to the Western hemisphere currently coexists with the noncompliance as means 
for achievement narrative applicable to the SE Asian context. Both narratives appear to be of 
transitional use, as we identified them to be most often used by actors in close connection the 
progress as achievement narrative. They are linked through the collective action narrative, 
which is told by actors from both HQ and subsidiary, i.e. low and high corruption-risk, con-
texts to express the hope for dynamics over time. This future oriented focus in the sensemak-
ing processes about the fight against corruption in global business then results in a progress 
as achievement narrative. 
------------------------------- Insert Table 2 about here ------------------------------- 
Interplay of narration and tangible anti-corruption developments over time 
Looking at recent developments in the anti-corruption field, there is tentative evidence that 
narratives can be related to certain material changes in the anti-corruption environment. Of 
course, anecdotal relations between narratives and material events are not a final proof of the 
constitutive nature of narration on real world outcomes, but they allow important insights into 
how communication and commitment oriented anti-corruption efforts and initiatives can 
translate into objectively observable anti-corruption developments. 
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Most notably, the planting seeds and bearing fruit metaphors within the collective action and 
progress as achievement narratives seem to connect with observable outcomes. For example 
we can observe not only rising signatory numbers but also rising numbers of self-assessments 
or more advanced implementation among participants in local integrity initiatives within 
ASEAN (see e.g. integrityintiative.com). Moreover, Siemens lists examples such as the estab-
lishment of local committees in Brazil to promote the concept of ‘clean (Olympic) games’, 
the setting up of a Summer Academy/Masters in Anti-Corruption Studies or even a compli-
ance pact with several competitors in the field of energy transmission in Argentina, suggest-
ing that “[i]n several markets, the Collective Action of Siemens and its partners has now 
started to tangibly bear fruit” (Siemens Compliance System, 2013). 
Following up on interviewees’ cues, we could also empirically observe the recent replacement 
of corrupt government officials by young and untainted personnel: the Philippine president 
Benigno Aquino III. (“actually his administration is bearing fruit“, Integrity Initiative Philip-
pines), the Indonesian president Joko Widodo, as well as the new and young energy secretary 
of the Philippines Jericho Petilla are examples in this regard. Moreover, the communicative 
efforts of Shell Philippines directed to the Philippine government have led to the material out-
come of engaging the Philippine government in the enhancement of tax measures that help 
curtail oil smuggling. Two months after our interview with the Finance Director of Shell 
Philippines, the Philippine government representative Terry Ridon, who is primarily con-
cerned with the reduction of oil smuggling explicitly “recalled a statement issued to media 
last February 2014 by Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation Country Chairman Edgar Chua“ 






DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Previous perspectives on decoupling significantly enrich our understanding of the relation 
between policies and practices, means and ends. This study aimed to further contribute to the 
decoupling debate by addressing central aspects that have not been fully incorporated in exist-
ing decoupling debates and thus may obscure a more comprehensive understanding of the 
phenomenon. First, we expand insights from previous decoupling views by focusing on a 
multi-spatial geographic context. Second, we contribute to the instrumental view and early 
studies of the classic view by treating decoupling as a purely dynamic phenomenon. Third, 
applying a social-constructionist perspective, we add to previous works on decoupling, which 
suggest that policies, practices and outcomes are objectively observable and clearly definable. 
Integrating different actors and interests across multiple spaces and developments over time 
by taking a narrative approach that acknowledges both material and ideational dimensions of 
decoupling, we develop in the following an ‘integrative view’ on decoupling (see Table 3). 
------------------------------- Insert Table 3 about here ------------------------------- 
We thereby contribute to the current decoupling literature by showing how the tradeoff be-
tween compliance and goal achievement as postulated by Wijen (2014) can be put into per-
spective by taking a multi-spatial and dynamic narration-oriented approach. 
The integrative view: Dynamic (de)coupling 
In our decoupling literature review, we outlined that recent developments like the transpar-
ency trend challenged central assumptions of the classic policy-practice decoupling view (e.g. 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Due to another trend, referred to as ‘rationalization of the environ-
ment’, an instrumental view on decoupling emerged (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Wijen, 2014). 
While the classic policy-practice decoupling perspective focused mainly on mono-spatial in-
stitutional complexity, the instrumental view expanded the geographic focus to the context of 
global socio-environmental governance. However, several studies within both views tend to 
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neglect the social-constructionist tradition (Berger & Luckmann, 1967) that inspired the very 
first works on decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
As summarized in Table 3, our study incorporates a social-constructivist epistemological 
stance. That is, we focus on the analysis of narratives and find that the meaning of compliance 
and achievement, and the relationship between the two, is no longer fixed but negotiated 
within a dynamic and non-linear process of sensemaking (see also Haack & Schoeneborn, 
2015; Weick, 1995). Depending on the means available and valuable to involved actors, they 
may identify goals which appear worthwhile to them (Joas, 1996). Consequently, decoupling 
is described in our ‘integrative view’ as a ‘flexible understanding of compliance and 
achievement’ (see Table 3). Moreover, this view perceives actors in the anti-corruption field 
as being more interactive compared to the rather passively or actively responsive actor behav-
ior assumed in the other two decoupling views. Not only regulatory institutions, but also 
many MNCs nowadays openly share and actively promote their anti-corruption practices with 
various actors worldwide. In the Philippines, for example, we even noted that “it’s the private 
sector trying to change the landscape” (Integrity Initiative, Philippines). 
Table 3 also depicts the central assumption of our integrative view that the ‘meaning of com-
pliance and achievement is ‘reciprocally typified’, i.e. mutually constituted among the in-
volved anti-corruption actors. In the following we outline the reasoning behind this assump-
tion by elaborating on the space and time dimensions of our integrative view. We thus further 
illustrate the pivotal role sensemaking (through narration) plays for gaining a holistic, i.e. ma-
terial and ideational spatiotemporal (Haley & Boje, 2014), understanding of compliance and 
goal achievement. 
Incorporating space: Making sense about geographic contingencies 
First addressing the space dimension, we contribute to the decoupling literature by suggesting 
that the means-ends debate should expand further beyond an objectivist either-or (i.e. either 
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compliance or noncompliance) perspective (see e.g. Wijen, 2014). Rather, we propose a so-
cial-constructionist, i.e. sensemaking, both-and perspective taking into account spatial contin-
gencies of (non)compliance in relation to the achievement of global societal goals. The role of 
making sense of geographic differences through storytelling has been recently identified in 
studies on everyday life and MNC internationalization (Haley & Boje, 2014; Lefebvre, 2004). 
However, previous studies on compliance and achievement in the context of socio-
environmental governance insufficiently recognize the potential of sensemaking to create a 
shared understanding of an interaction between compliant actors and noncompliant actors. 
Instead, scholars tend to regard compliance and noncompliance in clear separation, stating 
that (1) ensuring substantive compliance compromises the achievement of intended goals, 
while (2) favoring flexibility in compliance warrants goal achievement yet risks symbolic 
adoption (Wijen, 2014, p. 313). 
Our findings as summarized in Figure 2 suggest that through narration actors in the anti-
corruption field make sense of a parallel existence and interaction (middle box at t1) of sub-
stantively compliant actors mainly originating from a low corruption-risk space (left box at t1) 
and noncompliant actors in higher corruption-risk spaces (right box at t1) to be conducive for 
goal achievement (at tx) in complex institutional contexts. We were able to identify that actors 
develop a shared understanding about geographic contingencies requiring some actors to be 
compliant everywhere, other actors to be compliant somewhere and still others (so far) inevi-
tably to be compliant nowhere. 
In particular, Western and Asian actors make sense of uniform substantive compliance as the 
only option for MNCs originating in the Western hemisphere. Actors attribute this lack of 
choice for Western MNCs to noncompliance of these actors in the past, which led to major 
scandals and a radical rethinking (captured by the ‘complying with the rules’ story element in 
Table 2) (see also Schembera & Scherer, 2014). Having learnt their lessons the hard way, they 
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now proclaim: “Only clean business is Siemens business - everywhere - everybody - every 
time...“ (Peter Löscher, formerly CEO at Siemens). In contrast, local actors are only meant to 
be compliant when dealing with Western MNCs: “So, when they work with us, they have to 
follow our principles. But when they work with others, they don’t have those standards in 
place“ (Finance Director, Shell Philippines). Importantly, our findings suggest that such a 
coexistence of different degrees of compliance is possible because actors tend to have an im-
plicitly shared understanding about what compliance or corruption means (“… in practice, we 
all may agree that China’s corruption problem is more serious than Germany’s.“ Chinese 
compliance officer at Daimler Greater China) without being able to clearly define what prac-
tices in which context actually count as noncompliant (“is it culture that they take it, …  or is 
it really not?“ General Secretary, TI Malaysia). To remedy the theorized compliance-
achievement tradeoff, previous studies suggest creating niche institutions that explicitly de-
fine the conditions of noncompliance and compliance (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010; Wijen, 
2014; Young, 2012). In contrast, considering the apparent implicit understanding about who, 
where, when and why needs to comply as paraphrased in the quotes above, we suggest that 
such explicit context-specific definitions are hardly feasible on objectivist grounds. 
Our findings suggest that without the presence of globally uniform rules and substantive 
compliers acting as institutional entrepreneurs in the first place, non- or partially complying 
actors would lack the guidance and willingness to become compliant. As one interviewee put 
it: “Otherwise, we would be talking to companies: How do we fulfill compliance?” This in-
teraction between compliant and noncompliant actors appears thus as a necessary means to 
ultimately achieve global anti-corruption goals, which we capture in the narrative ‘noncom-
pliance as means for achievement’ (see Table 3 for further evidence). Not without a reason, 
the Integrity Initiative in the Philippines has chosen the name SHINE project for their anti-
corruption efforts. The interview partner explained that the project is meant to use institu-
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tional entrepreneurs like Siemens to ‘shine’ on other potentially less compliant or transparent 
actors. This metaphor is used by both compliant corporate actors and non-corporate actors and 
shows us how these actors make sense of remedying the compliance barriers in opaque fields 
as identified in the means-ends decoupling debate: lacking attention, lacking knowledge and 
lacking motivation (Wijen, 2014, p. 306). Through public events, compliance clauses in con-
tracts with suppliers or collective actions, compliant actors like Siemens reduce behavioral 
invisibility. They thereby remedy a further compliance barrier and driver of opacity in com-
plex global environments (Jiang & Bansal, 2003; O’Rourke, 2007; Spar & La Mure, 2003).  
The coexistence of different degrees of compliance suggested here further contributes to the 
selective coupling literature within the policy-practice decoupling perspective (Pache & 
Santos, 2013). While these scholars have addressed the coexistence of selective coupling (de-
coupling and compromising) within one ‘hybrid’ organization, we extend the level of analysis 
by examining the coexistence of selective coupling across geographic spaces. Finally, our 
contribution to perceive compliance and (transitional) noncompliance as complementary in-
stead of exclusionary approaches further supports findings from other issue areas, including 
labor conditions in global supply chains. Authors in this field similarly highlight the benefits 
of joint problem solving, information exchange and best practice diffusion among actors at 
different stages of compliance implementation (Locke, Amengual, & Mangla, 2009). 
Incorporating time: Ideational dynamics in global goal achievement 
We further contribute to the decoupling literature by stressing that a shared space-contingent 
understanding about compliance and noncompliance can only be maintained as long as actors 
perceive progress toward goal achievement over time. The means-ends debate (Bromley & 
Powell, 2012; Wijen, 2014), earlier studies within the policy-practice debate (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977) and several studies on sustainability standardization in general (Baron & Lyon, 
2012; Campbell, 2007; King, Prado, & Rivera, 2012) take a predominantly static perspective 
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on social reality. These studies thus neglect the powerful influence of ‘ideational dynamics’ 
on behavioral change and tangible outcomes scholars recently highlighted (Christensen, 
Morsing, & Thyssen, 2013; Haack et al., 2012; Tilcsik, 2010). ‘Ideational dynamics’ refers to 
a recently theorized process, according to which language may eventually become performa-
tive of certain ‘positive’ developments in the field of CSR and beyond (Christensen et al., 
2013). The underlying mechanism of this process is referred to as ‘aspirational talk’, i.e. an 
organization’s publicly expressed commitment to reduce the gap between formal structures 
and actual activities. More precisely, a process of ‘moral entrapment’ and ‘creeping commit-
ment’ may take place after organizations have publicly committed to moral values; such or-
ganizations may soon start to realize that they can actually be taken to task if they do not fol-
low-up on their promises and seek to avoid losing their legitimacy (Haack et al., 2012). In 
accordance with the psychological quest to avoid ‘cognitive’ and ‘emotional dissonance’, 
organizational actors adjust self-perceptions and interpretations of CSR to the “attitudes first 
taken by significant others toward it” (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 132). 
Incorporating such dynamics in sensemaking processes has proven fruitful in previous stud-
ies; for example, analyzing the context of MNC internationalization, Haley and Boje (2014, p. 
1128) noted precisely that “metaphors unravel when faced with paradox”. Similarly, the 
analysis of narratives in our study turned out to be crucial for putting the postulated tradeoff 
in the debate about compliance and achievement in a more comprehensive perspective. Static 
objectivist perspectives on compliance and goal achievement conclude that socio-
environmental governance schemes such as sustainability standards need to focus on compli-
ance (right away), as otherwise goals cannot be achieved due to symbolic adoption by firms 
(Wijen, 2014, p. 306) (see also Baron & Lyon, 2012; Campbell, 2007; King et al., 2012). 
Taking a dynamic social-constructionist perspective in our analysis revealed that anti-
corruption actors of different type and geographical origin care less about how, i.e. in what 
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state of compliance or noncompliance, actors ‘get on board’, but much more on the fact that 
they get on board at all. Only then these actors perceive the opportunity for a joint navigation 
toward reciprocally typified goals. The focus is consequently much more on the journey than 
on the status quo or ultimate destination. That is, potential tradeoffs in the current state be-
come negligible, if perceived as such at all, when actors focus on a progressive discursively 
typified understanding of compliance and goal achievement. Different types of actors used 
metaphors like flowerbeds, planted seeds or a jointly navigated big ocean liner, which help 
them understand that the collective end of fighting corruption is a moving target and organiza-
tional means for fighting corruption may only materialize along this process, which in turn 
will lead to a reinterpretation of the collective end. We thereby expand insights from studies 
on the MNC internationalization processes, wherein the coexistence of contradictory stories 
spanning time and space have been identified (Haley & Boje, 2014), to the context of compli-
ance and achievement in global socio-environmental governance. 
It is to note, however, that we do not perceive the interviewed actors as being overly optimis-
tic or simply naïve. We provided first anecdotal evidence that the metaphors used by actors 
are in some way reflected in observable and material anti-corruption outcomes. Positive par-
ticipant statistics over time in local integrity initiatives financed or inspired by Siemens, per-
sonnel exchange in key government positions or Shell’s success in enhancing tax measures in 
the Philippines are a first small set of exemplary material developments. So indeed, we sug-
gest that the logic of confidence and good faith, which Meyer and Rowan (1977) have con-
ceptualized as a necessary complement to policy-practice decoupling to secure organizational 
legitimacy, has shifted to means-ends decoupling. However, we should also be wary of the 
potential negative consequences in case actors no longer are able to identify certain cues of 
material developments which would render the confidence and good faith logic together with 
related ideational dynamics obsolete. 
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Synthesis. In sum, the integrative view on decoupling combines elements of both the 
classic and the instrumental view, most notably dynamic considerations in recent literature on 
the former and the global (multi-spatial) perspective of the latter, and highlights the role of 
narration and meaning creation in this global (de)coupling context. Our results from the 
analysis of narratives in the anti-corruption field therefore suggest understanding gaps be-
tween compliance and achievement, and between policies and practices, as moving targets 
that are subject to sensemaking processes and meaning negotiation. We highlighted how ac-
tors make sense about compliance and achievement through narration, e.g. by using stories 
and metaphors of collectively navigating a big ocean liner or planting seeds and referring to 
particular historical and/or geographic contingencies. Haack and Schoeneborn (2015) have 
recently suggested to include ideational dynamics in the means-ends conceptualization of 
Wijen (2014) and suggested that “[i]t is ultimately by “means” of policy-practice decoupling 
that the “end” of “effective” socio-environmental governance can be achieved.” Our dual fo-
cus on sensemaking across time and space taken here has helped us to further add to this de-
bate: In our integrative view, it is ultimately by ‘means’ of interaction between policy-
practice coupling and policy-practice decoupling that ‘effective’ socio-environmental gov-
ernance can be achieved. 
Implications for organizational corruption and CSR 
Our third contribution is of relevance to scholars and practitioners in the field of anti-
corruption and CSR alike. On the one hand, we contribute to anti-corruption literature that 
focused on an objectivist perspective on the phenomenon. Given the collective nature of the 
corruption problem involving public and private actors with heterogeneous and sometimes 
contradictory interests (Kingston, 2008; Pieth, 2012a), previous corruption literature has also 
focused on collective action as a means to curbing corruption (Petkoski, Warren, & Laufer, 
2009; Pieth, 2012a). While these studies were mostly restricted to an objectivist perspective 
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on corruption treating the issue predominantly as a rational choice problem (see also Ostrom, 
1998), we contribute to theorizing on collective action by highlighting the role of creating a 
flexible and discursively typified meaning of corruption and compliance through the discur-
sive elements of collective actions. Signing a letter of joint commitment may be perceived as 
a mere rational choice of a specific actor aiming to maximize its business opportunities in the 
first place, while the ideational dynamics potentially succeeding such a signature having laid a 
first common basis for talking to each other have been neglected in this literature. 
On the other hand, our study contributes to recent narration-oriented (social-constructionist) 
anti-corruption studies. By demonstrating that the meaning of corruption may vary with re-
spect to the geographic context, our findings support the findings of Gephart (2014) suggest-
ing a contested meaning of anti-corruption and further contribute to this literature by outlining 
how the construction of anti-corruption meaning may develop over time. By clarifying that 
the mainstream notion of a universal approach of anti-corruption is unlikely to achieve de-
sired goals, our research is in line with recent analyses of narratives on the construction of 
success in anti-corruption activity in Georgia (Di Puppo, 2014). We further contribute to the 
identified search for a mutual validation of different understandings of success by showing 
that the creation of a mutual understanding of anti-corruption goal achievements is shaped by 
considerations of both space and time (see Figure 2). 
Like corruption, CSR in general seems to be a moving and contested concept (Lockett, Moon, 
& Visser, 2006; Okoye, 2009), whose ideals, standards and targets are continuously shaped 
through discourse and interactions among legislators, corporations and other actors in the 
field (Gilbert, Rasche, & Waddock, 2011; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). Accordingly, our find-
ings suggest that the central arguments in the recent CSR literature on ideational dynamics are 
also applicable to the specific issue of fighting corruption. The mechanisms of ‘aspirational 
talk’ with regard to CSR in general (Christensen et al., 2013) and those of ‘moral entrapment’ 
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and ‘creeping commitment’ as identified in the context of environmental CSR issues (Haack 
et al., 2012) also appear valid in the specific context of fighting corruption. 
Surprisingly though, the development of narratives in the anti-corruption field faces a certain 
time lag compared to narration dynamics in the environmental realm. Still a great amount of 
story elements in our study focused on the ‘getting on board’ metaphor, whereas they tend to 
refer to commitment mostly in a prospective view. In contrast, in the environmental domain 
narratives of different actors may have already shifted from ‘joining the club’ toward ‘com-
mitment’ (Haack et al., 2012). This potential time lag in the context of corruption vis-à-vis 
other CSR issues is further supported by the observation that the largest voluntary CSR initia-
tive worldwide, the UN Global Compact, has added an anti-corruption principle only four 
years after CSR issues on the natural environment, human rights and labor norms had been in 
place. Even more, the interviewed program manager at ACN as well as the president of the 
local Singapore Compact have highlighted that corruption has only recently been included in 
public CSR debates. 
The other way round, our findings on anti-corruption may contribute to recent studies on idea-
tional CSR dynamics by highlighting the significant role of interactions and collective actions 
not only between different types of actors but also between the same types of actors. While 
Haack et al. (2012) focused on the reciprocal creation of meaning between banks and NGOs, 
future research is needed to explore ideational dynamics between e.g. compliant and noncom-
pliant corporate actors, their mutual interests and reasoning involved. Such studies tend to 
suggest that the different use of narratives is mainly attributable to the type of actor, e.g. “the 
failure narrative was solely told by NGOs” (Haack et al., 2012, p. 827). In contrast, we sug-
gest that primarily the point of reference, e.g. geographic or firm-specific context, explains 
the use of a certain narrative. Rather than NGOs solely referring to non-achievement and pri-
vate actors referring to compliance, actors are flexible to incorporate different perspectives 
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and refer to a specific point of view depending on the institutional context. This flexibility 
embodied in single actors to selectively apply a certain narrative dependent on the underlying 
context – together with the incorporation of dynamics over time – explains how actors can 
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Table 1: Overview of data 
Organization Type Organization Name Representative  Data Type 





Telephone interview, 3 Integrity Initia-
tive annual reports, Collective Action 
guide (with World Bank and others) 
Siemens, HQ Senior compliance 2 personal interviews, Telephone in-
terview, 5 Annual & Sustain. Reports, 
Compliance System publication 
Siemens, Philippines Senior sales Telephone interview 
Daimler, Greater China 
Ltd.  




Daimler, HQ 1 senior & 1 mid-
level compliance 
2 personal interviews 
Shell, Philippines Finance director Personal interview, presentation slides 
Companies 
SMART Technical Serv-
ices Co., Myanmar 
General manager Workshop presentation, presentation 
slides 
Singapore Compact (Local 
UNGC network) 
Senior Personal interview 
ASEAN CSR Network 
(ACN) 
2 program directors 3 personal interviews, publication 
Integrity Initiative, Philip-
pines  
1 from MBC & 1 
from ECCP 





Indonesian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, 
(KADIN BSD) 
Senior Personal interview, follow-up email 
correspondence 
Association of Southeast 




Personal interview Government 
CPIB, Singapore (Corrupt 
Practices Investigation 
Bureau) 
Former senior rep. Short conversation, workshop pres. 
UNODC (UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime), South-
east Asia and the Pacific 
Senior Personal interview, workshop pres. 
UNGC (Global Compact), 
Transparency & Anti-
Corruption 




Senior Several short conversations 
Transparency International 
(TI) Philippines 
Executive director Personal interview 
TI Malaysia 2 senior Personal interview 
IDEAS (Institute for De-





Personal interview, publication 
Thai Listed Companies 
Association 
President Personal interview 
TI Germany, Berlin Former rep. (Integ-
rity Pacts) 
Telephone interview, brochure 





Executive director 2 personal interviews 
Uni. of Nottingham, Ma-
laysia campus 
Professor Email correspondence Academia 
HTW Chur Professor Personal interview 
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Table 2: Sample quotes of selected narratives and story elements 
Narratives & 
Surface Stories 
Story elements Sample quotes 
Compliance despite non-achievement 
Complying with 
the rules 
“The public prosecutor’s office was investigating at our premises and, as a listed company at the New York Stock Ex-
change, of course the SEC as well. There was no choice.” (Siemens HQ, Switzerland) 
“[H]it by a lot of violation sanctions already, your controls have already matured to the point that you cannot afford any 
grey area in your policies.“ (ASEAN CSR Network (ACN)) 
Identifying clean 
business 
“Our intention is basically to identify good partners.“ (Siemens, ASEAN) 
“… we’ve hardly been, or not at all, into government entities. So mostly, the entities that we have been into … are 
mostly private firms, so it makes it easier for us (Siemens, Philippines) 
Substantive 
compliance 
Yes we can “We are a known brand. So yes, you could say it’s a market power, because Shell is a big player and we are known not 
to go into any under-the-table deals. (...) So, when we say no, they don’t insist. And we are still able to go through with 








“[W]e guys, we need to play fair, you local guys are not playing fair“ (ACN) 
“There are differences in the understanding of corruption and the tolerance level. … There are a sort of activities that 
are just - well - accepted.” (Daimler, Greater China, referring to China) 
“… at least the majority of European companies are doing their level best, on the same level. But you cannot say the 
same for the Koreans and the Japanese. We cannot see the same. (Siemens, ASEAN) 




„Do they think it is a bribe at all? … I think a lot of people will say, no, I don't give bribes, but I do look after my cli-
ents … And that's the question about how is it seen locally versus internationally.“ (TI, Malaysia) 
“How do you differentiate between professional activity and a personal activity?“ (Siemens, ASEAN)  
“Let's go into USA, America. It's very common that they get tips. If you want to have a nice dining table, you tip. If 
tips are a form of corruption, of petty corruption, how do you define that? … And what about the lobbyist system in 
America? … the difficulty that people have in actually uncovering who has given how much to which party when is 
symptomatic of the actual lack of transparency…“ (TI, Malaysia) 
“He [the government official] has not forced us down our throat. He was basically saying ‘please use … there is this 
partner, I recommend this person’. As long as he doesn’t put it to our head saying ‘if you don’t use him, you can’t do 
this’, I have no issues.“ (Siemens, ASEAN) 
 Managing per-
ception 
“It’s a game of perception. … certain governments are very good with containing such publicity and perception. They 
put in processes, they put in controls, but it doesn’t mean there are no bribery cases in Singapore.“ (Siemens, ASEAN) 
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 Complying with 
the rules but vio-
lating the princi-
ples 
“So you can work with the letter of the law, but leave out the spirit. So you can be 100% compliant, but no system is 
100% perfect. So you can deal with all the rules, and you can still bypass them at key points, and get what you want. 
And that is the difference between compliance and integrity.” (Business Integrity Programme Manager, TI Malaysia) 




“ … the agreement was [that] there is no ranking and in a way it also makes sense, because you cannot really compare 
apples and oranges, countries with very different backgrounds, … very different contexts.“ (UNODC, ASEAN) 
“I think at some circumstances because we are a big player because the problem with the smaller players is that ... if 
they say no now, there will be some repercussions later on, like things will be delayed or a permit will not be issued 






“It’s about the person who’s not earning so much and sees now someone’s giving me more. What would I do? I take 
that. So there’s so many different dimensions to it. Singapore government, basically, their administers are paid as much 
as a CEO of a company is paid.“ (Siemens, ASEAN) 
Getting others on 
board first 
“[O]ur first agenda is usually ... we get them on board, because once they do that ... then we have a clear framework to 
work with them. (...) to get them on board you need to use a system they are all open to.“ (UNODC, ASEAN) 






“Once they have actually ratified, they have obligations. (...) it also creates a momentum in countries to do it, because 
sometimes even the national authorities may want to do it, but they may not have the momentum or the support. ...“ 
(UNODC, ASEAN) 
“It’s the better approach actually (to) make people go back to their values, reflect on them ... It’s all ethical issues. 




“Some of these experiences and lessons learnt, … we also want to share with our JVs.“ (Daimler, Greater China) 
“I gave our contractors our hotline. I told them ‘if you think there is something you need to report, use this hotline or 
get in touch with your contract holder. … like I said earlier, be the example ...“ (Shell, Philippines) 





“In all areas there is a learning requirement. (…) the advanced companies, we are counting on these guys to really help 
us spread the word. (...) because of Siemens, we were able to access a resource that’s critical in fueling our efforts (In-
tegrity Initiative, Philippines) 
“He (Jericho Petilla, energy secretary, Philippines) says ‘we need the support from various sectors, in this case Sie-
mens’. And that I believe is one form of a vision also for a government to improve.” (Siemens, ASEAN) 
Leveling the Uniting actors “In this world, we are now 173 ships, (but) nowadays, we have to be one hundred and seventy three cabins in a big 
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and their thinking liner. And this is where we are working together. ... 173 countries moving around the ocean. We are really lost. (...) we 
can no longer become a ship, we are 173 cabins in one big ocean liner working together.” (TI, Malaysia) 
playing field  
Finding common 
grounds 
‘It is like a flowerbed, where it is uncertain which bulbs will bear fruit’ (Siemens HQ, Collective Action) 
“This is where we come in. We try to expose the deal in such a way that it is a level playing field. That’s why we are 
important here.“ (Integrity Initiative, Philippines) 
“We engaged the department of finance in coming up with a tax regulation saying that in order to prevent smuggling, ... 
why don’t you impose tax on all products and then if the company is able to prove that they re-exported it, then they 
get a refund on their tax.” (Shell, Philippines) 
Progress as achievement 




“These [collective action] processes take a lot of time” (Siemens HQ, Collective Action) 
“You are going to take baby steps with this topic.“ (Siemens, Philippines) 
“Most of us want to see success overnight, but you would not get this success of fighting corruption overnight. It takes 
some time“. (TI, Malaysia) 
Bearing fruit “No, actually his administration is bearing fruit” (Integrity Initiative, Philippines, referring to president Aquino) 
„ ... from where it was 10 years ago to where it is [now], there is change.“ (Siemens, ASEAN) 
“[T]he global discourse has changed a lot in the past 20 years. Corruption has become an issue that is discussed glob-
ally. There is much more awareness about it. (...) it’s not a taboo that it used to be.“ (UNODC, ASEAN) 
Progressing 
step-by-step 
Small steps are 
large steps 
“These changes happen in very small cycles but they are considered big changes.“ (Siemens, ASEAN) 
Ongoing effort 
demanding con-
stant recalibration  
“It means that you have to continuously do things. It’s not only about the laws you have to pass. You have to have sys-
tems in place. You have to have prevention systems in place. You have to be implementing those laws. You need to 
have institutions, which are capable of implementing all these normative frameworks. They need to have the capacity 
to do that and so on. (...) And these reforms I think it’s very naïve to think that you can pass these laws, and you can 
have an anti-corruption agency and everything, and you solved the corruption problem.” (UNODC, ASEAN) 
“… the weakness is that people take advantages. Or, it is that they find more loopholes existing in law and regulation. 
So you come back to the square one.” (TI, Malaysia) 
“I think it is very difficult in the area of anti-corruption to say that ever about any country: ... you are perfectly imple-





“Now, what ... [we] want to do with the ASEAN CSR Network is to create a regional network gradually; first with 
countries which are ready, but then bring all of them. And that has two purposes. One is to create another level of 
commitment among companies from the region …, to bring them all on the same level with their compliance system, to 
help coordinate, help exchange. But on the other hand, I also hope that they could bring more pressure on their gov-
ernments, demanding actions from the government.“ (ACN) 
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Table 3: Three theoretical perspectives on decoupling 
 The classic view The instrumental view The integrative view 
Decoupling 
description 
Gap between policy and 
practice (symbolic 
adoption) 
Gap between means and 
ends (symbolic imple-
mentation) 
Gap as moving target 














ligible; logic of confi-
dence and good faith 
Transparency and ac-
countability trend 
Meaning of compliance 
and achievement is re-
ciprocally typified 
Actors Passively responsive Actively responsive Interactive 
Space Local (mono-spatial) Global Multi-spatial 
Time Formerly static, increas-
ingly dynamic 









Meyer & Rowan, 1977, 
Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 
2008 
Bromley & Powell, 
2012; Wijen, 2014 
Christensen, Morsing & 






Figure 1: Data structure 
Narrative Surface Story Story Elements Focus 




Lacking awareness and/or wrong 
mindset 
HQ 
Complying with the rules HQ 
Identifying clean business HQ 
Substantive 
compliance 
Yes we can HQ 




Persistence of corruption and intranspar-
ent business elsewhere 
Sub 
Ambiguity of what actually counts as 
corruption  
Global  
Managing perception Global 
Compliance despite 
non-achievement 
No level playing 
field 
Complying with the rules but violating 
the principles 
HQ 
Highlighting others’ particularities Sub Acknowledging 
heterogeneity 
Perspective-taking Sub 





Gaining momentum and conditioning 
people’s minds 
Sub 
Leading by example HQ Educating 
Willingness to learn Sub 
Uniting actors and their thinking Global 
Collective Action  
Leveling the 
playing field  
Finding common grounds Global 
Allowing for time to progress (highlight-
ing dynamics) 
Global 
Bearing fruit Global 
Progressing 
step-by-step 
Small steps are large steps Global 







Gradually raising the bar Global 
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